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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NET OPERATING LOSS CARRYOVERS AND CORPORATE
ADJUSTMENTS: RETAINING AN ADVANTAGEOUS
TAX HISTORY UNDER LIBSON SHOPS AND
SECTIONS 269, 381, AND 382
FoR almost twenty years the financial pages of the New York Times and
other publications have been replete with advertisements offering to buy and
sell "loss corporations."' The phenomenon of rational businessmen seeking to
purchase corporations 2 that are, or have been, losing money can be ex-plained
by certain tax advantages available to corporations possessing an unsuccessful
financial history. Often the most important advantage is the corporation's
1. In 1943, an advertisement appeared in the New York Times: "For Sale. Stock
of corporation having 1943 tax loss deduction $120,000. Sole assets are W80,000 in cash and
equivalent" Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid Incmne or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of
the InternalRevenue Code, 58 HARv. L. Rv. 196 (1944). In February, 1960, the Neu' Yor:
Times carried the following: "Tax Loss Corporation deals arranged.' N.Y. Times, Feb.
7, 1960, § 3, p. 24, col. 1. "Loss Corporation for sale in retail discount or appliance field.
Sacrifice." Ibid. "We want to merge with or acquire a profitable company with competent
management-Our stock is listed on the American Stock Exchange. We have a sub-
stantial loss carry-forward but our operations are now decidedly profitable. We are
prepared to buy for cash or stock or both." Id. § 3, p. 11, col. 7. For general remarks
concerning loss corporation advertisements, see Harris, Acquisition of Loss Corporations
Under the New Revenue Code, 60 Cm. L.J. 72 (1955); Eldridge, Net Operating Loss
Carryovers i Corporate Acquisitions in 49 PRocrEINGs OF THE NA'r', TAX Ass'x 72,
73 (1957); Hearings Before the House Vays and Means Committce on Advisory Group
Recomneitdations on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 419 (1959) (statement of C. Rudolph Peterson, Esq.) [hereinafter cited as 1959
Hearings]; Hearings Before the House Ways and ieans Committee on General Revenue
Revision, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 2607 (1958) (remarks of Representative Wilbur
D. Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee) [hereinafter cited as
1958 Hearings].
As used in this Comment, the phrase 'loss corporation" refers primarily to a corporation
which has realized losses in earlier taxable years and which may, under INr. Rnv. CoDE oF
1954, § 172, be permitted to deduct all or part of those losses in subsequent taxable years.
[Hereinafter, citations to statutory sections refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
unless otherwise indicated.]
2. The simplest case of a "purchase of a corporation" would be a purchase of all its
stock. Because a corporation is ordinarily treated for tax and other purposes as an entity
separate from its shareholders, its .tax history is usually unaffected by changes in its
stock ownership. A so-called "tax-free" reorganization is a more sophisticated method
of "purchasing a corporation" since some, if not all, of its tax attributes are inherited
by the "purchaser."
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"net operating loss carryover"3 by which the corporate income tax payable
in a profitable year may be reduced or eliminated by averaging current profits
with losses of earlier years.4 Present section 172 5 provides that a net operating
3. The term "carryover" is used in § 172 to refer only to that portion of a "net operat-
ing loss which may be carried forward." See text accompanying note 8 infra. As employed
by this Comment, however, the term "carryover" will ordinarily include both carryforward
and carryback except where the context requires otherwise.
4. The importance of carryovers in mergers and other acquisitions since 1950 is de-
scribed in Tarleau, The Place of Tax Loss Positions in Corporate Acquisitions, in JOINT
COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84H CONG., IST SEss., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 610, 614-16 (1955), reprinted with minor modifications
as Difficulties Faced by Taxpayer Trying to Take Tax Advantage of a Loss Carryover,
4 J. TAXATION 91 (1956) ; 1958 Hearings 3104-08 (statement of Solomon Barkin, Director
of Research, Textile Workers Union of America) ; 1959 Hearings 876-77 (statement of
Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Director, Dep't of Research, AFL-CIO) ; id. 885, 887-88, 902-04
(statement of George E. Lent, Visiting Professor of Business Economics and Director
of Research, Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth College), re-
printed with minor revisions as Net Operating Loss Carryovers and Corporate Mergers,
11 THE TAX ExEculE 241 (1959).
From a purchaser's point of view, only the carryforward will have prospective sig-
nificance since an existing carryback gives rise to a refund of taxes paid in an earlier
year, see text accompanying note 7 infra, and is therefore the equivalent of cash. Of
course, if a corporation is purchased at the end of a taxable year after which a carryback
refund is claimed but not yet received, the price will be increased by the amount of the
expected refund discounted by the time interval before receipt and by the likelihood of
allowance of the carryback refund. See Tarleau, supra at 617.
5. While averaging has been a part of income tax law for many years, the length
of the period during which gains and losses are to be evened out has radically fluctuated.
The Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 1061, permitted net losses (as defined)
to be carried back one year and then forward one year. The Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136,
§ 204, 42 Stat. 231, eliminated the carryback but extended the carryforward to two years.
The Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 206, 43 Stat. 260; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §
206, 44 Stat. 17; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 117(b), 45 Stat. 825, reenacted the two
year carryforward. In the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 117(b), 47 Stat. 207, Congress
reduced the carryforward to one year, and in 1933, the National Industrial Recovery Act,
ch. 90, § 218(a), 48 Stat. 209 (1933), eliminated the carryover altogether. In 1938, a
limited carryforward was reintroduced. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, §§ 26(c), 27(c),
52 Stat. 467. In 1939, a two year carryforward similar to the pre-1932 carryover was
added. Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 211, 53 Stat. 867. This provision became § 122
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 153, 56 Stat.
847, added a two year carryback to the existing two year carryforward. The World War
II excess profits tax law, Act of Oct. 8, 1940, ch. 757, tit. II, 54 Stat. 975, as amended, 55
Stat. 17 (1941), applicable to the period from 1940-1945, similarly included a two year
carryback and two year carryforward of "unused excess profits credits." See generally
7A MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 42.01, 42.34 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
MERTENS]. The most drastic revision of income tax carryovers occurred in 1950, when
the carryback was reduced to one year but the carryforward extended to five years.
Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 215, 64 Stat. 937. On these early averaging provisions,
see generally 5 MERTENS § 29.01. The same averaging period was utilized in the Excess
Profits Tax Act of 1950 (Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 432(c)), 64 Stat. 1139 (1951),
applicable to the period from 1951-1954, providing for carryovers of unused excess profits
credits. See generally 7A MERTENS § 42.34. The 1954 Code retained the five year carry-
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loss (roughly, the excess of deductions over gross income)0 can be "carried
back" to the third year preceding the loss and offset against taxable income
of that year.7 Thus, a loss in 1960 is carried back to 1957, and the taxpayer
gets a refund equal to the difference between the tax paid in 1957 and the
amount which would have been paid had the loss been sustained in that year.
If the 1960 loss is not exhausted, the unused portion is applied against 1958
income in the same way, and then against 1959 income. If this three-year
carryback does not absorb the entire loss, the unused portion can be carried
forward to 1961; loss not absorbed by 1961 taxable income may be carried
forward year by year for four more years.8 Thus, a corporation with a large
carryforward may earn tax free profits for a maximum of five years.0
Of course, the carryforward can be used only if the corporation produces
profits against which the loss can be offset. If the corporation does not antici-
forward of net operating losses and extended the carryback to two years. Lrr. Rnv CoDs
oF 1954, § 172(b) (1), and the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1678,
further extended the carryback to three years.
The carryover provisions are not limited to corporate taxpayers but also apply to indi-
viduals. For the computation of net operating losses of taxpayers other than corporations,
see Treas. Reg. § 1.172-3 (1956) ; 5 MEmTNs § 29.02(b). Trusts and estates are also
permitted to carry over net operating losses. § 642(d). The computation of a trust's net
operating loss is, with certain minor exceptions, see Treas. Reg. § 1.642(d)-l (1956),
identical with computation of an individual's loss.
6. The 1954 Code radically altered the definition of net operating loss. Formerly,
only so-called "economic losses" could be carried over. A corporation's economic loss was
determined by reducing the excess of deductions over gross income by the portion of
dividends untaxed by virtue of the predecessor of § 243, the excess of percentage over
cost depletion, interest on certain governmental obligations excluded from gross income
under the predecessor of § 103, and certain other deductions and exclusions. Section 172
of the 1954 Code adopts the "taxable-income' approach and does not, with two minor
exceptions, see § 172(d) (5), require that the loss be reduced by nontaxable receipts. For
arguments for and against both approaches see Treas. Dept. & Joint Comm. on Int.
Rev. Taxation, Business-Loss Offsets, reprinted in Hearings Before the Housc Corn-
inittee on Ways and Mems on Revenue Revisions, 1947-48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at
3783, 3787-88 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Business Loss Offsets].
On the computation of the net operating loss carryovers, see generally Graichen, The
Net Operating Loss, N.Y.U. 16TH INsT. ox Fun. TAX. 865 (1953); 5 MERT.ns §§ 29.02a,
29.08.
7. A net operating loss must, under § 172(b) (2), be carried back to the earliest year
permitted, siz., the third year preceding the year in which the loss is sustained. Certain
adjustments to taxable income of the carryback year are required by §§ 172(b) (2) (A)-
(B) to eliminate possible double deductions and to take account of carrybacks from suc-
cessive loss years.
8. The adjustments to taxable income of carryforward years are the same as those
required in the case of carrybacks. See notes 6, 7 supra.
9. The value of a carryforward to a corporation is apparent. If a corporation has
a net operating loss in 1960 of $200,000, and that corporation has, in the aggregate, $100,000
taxable income for the preceding three taxable years, $100,000 of the 1960 loss must be
carried back. But $100,000 will remain unabsorbed. This potential deduction, if availed
of, will result in a maximum of $52,000 of tax saving over a maximum of five years. The
current value of a carryforward will depend, inter alla, on the expected tax bracket of
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pate an improvement in its own business, it may attempt to acquire income
producing property by purchase, merger, or other combinative technique.
Alternatively, its shareholders may sell their stock to others who can make
use of the carryforward-for example, to investors who plan to pour a profit-
able enterprise into the loss corporation and use its carryforward to offset
future profits.' 0
But Congress, the courts, and the Internal Revenue Service have raised
barriers to the use of a loss carryover when its use was thought to be incon-
sistent with policies underlying the loss carryover deduction. Three justifica-
tions ,have been most often advanced for loss offsets." Averaging gains and
losses seems "equitable" since it places taxpayers with fluctuating income in
roughly the same position as those whose income is stable.12 Further, the carry-
the corporation (surtax or normal), the expected delay before the carryforward is de-
ducted, and the likelihood of future profits. For discussion of the factors involved in
pricing a carryover, see 1959 Hearings 840-41 (statement of Bernard Wolfman, Esq.).
The premium has been reported to be approximately 200 of the total carryover. See,
e.g., id. at 840 (statement of Bernard Wolfman, Esq.) (10-30%) ; id. at 904 (statement
of George E. Lent) (10-15 cents on the dollar of tax loss) ; Cuddihy, Tax, Legal and
Practical Considerations in Acquisition of a Lass Corporation, U. So. CAL. 1958 TAX
INST. 303 (20-25%) ; Ekman, Purchase of Loss Corporations, Sections 269 and 382; Carry-
overs, Secticon 381, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 742-43 n2 (1957) (25%).
10. Pooling of income and losses of several corporations may also be effectuated
by affiliation and filing of consolidated returns. The various advantages and disadvantages
of this method of pooling income and losses in a single year and over several years arc
beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally PEEL, CoNsommDAT TAX RmiTRNS
(1959) ; 8 MERTENS, §§ 46.01-.61; Hellerstein, Consolidated Federal Income Tax Returns,
Am. U. 5TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 415 (1953); Cuddihy, Consolidated Returns, N.Y.U.
16TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 351 (1958).
11. Most commentators have favored one of the many variations of averaging which
have, to date, been suggested. See Steger, Averaging Income for Income Tax Purposes,
in 1 COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE SUBMITTED TO THE HousE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS IN CONNECTION WITH THE PANEL DIscussIoNs
ON THE SAME SUBJECT BEGrNNING ON NOVEMBER 16, 1959, at 589, 599-610 (describ-
ing "all possible averaging devices"), 607-10 (describing various proposals recom-
mended over the years and their particular advocates). But the approbation of averaging
of gains and losses has not been unanimous. It has been suggested that loss carryovers
"foment strikes, because industry can afford them," see Lasser, Loss Carryovers Under
the Internal Revenue Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 50, 71 (1947). Moreover, carryovers
are sometimes said to encourage corporate combinations in contravention of general anti-
trust policies. See Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes and Realism, 71 HARV. L. Rnv. 254, 255
(1957); Simons, Comment on Tax Provisions Which Promote Concentration in TAX
INSTITUTE, TAXATION AND BusINESs CONCENTRATION 78, 79 (1950). But sec BuTrims,
LINTNER & CARY, EFm cTs OF TAXATION: CORPORATE MERGERs 17, 18-19 (1951); Wynn,
Relation of Carry-Forward and Carry-Back Provisions to Business Concentration in
TAX INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra at 69, 75, 77. Additionally, carryovers have been criticized
on the ground that they encourage liquidation of unprofitable enterprises thereby contribut-
ing to unemployment See 1958 Hearings 3102, 3111-12 (statement of Solomon Barkin).
12. This rationale derives from a comparison of the tax burden on a corporation with
$50,000 taxable income in each of two successive years, with the total tax liability of a
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forward encourages investment in new businesses since losses which may occur
in early years can be offset against later profits ;13 similarly, both carryforw%ards
and carrybacks foster investment in established business with irregular
profits.14 Finally, averaging is claimed to ameliorate the effects of business
cycles, for carryovers may result in immediate refunds during recessions and
encourage expenditures during such periods. 1 These policies are sometimes
thought inapplicable when the corporate taxpayer claiming the deduction
seems significantly different from the taxpayer which sustained the loss, either
because the jural entity has changed or because beneficial ownership of the
corporation which has $200,000 taxable income in one year and "net operating loss" of
$100,000 in the next year. Over the two year period both corporations have "earned"
$100,000, but %ithout averaging, the tax burden on the two-year operation of each is quite
disparate. The corporation with stable income will pay $20,500 in each year, the corpora-
tion whose income fluctuates will pay $98,500 in the one profitable year. With a loss
carryback, however, this corporation will receive a refund of $52,000. The disparity
between the total tax paid by the corporation whose income is stable ($41,000) and the
tax paid by the corporation after the carryback ($46,500) obtains because of the "step"
in the rates applicable to corporations. See §§ 11(b)-(c). On equity as justification for
averaging, see S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1918) ("[strict annual account-
ing] does not adequately recognize the exigencies of business, and under our present high
rates of taxation, may often result in grave injustice"); H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939), reprinted in 1939-2 Cutz. BuL. 504, 508, 510; Business Loss Offsets
3784; Beck, Carryover of Business Losses, 6 NAi'L -TAX J. 69-70 (1953).
13. See Business Loss Offsets 3784; H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939),
reprinted in 1939-2 Cums. BuL.. 504, 510-11 ("It is ... believed that the allowance of a
net operating business loss carry-over will... stimulate new enterprises"); Beck, supra
note 12, at 85.
14. See Business Loss Offsets 3784 ("Without loss offsets, investments in assets with
less risk of loss are favored over those in which the risk may be greater ... Investments
in such assets and ventures may be particularly desirable in the economy...."); Beck, supro
note 12, at 80-82.
15. See Busiess Loss Offsets 3784; Beck, supra note 12, at 81-84; Raum, Carry-
overs and Carry-backs in Connection With the Liquidation or Sale of a Business, 49
COLum. L. REv. 48, 50 n.10 (1949) (suggesting that abolition of averaging during the
depression, see note 5 supra, may have been erroneous because of the loss of its counter-
cyclical effect).
An additional historical purpose served by carrybacks has been to facilitate the transi-
tion after World War II from war to peacetime production. "The carry-backs... were
enacted as a partial answer to the demand for reconversion reserves and were intended,
at least to a certain extent, to take care of the difficult problem of allocating war-caused
postwar expenditures against wartime income as well as to serve as an averaging device."
Raum, supra at 53. And the original carryover provision, § 204(a) of the Revenue Act
of 1918, seems, at least partially, to have been intended to assist recovery after World War
I. That section permitted a carryback not only of loss resulting from "the operation
of any business regularly carried on by the taxpayer" but also loss resulting from "the
bona fide sale by the taxpayer of plant, buildings, machinery, equipment or other facilities,
constructed, installed or acquired by the taxpayer ... for the production of articles con-
tributing to the prosecution of the present war..." Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 204(a),
40 Stat. 1061 (1919).
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corporation has been transferred.' 6 Similarly, the propriety of offsetting losses
sustained by one kind of business against income from another has been ques-
tioned, even if the entity and ownership remain the same.17 Partly in response
to objections of this sort, Congress attempted, in 1943, to restrict the use of
carryovers.' 8 The 1954 Code introduced a more elaborate statutory pattern. 1
Prior to both Congressional enactments, the Internal Revenue Service had,
without specific statutory authority, attempted to restrict use of carryovers
in certain circumstances, 20 and the courts had established doctrines which
may still be viable under the 1954 Code.21 Although the 1954 Code includes
an intricate scheme regulating the allowance and disallowance of loss carry-
overs, it does not apply to all corporate adjustments. This Comment will re-
view the prior law and the changes made by the 1954 Code. It will then discuss
a series of 'hypothetical transactions, illustrating the effect of the statutory
and common law of carryovers upon specific corporate adjustments.
16. See, e.g., 1958 Hearings 3104, 3113 (statement of Solomon Barkin) ; 1959 Hear-
ings 817 (remarks of Chairman Wilbur D. Mills) ; But see id. at 890, 894, 914 (statement
of George E. Lent) ; Tarleau, supra note 4, at 619; Cuddihy, supra note 9, at 309.
17. See, e.g., 1959 Hearings 890, 892, 898, 910, 911-12, 913-14 (statement of George
E. Lent) ; id. at 878 (statement of Stanley H. Ruttenberg) ; 1958 Hearings 3114 (state-
ment of Solomon Barkin) ; cf. Westover Co. v. Smyth, 43 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1283, 1286-87
(N.D. Cal. 1951) (dictum). But see 1959 Hearings 774, 777 (statement of Crane Hauser,
Esq.) ; Surrey, Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Shareholdcrs: American Lazt
Instititte Tax Project, 14 TAX L. REv. 1, 36-37 (1958) ; Tarlau, supra note 4, at 619;
Cuddihy, supra note 9, at 308.
For discussion of various factors considered a source of limitation on corporate loss
carryovers, see ALI, INcomxa TAX PRoBuMs OF CORPOaTIONS AND SHAREnOLDERS 341-48
(1958) ; Surrey, supra at 27.
Arguments favoring free transferability of loss carryovers have occasionally been
voiced by commentators, but Libson forecloses acceptance of such a doctrine without
legislative action. For the arguments for free transferability, see Tarleau, supra note 4;
Cuddihy, supra note 9, at 309. For arguments contra, see Eldridge, supra note 1, at 86-89.
18. This section, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 129, was directed not only at felt abuses
of loss carryovers but also, perhaps primarily, at manipulation of excess profits credits.
See H.R. RE. No. 871, 78th Cong., ist Sess. (1943), reprinted in 1944 Cum. BULL. 901,
.919-20, 938-39; S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), reprinted in 1944 CuM.
BULL. 973, 993-94, 1016-18. For discussion of this legislative history and contemporaneous
interpretation of § 129, see Rudick, supra note 1; Chase, An Analysis of Section 129, of
the Internal Revenue Code, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 421 (1945) ; Barnard, Acquisitions for Tax
Benefit, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 36 (1946). Section 129 was reenacted, with certain minor
changes, as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 269. See text accompanying notes 134-61 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 156-304 infra.
20. Several early rulings strictly construed the carryover sections of the statutes.
See, e.g., A.R.R. 1597, 1I-1 Cum. BULL. 33 (1923) (Revenue Act of 1918, § 204, did not
permit carryback of corporation's loss against predecessor proprietorship's income of
preceding taxable year) ; I.T. 1562, 1I-1 Cum. BULL. 33 (1923) (Revenue Act of 1921,
§ 204, did not permit carryover of decedent's loss to the first taxable year of his estate) ; I.T.
2094, 111-2 Cum. BULL. 43 (1924) (loss sustained by foreign corporation's branch office
could not be carried over against income of domestic wholly-owned subsidiary formed
to acquire and operate branch office).
21. These doctrines are discussed in the text accompanying notes 22-133 infra.
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THE "CommoN LAvw" OF Loss CRYovERs
The New Colonial Doctrine
Prior to 1943, the effect of a corporate change upon the availability of
a loss carryover was determined solely by the courts and the Internal Revenue
Service. Limitation on use of this device could be found only in the words of
the predecessors of section 172 which allowed "the taxpayer" to carry over
his net operating losses.22 The Service took the position that "the taxpayer"
was the corporate entity, and not its shareholders. Thus, if the corporation
which claimed the deduction was operating under a different charter from the
corporation which sustained the loss, the carryover was disallowed even though
the shareholders and business remained as they were before the change in
charter2 3 The entity theory received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court
22. The operative portion of all the carryover sections prior to the 1954 Code used
substantially the same phraseology. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1924, cI. 234, § 206(b),
43 Stat 260 ("If, for any taxable year, it appears... that any taxpayer has sustained a net
loss, the amount thereof shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the net income "i
the taxpayer for the succeeding taxable year." [emphasis added]); Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 122(b) (1), added by ch. 619, § 153, 56 Stat 847 (1942) ("If for any taxable
year... the taxpayer has a net operating loss ... ." [emphasis added]) ; Excess Profits
Tax Act of 1940, § 710(c) (3) (A), added by ch. 619, § 204, 56 Stat. 900 (1942) ("If for
any taxable year... the taxpayer has an unused excess profits credit . . ." [emphasis
added]); Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950, § 432(c) (1), ch. 1199, 64 Stat 1139 (1951).
The issue, therefore, in the rulings and the litigated cases centered on the meaning of
"the taxpayer:'
23. See Athol Mfg. Co., 22 B.T.A. 105, aff'd, 54 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1931) (rein-
corporation in the same state); West Point Marion Coal Co., 19 B.T.A. 945 (1930)
(same); I.T. 2554, X-1 Cusm. Buu.- 162 (1931) (same); The Maytag Co., 17 B.T.A. 182
(1929) (reincorporation in different state); Plumber's Supply Co., 20 B.T.A. 459 (1930)
(same); G.C.M. 13073, XIII-1 Cum. BuLL. 134 (1934) (same); White House Milk Co.,
2 B.T.A. 860 (1925) (sale of assets); Brandon Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 762 (4th
Cir. 1934) (consolidation pursuant to state statute) ; Manufacturers Trust Co., 23 B.T.A.
1260 (1933) ("merger or consolidation" of two banks pursuant to federal statute);
Overbrook Nat'l Bank, 23 B.T.A. 1390 (1931) (merger or consolidation of two state
banks; taxpayer operating under a federal charter obtained after amalgamation) ; Stand-
ard Silica Co., 22 B.T.A. 97 (1931) (consolidation pursuant to state statute); Swedish
Iron & Steel Corp. v. Edwards, 1 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) (alternative holding)
(same); Clark Dredging Co., 23 B.T.A. 503 (1931), aff'd on other grounds, 63 F2d 527
(5th Cir. 1933) (creditor's reorganization by formation of, and transfer of all assets to,
taxpayer) ; Elliott-Granite Linen Corp., 26 B.T.A. 936 (1932) ("tax-free" reorganiza-
tion); Hartford-Empire Co., 26 B.T.A. 134 (1932) (same); Farmers Cotton Oil Co., 27
B.T.A. 105 (1932) (dictum) (same); cf. Phillip C. Donner, 16 B.T.A. 758 (1929)
(transfer to, and continuation of, loss corporation's business by partnership); Jones v.
Noble Drilling Co., 135 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1943) (dividends paid carryover); .Marion-
Reserve Power Co., 1 T.C. 513 (1943) (same); Planters Cotton Oil Co. v. Hopldns, 286
U.S. 332 (1932) (wholly owned corporations not permitted to carryover losses of joint
stock associations wholly owned by same individuals even though consolidated return
filed in carryover year). Contra, Industrial Cotton Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 61 F2d
291 (4th Cir. 1932) (on demand of creditors, newly organized holding company took over
all stock of loss corporation; taxpayer, a corporation resulting from upstream "merger"
into holding company permitted to carry over operating company's losses).
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in the 1934 case of New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering.24 A corporation in
financial difficulties transferred its assets to a newly organized corporation,
in exchange for the new corporation's stock. This stock was then distributed
to the old corporation's stockholders in exchange for the old stock.25 The
creditors, capital structure, and business of both corporations were substantially
the same, and both were incorporated under New York law. New Colonial
sought to apply its predecessor's losses against its own income. The Supreme
Court disallowed the deduction noting that the two corporations were "not
identical but distinct. ' 2 In statutory terms the corporation which sought to
apply the losses was not "the taxpayer" which had sustained the loss '2 7 Sub-
sequent cases, using the New Colonial doctrine, denied carryforwards to suc-
cessor corporations after mergers,28 consolidations, 29 creditors' reorganiza-
tions,30 and reincorporations in the same 3 1 or different states.5a2 While no
24. 292 U.S. 435 (1934). The taxable years involved were 1922 and 1923 which were
governed by the Revenue Act of 1921, § 204(b). When the case reached the Supreme
Court, the lower courts were almost unanimous, see note 23 mipra, in holding that a change
in corporate charter was fatal. Except for Industrial Cotton Mills Co. v. Commissioner,
note 23 supra, the taxpayer's argument was based primarily upon broad statements in cases
involving tax attributes other than loss carryovers, e.g., Pioneer Pole & Shaft Co. v.
Commissioner, 55 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1932) (good will as invested capital); H. H. Miller
Industries Co. v. Commissioner, 61 F2d 412 (6th Cir. 1932) (basis of assets); Phillips
v. Lyman H. Howe Films Co., 33 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1929) (waiver of statute of limita-
tions) ; see Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, pp. 10-19, New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 435 (1934).
25. Actually only preferred stock and voting trust certificates were received by the
old shareholders at the time of the transfer of assets. All the common stock of the new
company, after the transfer of assets, was delivered to voting trustees, the majority of
which were selected by the old company's creditors. This trust terminated in 1927 after
the new company became profitable. See Record, pp. 11-14, New Colonial Ice Co. v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
26. 292 U.S. at 441.
27. The last paragraph of the opinion expressed disapproval of three of the cases
cited by the taxpayer, Pioneer Pole, Industrial Cotton Mills and H. H. Miller Industries,
and at the same time approved the result in Athol Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d
230 (1st Cir. 1931) (carryover disallowed after reincorporation in the same state).
28. See J. M. Smucker Co. v. Keystone Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa.
1935), aff'd per curian sub nomn. Franklin v. United States, 83 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1936);
Pennsylvania Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F2d 719 (3d Cir. 1935).
29. See National Bank of the Republic, 31 B.T.A. 680 (1934) (consolidation of two
banks pursuant to federal statute); Brandon Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 762 (4th
Cir. 1934) (consolidation of three corporations pursuant to state law).
30. See Follansbee Steel Corp. v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 635 (W.D. Pa. 1953)
(§ 77B reorganization).
31. See Weber Flour Mills v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1936) (corporate
charter had expired for failure to pay license fees) ; California Barrel Co. v. Commissioner.
81 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1936) (California Supreme Court had held that par value of pre-
ferred and common must be the same; Secretary of State refused to allow loss corporation
to amend its articles in incorporation; taxpayer organized to comply with par value re-
quirement).
32. See General Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 85 F,2d 846 (3d Cir. 1936) (Delaware
corporation doing no business outside Pennsylvania "domesticated" in Pennsylvania);
1208 [Vol. 69:1201
NET OPERATING LOSS CARRYOVERS
early cases decided the point, the entity approach would also seem to have
barred any carryback of losses sustained after the combination of two corpora-
tions against income of a legal entity whose existence was terminated.3
The Service's reliance on the entity concept backfired in Alprosa Watch
Corp.34 There, a partnership, engaged in the business of importing watches,
purchased the stock of a corporation manufacturing gloves. At the time of
the sale, the glove corporation had a large loss in the early months of the
taxable year and a loss carryforward from a prior year.as Shortly after the
May Oil Burner Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F2d 644 (4th Cir. 1934); McLaughlin v.
Purity Inv. Co., 75 F2d 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 753 (1935) ; Shreveport
Prod. & Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 972 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 616
(1934).
33. Except for the one year carryback briefly permitted by the Revenue Act of 1918,
§ 204, the statutes did not include any carryback provisions until 1942. Several recent
cases, relying on New Colonial, have, however, disallowed carrybacks to profitable tax-
able years of different entities. See Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F2d 330
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951); Donohue v. United States, 112 F. Supp.
660 (E.D. Mo. 1953), 67 H.A v. L. REv. 724 (1954) ; Eleanor H. Vendig, 22 T.C. 1127,
1132 (1954), re'd on other grounds, 229 F.2d 93 (2d Cr. 1956).
34. 11 T.C. 240 (1948). Although Alprosa is the most frequently cited of a line of
Tax Court cases reaching similar results, the Tax Court's rigid entity approach vas
foreshadowed in an earlier case, Northway Securities Co., 23 B.T.A. 532 (1931), acq.
X-2 Cum. B=.. 52 (1931) (manufacturing losses offset against investment income).
35. The glove corporation had, for the first eleven months of the taxable year, an
excess of deductions over income of roughly $26,000, and a loss carryover of $935. It
also had an "unused excess profits credit" of some $4000. The Commissioner sought
to disallow all three of these tax attributes.
Since many litigated cases involve only carryovers of unused excess profits credits,
some explanation of the similarity of their function and operation to net operating loss
carryovers is in order. The World War II excess profits tax was a tax on corporate profits
designed to recoup for the Government the increment in earnings attributable to the war.
To determine "excess profits," a corporation's total excess profits income was ascertained
(this roughly corresponded to the present computation of taxable income); from this
figure, "normal profits" (the "excess profits credit") were subtracted. The difference
between the total excess profits income and the excess profits credit was "excess profits net
income" against which the excess profits tax rate was applied. The statute provided for a
two year carryforward and two year carryback of so-called "unused credits" in an effort
to reduce the undesirable effect of the prohibitive tax rate on corporations with fluctuat-
ing income. Thus, an unused excess profits credit, like a loss carryover, became valu-
able since future excess profits over a maximum of two years could be earned tax free.
By virtue of the comparable operation of both tax attributes, and the equivalence of the
statutory language, see note 22 supra, cases involving only unused excess profits credits
are persuasive in interpretation of the loss carryover sections of the statute. Courts have
generally so held. See, e.g., Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957) (loss
carryovers at issue, Court approved and disapproved excess profits tax cases without
distinction).
In at least one respect, the unused excess profits carryback differed from loss carry-
backs. The credit was applicable to each taxable year whether or not the corporation
had any excess profits income and whether or not any effort was made to earn any.
Thus corporations which ceased business altogether attempted to claim the benefit of
the carryback of the unused credits during the period of inactivity. To thwart such
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sale, all the glove manufacturing machinery was sold to the prior owners, the
corporation's name was changed to the Alprosa Watch Corporation, and the
location of the business was changed. Thereafter it was engaged solely in the
business of selling watches and other jewelry. In validating Alprosa's de-
duction of the early months' loss and the carryforward the Tax Court alterna-
tively held that, since the corporate entity had not changed, the radical change
in ownership and in the nature of the corporation's business would not prevent
utilization of the corporation's favorable tax history.3
Under the strict entity theory, survival of a corporation's tax attributes
depended solely upon the form of the transaction. Thus, if A Corporation had
a loss carryover, and merged into B Corporation, B would have been denied
any deduction for A's premerger loss even though A's business (which pro-
duced the loss) had been continued by B and had become profitable 1 The
same result would have obtained if A and B had consolidated into C Cor-
poration. But if B Corporation 'had merged into A Corporation, A's premerger
loss would have been deductible even if A's premerger activities had been discon-
tinued.8  Similarly, if A Corporation conducted two businesses one of which was
unprofitable, a net operating loss presumably could have been carried forward
by A even if it transferred the loss business to a newly formed subsidiary, Z.
But if A were to split up, so that one of its businesses was carried on by X,
and the other by Y, A's liquidation would result in a loss of the carryover.
techniques, the de facto dissolution doctrine was devised, to deny a carryback of unused
credits from a period in which a liquidation was unreasonably prolonged. See Wier
Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1949); American
Well & Prospecting Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F2d 934, 938 nn.8-10 (3d Cir.), ccrt.
denied, 352 U.S. 840 (1956) (citing cases).
The Commissioner's attempts to extend the doctrine to loss carryovers were generally
unsuccessful. See Acampo Winery & Distilleries, Inc., 7 T.C. 629 (1946), acq., 1949-1
Cr. BULL. 1; Gorman Lumber Sales Co., 12 T.C. 1184 (1949), acq., 1949-2 CuMAi. BULL.
2; Oahu Beach & Country Homes, Inc., 17 T.C. 1472 (1952). But see Justice Motor Corp.
v. McGowan, 97 F. Supp. 570 (W.D.N.Y. 1951) (implying that unreasonable delay in
liquidation would deny carryback of net operating losses). The impropriety of applying
the de facto dissolution doctrine to loss carrybacks of single corporations is discussed in
Raum, note 15 supra, at 54-61. For a recent attempt to employ the doctrine to disallow
loss carryovers in the consolidated return context, see Joseph Weidenhoff, 32 T.C. No.
120 (Sept. 23, 1959).
36. Apparently because the most important tax benefit at issue was the loss in the
early months of the taxable year, the Government's main argument was that control of
the corporation had been acquired for a tax avoidance purpose. Its theory was that q
129, enacted in 1943 but inapplicable to taxable year involved in the case, codified existing
law and therefore, even without § 129, the Commissioner had the power to disallow
corporate deductions after control of a corporation had been acquired solely for a tax
avoidance purpose. Answering this argument, the court found that tax avoidance was
not the principal purpose of acquiring control. 11 T.C. at 244-45.
37. See cases cited in notes 23, 28-32 supra.
38. WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952), acq., 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 6; see A. B. & Con-
tainer Corp., 14 T.C. 842 (1950), acq., 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 1; cf. Alprosa Watch Corp.,
11 T.C. 240 (1948).
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On the other hand, the entity theory would not bar a carryover if the loss
corporation discontinued its losing venture and entered a profitable line of
business, no matter how radically different ;39 nor did it stand in the way of
using the carryover if the stock of the corporation changed hands, so long
as the corporate shell was not altered. Thus under the formalism of the entity
theory, a loss carryforward could be preserved in most instances, since the
techniques of combining or dividing enterprises were ordinarily flexdble enough
to permit the survival of the loss corporation-the touchstone of the carry-
over's continued viability. The theory penalized only poorly advised taxpayers
and those who for nontax reasons found it necessary to extinguish the loss
entity.
Stanton Brewery
New Colonial remained inviolate until the case of Stanton Brewery, Itc. v.
Commissioner in 1949.41 There, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a parent holding company which survived a statutory merger with
its wholly owned operating subsidiary was the same taxpayer as the corpora-
39. See Northway Sec. Co., 23 B.T.A. 532 (1931), acq., X-2 Cum,. BuLL. 52 (1931) ;
Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948); WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952), acq.,
1954-2 Cum. Buz. 6.
40. This occurred, for example, because several states prohibited reorganization
of railroads (in the bankruptcy sense) under the same corporate charter. Other states,
however, did not require the formation of a "new" corporation. As a result, the House,
in 1945, passed H.R. 3633, which, in substance, provided that railroads which were re-
organized under a new charter could carryover both net operating losses and unused
excess profits credits of the prereorganization corporation. See H.R. RE. No. 849, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1945). The measure was deleted by the Senate Finance Committee.
In 1947, however, P.L. 189, Act of July 15, 1947, ch. 249, 61 Stat. 324, essentially the
same as the earlier H.R. 3633, passed both Houses. The statute applied to successors in
reorganizations occurring after 1939 and before 1950, and, according to H.R. REP. No.
624, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947), was thought to affect only seven railroads. Oa the
floor of the House the measure was justified on the ground that railroads which come out
of reorganization under a different charter "are not a different company. It is the same
management, the same roadbed and equipment, and the same employees." 93 Co.NG. Rc.
7568 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Jenkins, of Ohio). Regulations implementing the bill
were issued. T.D. 5642, 1948-2 Cu. Buu. 70. P.L. 189 certainly indicated Congres-
sional recognition, if not approval, of the New Colonial doctrine, and was, therefore fre-
quently used by the Government in argument. Sometimes the courts were impressed.
see, e.g., Donohue v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 660 (E.D. Mo. 1953), at other times
they were not, see, e.g., Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 572, 577
(2d Cir. 1949); Koppers Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. ', 32-34, 134 F. Supp. 290,
297 (1955), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957). For the proposition that, even without
P.L. 189, railroads reorganized under a new charter could have carried forward net
operating losses and unused excess profits credits of their predecessors, see Wabash R.R.
v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 226 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
41. 176 F2d 573 (2d Cir. 1949) (Clark, J.), 63 HA.v. L. REv. 897 (1950), 2 STA'.
L. R v. 422 (1950). Prior to 1949, only one aberrational case, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Becker, 27 Am. Fed. Tax IL 1026, 1032 (E.D. Mo. 1940), re-iJd on other grounds, 120 F.2d
403 (8th Cir. 1941), permitted a separately chartered corporation to deduct a loss of its
predecessor.
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tion which disappeared. 42 The court thought its decision would "accord the
privileges of the carryover provisions to what is essentially a continuing enter-
prise, entitled to all their benefits in ameliorating otherwise harsh tax con-
sequences of fluctuating profits or expanding business. '43 But the court did
not feel secure in resting its decision solely on policy grounds.44 It apparently
believed that New Colonial was inapplicable because the transfer of assets in
New Colonial -was voluntary whereas the Stanton combination was consummated
in accordance with a state merger statute which transferred "by operation
of law" the rights and obligations of the disappearing corporation.46 This
42. The tax attribute at issue was an unused excess profits credit, see note 35 su pra,
of the subsidiary corporation which, pursuant to New York law, was "merged" into it'.
parent. The court, purporting to rest its decision on "business realities," 176 F.2d at 575,
refused to decide "which legal entity swallowed the other," id. at 574. Apparently, however,
the Commissioner conceded that if the subsidiary had been the survivor, the carryover
would not have been questioned.
43. Id. at 577.
44. While not altogether clear, Stanton Brewery seems to rest on two other grounds,
First, since the relevant statute, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 710(c) (3) (B), permitting the
carryover, spoke in terms of "the taxpayer," the court looked to the definition of that
term. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3797(a) (14) defined "taxpayer" as any "person subject
to a tax imposed by this title," and § 3797(a) (1) defined "person" to include "corpora-
tion." Then, the court found that the Stanton Brewery, Inc., would be primarily liable,
rather than secondarily liable as transferee, for taxes owed by its component subsidiary.
Equating "subject to a tax" with "primarily liable for," the court found the resultant
corporation the same taxpayer as its component whose credit it sought to utilize. Secondly,
in response to the Government's argument that prior cases permitting the deduction of
unamortized bond discount on obligations of predecessor corporation were distinguishable
on the theory that the deduction for the loss was not transferred but the loss would in
fact be sustained by the resultant corporation when the bonds were paid at maturity, the
court found that the resulting corporation, Stanton Brewery, Inc., was a "union of com-
ponent corporations into an all-embracing whole which absorbs the rights and privileges,
as well as the obligations, of its constituents," 176 F.2d at 575. (Emphasis added.) For
this proposition the court relied upon the Supreme Court's metaphoric expression in
Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 306 U.S. 522, 529 (1939), that in a merger,
"the corporate personality of the transferor is drowned in that of the transferee." That
case, according to Judge Clark, permitted a successor to deduct bond discount on obliga-
tions of a predecessor on the theory expressed in the metaphor, rather than on the theory
that the loss was incurred upon payment at maturity.
45. "[A]IIl the cases cited in [support of the proposition that carryovers do not survive
a change in entity] . . . and independently stressed by respondent, [including New
Colonial], deal with succession by purchase and contract, rather than by operation of law."
176 F.2d at 576. Some later cases seemingly have relied upon this distinction, see, e.g.,
Koppers Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 22, 31, 134 F. Supp. 290, 296 (1955),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957), while others have found that the corporate existence
of -the absorbed corporation was not terminated by the merger but continued as part of
the transferee, relying in part upon the language of the state merger statute or decisions
of the state courts in merger cases. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Commissioner, 227
F.2d 699, 703-04 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1955); Old Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 639
(7th Cir. 1958).
In view of the importance of New Colonial to the result in almost every prior case,
it is interesting to note that the only citation by Judge Clark of New Colonial appears
in the statement of the Government's argument.
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basis of the holding narrowed the future applicability of the decision to "oper-
ation of law" mergers.46 Moreover, since the parent-subsidiary merger effected
no shift in the shareholders' economic interest and since the business of the
corporation remained the same,47 the decision might not apply if either owner-
ship or business were altered. The Stanton rationale was applied to a loss
carryback in the First Circuit decision of Ncniarket Mig. Co. v. United
States which allowed a carryback after a profitable corporation had rein-
corporated in a different state through a statutory merger with a wholly owne I
subsidiary.48 That decision, like Stanton, could be read narrowly; the court
46. The reliance on a transfer by "operation of law" would, of course, make the
decision inapplicable to transfers of assets by liquidation, sales, or other reorganization
with the possible exception of an insolvency reorganization under Chapter X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, or its predecessor. A trustee in reorganization, by virtue of § 186, which
incorporates § 70(a) by implication, see 6 CoLLER, BANKIRJPTCV 1 8.03 (14th ed. 1947)
[hereinafter cited as Coamm], is vested by operation of law with complete legal title
to all the property which the debtor corporation may claim under the act. Wh'lether a
transfer to a new corporation under the plan is effected "by operation of law" is unclear.
Arguably such a transfer would so qualify because § 227 gives the reorganization court
the necessary power to compel the trustees to execute and deliver the necessary instru-
ments of transfer, see 6 COLLIER f 11.16, and § 174 requires confirmation of the plan by
the reorganization court, see 6 Couza, 11 7.31.
The deductibility by the new corporation of losses attributable to the operation of
the debtor's business by the trustee is likewise questionable. In Follansbee Steel Corp. v.
United States, 109 F. Supp. 635 (,W.D. Pa. 1953), such a carryover was denied. The
court did not cite Stanton, but relied solely on Nea, Colonial. Although the court found
that the reorganization court in confirming the plan of reorganization "did not intend
that taxpayer should have the right to carryover losses" of its predecessor, id. at 636, the
Stanton rationale would seem to require allowance of the deduction. Section 271 of the
Bankruptcy Act specifically makes a new corporation organized pursuant to the plan liable
for income taxes arising from the operations of the trustee. Since this liability is primary
and not as transferee, 6 CoLLIE t 15.13, the new corporation would be the "perscn subject
to tax" and therefore "the taxpayer," see note 44 supra. Conceivably the purchaser
at a judicial sale by the trustee might also inherit the carryover since, in other
contexts, such sales pass title by operation of law. See 4 Cou.mt 1 70.28, at 1164-6;
Note, 68 YA.T- L.J. 515, 519 & n.14, 520 & n.17 (1959).
47. It seems clear that prior to the merger the parent engaged in little activity other
than leasing the brewing property to its subsidiary, see Brief for Respondent, p. 2, Stanton
Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; note 41, and holding the stock of the operating sub-
sidiary. Prior to the merger the parent filed a personal holding company return showing
almost 90% of its income as dividends received from the subsidiary. Ibid.
48. 233 F.2d 493 (lst Cir. 1956), cert. denicd, 353 U.S. 983 (1957), v'acaling and
remanding 130 F. Supp. 706 (D. Mass. 1955). To the extent that Stanton rests on policy,
a carryback to a prior taxable year of the subsidiary would seem proper. Neither technical
theory of Stanton is persuasive, however, where arryhacks are involved since in no case
can the subsidiary be liable for taxes resulting from postmerger operations and no tax
attribute has been transferred "by operation of law" from the resultant corporation to
the subsidiary. See Standard Paving Co., 13 T.C. 425, 447 (1949), af'd, 190 F.2d 330
(10th Cir.) cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951). But the Gallo analysis, see note 45 supra,
that the absorbed corporation's existence continues "submerged" in the transferee, would
seem to support the carryback if the loss can be treated as sustained by the submerged
subsidiary, a highly conceptual and tenuous argument.
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emphasized that the business and shareholders of the successor and disappear-
ing corporations were identical and that only the state of incorporation had
changed. 49
Subsequent decisions did not reveal the extent to which Stanton relaxed the
entity test of New Colonial. The Ninth Circuit seemed to read Stanton broad-
ly in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Commissioner, permitting the surviving cor-
poration in a statutory merger to utilize the carryforward of an absorbed
corporation.50 The corporations were not parent and subsidiaryr' and their
stock ownership was different; continuity of the absorbed corporation's busi-
ness was not discussed. Gallo could be construed, therefore, as permitting a
carryforward after all "operation of law" mergers, without regard to changes
in business or shareholder ownership. 5 2 The carryback analogue of Gallo may
have been Koppers Co. v. United States, where the Court of Claims allowed a
carryback seemingly without relying on the identity of postmerger and pre-
merger business and shareholders. 3 But the facts in that case showed that
all the combining corporations had filed a consolidated return in the year to
which the postmerger loss was carried back.5 4 Thus the affiliated group was,
in effect, the same "taxable entity" before the merger,5 so that the carryback
49. Judge Magruder's opinion is couched in quite narrow terms. 233 F.2d at 497
("everything in the business remains the same, except for the change of corporate domicile";
"throughout the whole period in question there was only one single business"; "but for
the statutory merger the Massachusetts corporation [the absorbed entity] would have
been entitled to the carry-back deduction"). But New Colonial was distinguished as
not involving a statutory merger. Id. at 498.
50. 227 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1955), reversing 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 400-01 (1953).
The tax attribute at issue was an unused excess profits credit.
51. See 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 400-01 (1953). In fact the Tax Court, while refusing
to follow Stanton in any event, relied upon the absence of the parent-subsidiary relationship.
52. The Ninth Circuit opinion speaks in terms of the absorbed corporation being
"drowned" in the resultant corporation, relying primarily on Helvering v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 306 U.S. 522 (1939). The court thought state law controlling as to whether
"the identity of the old corporation continued in the surviving corporation," 227 F.2d at
704, and found that the California cases had so held, id. at 702. New Colonial was distin-
guished as not involving a statutory merger.
To the extent that Gallo and Stanton rely upon Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co.
supra, a successor corporation after a statutory consolidation would inherit the tax attributes
of the corporations absorbed in either a merger or consolidation since that case repeatedly
refers to both. See 306 U.S. at 526, 527. Of course, the holding that the resultant corporation
may deduct unamortized bond discount on obligations of its predecessor after a de facto
merger may be restricted, since the absorbed corporation was a wholly owned subsidiary
and was already liable on the bonds as guarantor. 306 U.S. at 529.
This broad reading of Gallo is no longer authoritative in view of the Supreme Court's
disapproval of the Ninth Circuit's failure to reveal "whether or not a continuing enter-
prise was involved." Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 388 n.7 (1957).
53. 133 Ct. Cl. 22, 134 F. Supp. 290 (1955), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957). The
tax attribute was an unused excess profits credit.
54. 133 Ct. Cl. at 24, 134 F. Supp. at 292.
55. The affiliated group for which a consolidated return is filed was treated, roughly
speaking, as a single corporation for income tax purposes, see authorities cited note 10
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could have been used in the same way even if there had been no merger; but
this was not referred to in the opinion and perhaps was not necessary to the
result. Contrary to these apparent extensions of the Stanton rationale, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit subsequently found both Gallo and
Stanton "not persuasive."5 6 And the Tax Court, which had been reversed in
Stanton, refused to follow either a broad " or a narrow rs interpretation of the
Second Circuit opinion in that case. As far as its thirteen judges were con-
cerned, New Colonial was still controlling.
As ultimately applied, the Stanton case represented little improvement over
the formality of the New Colonial "entity" doctrine. Even when interpreted
broadly, the Stanton doctrine permitted inheritance of an absorbed corpora-
tion's tax history only when the combination was effected by statutory
merger.5 9 Of course, a Stanton approach sometimes removed the tax impedi-
ment hindering the businessman who wished to alter the corporate shell for
nontax considerations. On the other hand, tax avoidance schemes were
facilitated, since Alprosa-like transactions could be accomplished without the
need to retain the old corporate shell. The most serious objection to the
Stanton line of cases arose from the failure of the courts to specify the criteria
which were prerequisite to the transferability of carryovers; no case made
clear whether identity of business, identity of shareholders, or both wvas neces-
sary to escape New Colonial. As a result neither the Government nor the tax
planner could accurately predict the tax consequences of corporate changes.
supra, as well as excess profits tax purposes, see Treas. Reg. 110, §§ 33.30-.31 (1941). Had
the group not been amalgamated, the unused excess profits credit could have been carried
back. Treas. Reg. 110, § 33.31(a) (34) (1943).
56. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 229 F.2d 220, 227 (8th Cir. 1956), af'd, 353 U.S.
382 (1957). The Eighth Circuit distinguished Stanton as involving "one operating cor-
poration and a parent holding company. The business carried on after the merger was
substantially the same as that which had theretofore been carried on by the merged oper-
ating corporation, and without the merger the latter would have been entitled to the
claimed carry-over." 229 F.2d at 224.
57. See E. & J. Gallo Winery, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Meni. 400-01 (1953).
58. See California Casket Co., 19 T.C. 32 (1952) (successor corporation denied
carryover after merger with wholly owned subsidiary; same business apparently con-
tinued). And several district courts were of a similar mind. Commonwealth Title Co.
v. Rothensies, 124 F. Supp. 274, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Newmiarket Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 130 F. Supp. 7046 (D. Mass. 1955), vacated and remanded, 233 F.2d 493 (Ist Cr.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957).
59. For example, carryforwards and carrybacks of subsidiaries were erased after
liquidation into the parent. Carryforwards: Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 30 T.C. 602
(1958), aff'd without discussion of the point, 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
835 (1959) (net operating loss) ; Patten Fine Papers, Inc., 27 T.C. 772 (1957), aff'd,
249 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1957) (capital loss); Gramm Trailer Corp., 26 T.C. 699 (1956)
(unused excess profits credit). Carrybacks: Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190
F.2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951) (net operating loss) ; Eleanor
H. Vendig, 22 T.C. 1127 (1954), rev'd on other grounds, 229 F2d 93 (2d Cir. 1956)
(same).
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Libson Shops
The Supreme Court's first foray into this troubled area since New Colonial
was the 1957 case of Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler.60 The taxpayer was a
corporation into which sixteen other corporations had been merged pursuant
to a state statute. Prior to the merger Libson Shops, Inc. had provided man-
agement services to the sixteen companies, each of which operated a single
retail store selling women's clothing. All seventeen corporations were owned
by the same individuals in the same proportions. After the merger, the tax-
payer carried on the operations of all seventeen. The dispute arose when it
attempted to carry forward the premerger losses of three of the sixteen sale&
corporations. Although the stores owned by these three corporations continued
to lose money after the merger, the other stores produced income against which
the losses were offset by the taxpayer.61 The Commissioner disallowed the de-
duction, arguing in the Supreme Court that New Colonial was still viable and
that Libson could not claim the losses of a different entity.0 2 Alternatively,
the Government contended that the "taxpayer's business was substantially
different from that of its predecessors" and that the deductions should be dis-
allowed because the congressional policies embodied in the carryover provisions
were inapplicable.68 The taxpayer relied on Stanton, Gallo, Koppers, and
Newmarket to support its theory that a carryover survives a statutory mer-
ger.6 4
The Supreme Court denied the carryover. The Court first noted that the
language of the statute required it to decide whether Libson Shops was the
same "taxpayer" as the three merged loss corporations.66 The apparent con-
flict between the Stanton "operation of law" cases relied on by the taxpayer
and a strict entity view of New Colonial urged by the Government was not
discussed; the Court thought the Government's alternative argument "dis-
positive."6 6 The Government contended that "the carry-over privilege is not
60. 353 U.S. 382 (1957), The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HAv. L. Rxv. 85, 190
(1957). This case is discussed at length in Levine & Petta, Libson Shops: A Study in
Semantics, 36 TAXES 445 (1958); Sinrich, Libson Shops-An Argument Against Its
Application Under the 1954 Code, 13 TAX L. REv. 167 (1958) ; Arent, Current Develop-
ments Affecting Loss Corporations, 35 TAXES 956, 959-65 (1957).
61. 353 U.S. at 382-84.
62. The Government took the narrowest position possible contending that separately
chartered corporations could never be the same taxpayer within the meaning of the carry-
over section of the statute. See 353 U.S. at 385-86; Brief for Respondent, pp. 8-9, 33,
Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, supra note 60.
63. Id. at 41-44.
64. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, pp. 6-7, 25-26, Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler,
supra note 60.
65. 353 U.S. at 385.
66. Id. at 386. The Government's first argument, see note 62 supra, may have been
decided, sub silentio, in the taxpayer's favor, because the court seemed to approve cases
such as Stanton Brewery, ANewnarket, and Koppers which had breached the strict entity
theory of New Colonial. See text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
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available unless there is a continuity of business enterprise.... [TIhe prior
year's loss can be offset against the current year's income only to the extent
that this income is derived from the operation of substantially the same busi-
ness which produced the loss."67 The Court found this requirement "in ac-
cord" with the legislative history of the carryover provisions:
The provisions were [not] designed to permit the averaging of pre-
merger losses of one business with the post-merger income of some other
business which had been previously operated and taxed separately before
the merger .... Congress primarily was concerned with the fluctuating
income of a single business.6s
Even the cases cited by the taxpayer, the Court declared, recognized the dis-
tinction between a "single business" and "several businesses." In Stanton
and Newntarket the businesses were identical before and after the merger.60
Gallo was deemed "inconclusive... since the opinion... [did] not disclose
whether or not a continuing enterprise was involved.""7 And the result in
Koppers was justified by the presence of premerger consolidated returns
which made the predecessor and survivor "essentially the same taxable enter-
prise." 71 The opinion concluded with the statement that "petitioner is not
entitled to a carryover since the income against which the offset is clainit-d
was not produced by substantially the same business which incurred the
loss."' 72 A final footnote, however, disclaimed any intention to "pass upon
situations like those presented in. . . Alprosa Vatch Co. v. Commnissioner...
[where] a single corporate taxpayer changed the character of its business and
the taxable income of one of its enterprises was reduced by the deductions oi
credits of another."
73
While the continuity-of-business test seems to break with the formalism
of prior case law, the Court's further explanation of Ncewmarket suggests a
narrow use of the "single business" concept. The Court analyzed Ne-,market
by asldng whether the carryback could have been utilized if there had been
no merger. Had the corporation in Ncwmnarkct not reincorporated in Dela-
ware, it could have offset its current losses against the income of prior years.
On the other hand, if the Libson merger had not taken place, the losses of the
three corporations could not have been offset against the subsequent income
of the others since the seventeen separate corporations had not filed consoli-
dated returns during the loss years.74 In sum, the Court seemed to say that
67. 353 U.S. at 386.
68. Id. at 386-87. For this proposition the Court cited only M-.R. REP. No. 855, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1939), reprinted in 1939-2 Cum. BULLt at 510-11.
69. 353 U.S. at 387.
70. Id. at 388 n.7.
71. Ibid. Compare Brief for Respondent, p. 43, n20, Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koelzkr,
supra note 60 ("the corporation resulting from the merger carried on essentially the
same enterprise as before. . .
72. 353 U.S. at 390.
73. Id. at 390 n.9.
74. Id. at 388.
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the availabi!Ky of loss carryovers should not be affected by the occurrence of
a merger. But because the merger has in fact occurred and the corporate
identity of the absorbed corporations has been obliterated, the entire enterprise
of the resultant corporation must be divided as if the absorbed corporations
had continued their separate existence. Thus the limitation of the premerger
loss carryforward to income produced by "substantially the same business"
may be interpreted to require only that the taxpayer divide the resultant cor-
poration's activities into artificial entities and demonstrate that the loss carry-
over is being applied against income from the submerged loss corporation. In
this context, "substantially the same business" may be a synonym for the
artificial postmerger entity. It would not necessarily mean that the submerged
corporation will lose its carryforward if it changes the nature of its economic
activity; the Court disclaimed any intention to pass upon the question of what
changes within a single corporate entity, if any, would bar use of carryovers.Y5
Presumably, the case law regulating the use of carryovers within a single
corporate entity, including the Alprosa doctrine, would be applied to the merger
transaction, as if the absorbed corporations continued to be separate legal
entities.
This interpretation of the Libson opinion raises numerous problems. In addi-
tion to requiring an unreal and impracticable analysis by courts and taxpayers it
would lead to free transferability of loss carryovers. Applying Alprosa, carry-
overs would be allowed even though the economic activity of the absorbed
corporation had been discontinued and another substituted in its place.70 This
issue was not raised in Libson because operation of the three loss stores was
continued, and they remained unprofitable. But if one of the Libson loss stores
had been sold and the proceeds used to purchase a profitable dude ranch, the
Alprosa theory would permit income from the ranch to be offset by premerger
losses of the clothing store. Similarly, if the stockholders of one loss corpora-
tion had contributed new capital for the purchase of the profitable dude ranch,
the result would be the same. Indeed the absorbed corporation could hypo-
thetically "acquire" the profitable business of any of the merging corporations.
Thus the policy of treating absorbed corporations as if they had not merged
cannot be defended if, as the Court implied, merger is not to become a vehicle
for free transferability. Some limitation upon postmerger changes in the kind
of economic activity seems necessary. For this purpose, "substantially the
same business" may have been intended as a substantive limitation upon carry-
overs after mergers rather than a requirement that the absorbed loss corpora-
tion be traced into the resultant corporation. Giving substantive content to the
continuity of business requirement would render Alprosa inapplicable to
merger transactions; whether Alprosa survives in the field of single corporation
carryovers after this reading of Libson is open to question.
77
75. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
77. If the Court's intention was to treat merged corporations and single corporations
alike, rejection of the Alprosa theory in the field of corporate mergers might well presage
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When the phrase "substantially the same business" is interpreted as a
limitation upon changing economic activity after the merger, the opinion
does not indicate what changes will erase the premerger tax history. Does
a change in location, addition or discontinuance of a new line of merchandise,
or replacement of assets constitute a change in business? Is a business quali-
tatively different when it sells men's clothing instead of women's clothing?
Once "sameness" is defined, must the business of the resultant corporation
include only the business of the loss corporation, or does Libson permit carry-
overs attributable to the loss business when the loss business is continued as
one of several businesses operated by the resultant corporation after the
merger? For example, if the three loss stores had produced income after the
merger, could their premerger losses have been carried forward to offset that
income ?78
Libson Shops-The Internal Revenue Service interpretatim
Libson's disallowance of a carryover because "substantially different busi-
nesses" were involved seems to imply that if the business were "substantially
the same" the carryover would have been permitted, and the Government has
so ruled. Rev. Rul. 59-395 79 attempts to delineate criteria for determining
when one business is "substantially the same" as another. Following a statu-
tory merger or consolidation, the net operating losses of an "absorbed con-
stituent" corporation may be carried forward to the extent that such losses
offset income of the "resultant" corporation attributable to assets:
1) acquired by it from the asborbed constituent, and
2) "used in continuing the prefusion business of such absorbed con-
stituent" 80
a similar doctrine applicable to single corporations filing separate returns. Although
the Court specifically did not pass on this possibility, 353 U.S. 390, n.9, one post-Libson
case apparently took the hint, see text accompanying notes 107-11 infra.
78. The opinion implied that the premerger losses could have been carried over had
the three loss stores had postmerger income. The Court accepted the Government's con-
tention that "the carryover privilege is not available vndess there is a continuity of
business enterprise." 353 U.S. at 386. (Emphasis added.)
79. 1959 INT. Rr-v. BuL.. No. 51, at 20.
80. 1959 IT. REv. BuL.. No. 51, at 24. This theory of allocation has been said "to
carry continuity of business enterprise to an absurd and impractical e.'-treme." Buffington,
Carry-Overs in Reorganizations: Corporate or Tax Entity Approach, 32 TAxES 575,
582 (1954).
Another method of allocation has been suggested: a carryover is inherited in the
proportion that the value of the loss corporation's assets bear to the total assets of the
combined enterprise. See Note, 65 HAnv. L. REv. 648 (1952), approved in Buffington,
supra. A taxpayer argument along those lines was rejected in Manufacturer's Trust
Co., 28 B.T.A. 1260 (1933).
Since the ruling applies only to taxable years governed by the 1939 Code and allows
excess profits credits to be carried over under the same circumstances as net operating
losses, corporations subject to the Korean War excess profits tax may, if the taxable
years involved are still open, be able to take advantage of the ruling. Curiously, the
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Additionally, "the portion of the net operating losses" attributable to such
assets may be carried back "to the extent that they offset the prefusion income
of the absorbed constituent."8' The ruling also provides that where the merged
or consolidated corporations had filed a consolidated return in the loss year,
and the resultant corporation "conducts the same businesses as previously
operated by the constituent corporations," carryovers are allowable "on the
same basis as if the group . . . represents, collectively, after the merger or
consolidation, .the same taxable enterprise as before that event."8 2
The section of the ruling dealing with the merger of an affiliated group which
had previously filed consolidated returns seems inconsistent with existing
consolidated returns regulations. Under those regulations, an affiliated group
can carry over a consolidated net operating loss of one year to reduce con-
solidated taxable income of another year regardless of changes in the business
of the group as a whole, or of the member to which the loss was attributable. 3
If, however, the same group merges, the Service's ruling would apparently dis-
allow the carryover if the business of one member of the group had been
changed, because the resultant corporation would not then be conducting "the
same businesses as previously operated by the constituent corporations."' The
ruling would thus seem to discriminate unnecessarily against affiliated groups
which decide to merge, contrary to the implication in Libson that carryovers
available but for the merger may be retained. The anomaly may be only ap-
ruling's treatment of unused excess profits credits may be totally inconsistent with the
Libson rationale. Unused credits may, under Rev. Rid. 59-395, be carried over against
income attributable to assets acquired from the absorbed corporation and used in con-
tinuing the prefusion business. But there is no requirement that the excess profits credit,
even if based upon income, be attributable to either the same type of business or the
business assets which produces the postmerger income. The excess profits credit may
be determined by average annual income during 1946-1949 at which time the corporation
may have been manufacturing household appliances. It later may have discontinued that
enterprise and become a uranium mining corporation or a real estate sales corporation.
Its credit ordinarily remains the same. Rev. Ril. 59-395 requires the survivor to con-
tinue "the prefusion business"-uranium mining or real estate sales-but the excess profits
credit to which it will succeed will be based upon income from household appliance
manufacturing.
Although a broad reading of Libson might support inheritance of other tax attributes
such as capital loss carryovers, see Patten Fine Papers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d
776 (7th Cir. 1957), or charitable contribution carryovers, Rev. Rid. 59-395 may, by re-
ferring only to net operating losses and excess profits credits, negatively imply that no
carryover of other items will be permitted.
81. 1959 INT. REv. BuLj_ No. 51, at 24.
82. Ibid.
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-31 (a) (3) (1955) ; Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc., 32 T.C. No. 120
(Sept. 23, 1959) (portion of consolidated net operating loss attributable to corporation
whose assets had been sold and which had become inactive could be carried forward
to reduce consolidated taxable income of subsequent year).
84. The ruling's reference to the premerger business is strange for the Libson Court
approved the result in Koppers without reference to the post- and premerger business of
the corporations. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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parent, however, since the ruling may presage an amendment to the consoli-
dated returns regulations providing that consolidated loss carryovers are
deductable from consolidated taxable income only if the affiliated group is
conducting substantially "the same businesses" in both years.8s The ruling makes
no attempt to define "same businesses" in this section, although the test of the
first part may be read into the second.
Under this ruling, the consolidated return group may suffer disadvantages
not imposed upon corporations which file separate returns before merging.
Suppose, for example, the A Corporation, operating a steel mill, was affiliated
with B Corporation, operating a beauty parlor, and the two had filed consoli-
dated returns on a calendar year basis for 1955, 1956, and 1957, showing zero
taxable income in each of those years. In 1958, A Corporation had a sub-
stantial loss and B Corporation broke even. In 1959, A Corporation's steel
mill had income. If, on January 1, 1959, A Corporation had merged into B
Corporation pursuant to state statute, and B's beauty parlor-which was not
the loss business-were then sold, B, "the resultant corporation," would not
be permitted to carry forward the 1958 loss against the 1959 income of the steel
mill; the "resultant corporation" would not be conducting "the same businesses"
as were previously operated by the constituent corporations. But if Corporations
A and B had not filed consolidated returns, in the previous years, after a merger
of A into B, B would be entitled under the general portion of the ruling to carry
over the 1958 steel mill loss against the 1959 steel mill income; the 1959 income
would be "attributable to assets acquired... [from the loss corporation] and
used in continuing the prefusion business." This disparate treatment would
be avoided, however, if the general portion of the ruling were applicable
whether or not consolidated returns had been filed previously. The portion
of the ruling specifically dealing with consolidated returns would be needed
only when the continued business of A corporation remained unprofitable and
the premerger loss was sought to be applied against postmerger income from
B Corporation's business.8 6
The first half of the formula used by the general provisions of the ruling-
premerger losses may be carried over against income of the resultant corpora-
ttion attributable to assets acquired from the absorbed constituent S7--will
85. The Commissioner made this argument, unsuccessfully, in Joseph Weidenhoff,
32 T.C. No. 120 (Sept. 23, 1959), see note 83 supra.
86. This latter interpretation would harmonize the ruling with Libson's approval
of Koppers solely because of the premerger consolidated returns, see text accompanying
note 71 supra, and the existing consolidated returns regulations, see note 83 supra.
87. Nowhere in the Libson opinion does the Supreme Court equate "business" with
particular assets, and the ruling's interpretation is hardly the only possible one. Compare
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911) ("'Business' ... embraces every-
thing about which a person can be employed.. .. 'That which occupies the time, attention
and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood or profit"); Bogardus v. Commis-
sioner, 302 US. 34, 36 (1937) ("Under its new ownership [all the stock had changed
hands], the Universal continued to carry on the same bu.siness, retaining a large part
of its assets." [emphasis added]); Treas. Reg. 41, art. 8 (1917) ("the terms 'trade,'
1960] 1221
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
be difficult to apply. Initially, the formula requires ascertainment of the portion
of the resultant corporation's entire income which is somehow related to the
loss corporation's assets.88 Read literally, the phrase "attributable to assets"
requires that income produced by "assets" be separated from income produced
by heat, light, and power expense, advertising expense or salaries. Even if
the assets of the loss business remained exactly the same, the premerger loss
could be applied against only a part of the loss business' income. It seems
preferable to interpret the ruling as permitting deduction of the entire income
of a business once it is determined that the "assets" of the business qualify
as "assets acquired" from the loss corporation.
The phrase "assets acquired" is also puzzling. It appears to prevent the
loss business from acquiring additional income-producing property after the
merger. The ruling does not distinguish, however, betveen additional assets
contributed by the shareholders or the resultant corporation, additional assets
purchased with the loss business' cash on hand at the date of merger, additional
assets purchased from postmerger profits of the loss business, additional assets
financed by postmerger borrowing, and assets acquired as replacements. The
ruling might be read to exclude all such acquisitions, limiting the carryover to
income produced by the same physical assets that were acquired from the loss
corporation. When applied to inventory assets in continual turnover, this in-
terpretation would mean that income from any inventory other than that on
hand at the date of the merger would not qualify. Even if the word "assets"
were applied solely to fixed assets such as buildings and machinery, a limitation
'business,' and 'trade or business' comprehend all activities for gain, profit, or livelihood.
...") ; Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3 (1959) ("The business of a corporation is not merely that
which it has previously carried on but includes, in general, any line of business which
it may undertake.... [T]he business of one corporation may be regarded as including
the business of another corporation if such other corporation is a mere instrumentality
of the first corporation; that may be established by showing that the first corporation
owns at least 80 per cent of the voting stock of the second corporation ... .") ; Treas.
Reg. § 1.446-1(d) (1957) ("Where a taxpayer has two or more separate and distinct
trades or businesses, a different method of accounting may be used for each. . . ." [em-
phasis added]); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (c) (1955) ("a trade or business consists of a
specific existing group of activities being carried on for the purpose of earning income
or profit from only such group of activities, and the activities included in such group
must include every operation which forms a part of, or a step in, the process of earning
income or profit from such group").
88. A potential anomaly may inhere in the ruling's general carryback provision. The
ruling provides that "the portion of the net operating losses ... attributable to the assets
acquired by the resultant corporation from an absorbed constitutent and used in con-
tinuing the prefusion business of such absorbed constituent may be carried back, to the
extent that they offset the prefition income of the absorbed constituent. . . ." 1959 INT.
Rav. BULL No. 51, at 24. (Emphasis added.) Since the ruling does not require that a
postmerger loss be carried back against income earned by the assets which produced the
loss, a postmerger loss could be carried back against income earned by a wholly unrelated
business. Even in less extreme cases, "the prefusion income" will often include dividends
or other personal holding company type income so that the carryback permitted by the
ruling may be more liberal than the carryforward.
1222 [Vol. 69:1201
NET OPERATING LOSS CARRYOVERS
which would preclude carryforwards to businesses with no fixed assets, income
generated by assets purchased to replace the original fixed assets would be
tainted. Since the need to replace both current and fixed assets depends upon
fortuitous factors such as the kind of commodity sold or the age of the assets,
restricting the carryover when acquired assets are replaced would result in
arbitrary denial of carryover benefits. To escape this result, the ruling might
be interpreted to allow replacement of assets-at least current assets ordinarily
replaced in the course of business. The taxpayer presumably would have the
burden of demonstrating that the new assets were substitutions for the old
assets rather than a contribution of additional assets.
The second half of the formula-the assets must be "used in continuing the
prefusion business"--vill create even more complex problems. If, for example,
noninventory assets are sold or otherwise disposed of at a loss after the merger,
the concept of continuation might preclude a carryback of losses against pre-
merger income of the absorbed constituent. Thus, losses resulting from the
sale of such items as the buildings and fixtures 89 of the thirteen profitable stores
in Libson could not be carried back. The Service has argued in the past that
losses by a single corporation in liquidation could not be carried back against
operating income, theorizing that liquidating assets is not the "same business"
as was previously carried on and therefore not within the spirit of the averaging
provisions. While the Service's argument has been rejected in several cases,""
it may find new support in Libson's emphasis upon continuity of business.
Should this argument prevail, consistency would seem to require also that pre-
merger operating losses not be carried forward to offset gains from the sale
of noninventory assets. On the other hand, the ruling's phrase "used in con-
tinuing the prefusion business" may not define the kind of business activity
producing gains or losses but may only specify the assets whose sale will produce
gains or losses which qualify. Under this latter view, the relevant factor is not
whether the sale of an asset was in the ordinary course of business but whether
the assets sold were "used in continuing the prefsion business," for some period
after the merger. What period would satisfy the "continuing" criterion would
presumably be decided on an ad hoc basis. Admittedly, both suggested interpre-
89. Such losses would be ordinary losses by virtue of § 1231. Similarly treated
would be losses on sales of "real property used in the trade or business." See § 1231 (b) (1).
90. See, e.g., Acampo Winery and Distilleries, Inc., 7 T.C. 629, 640 (1946), acq., 1949-1
C, . Bunu. 1; Gorman Lumber Sales Co., 12 T.C. 1184, 1194 (1949), acq., 1949-2 Cum.
BuLT. 2.
The Commissioner has, in the past, ordinarily been successful in disallowing carry-
overs of losses sustained by individuals on sales in liquidation of their income producing
property, see, e.g., Puente v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1952); Sic v. Corn-
missioner, 177 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 913 (1950); Pettit v.
Commissioner, 175 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1949). Although these cases have been reversed
by § 172(d) (4) of the 1954 Code, they might be persuasive in applying Rev. RuL. 59-395.
Additionally the legislative history, relied upon by the Libson court, referring to "a
buainess with alternating profit and loss," see 353 U.S. at 387 n.6, might buttress the
argument that carryovers were intended to average only operating profits and losses.
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tations seem somewhat forced, indicating that the Service was focusing solely on
the problem created in the Libson factual context if the three loss stores had
become profitable. The ruling would seem to allow the carryover in such
cases since the assets acquired were dearly used in "continuing the prefusion
business." The ruling does not, however, indicate what changes in the operation
of the three stores would constitute failure "to continue" that business. And
the significance of any change cannot be determined until the definition of "pre-
fusion business" had been clarified.
"Prefusion business" apparently refers to the qualitative nature of the profit-
making activity, for example automobile manufacturing as distinguished from
retail selling of women's clothing. In the Libson context, however, a single
loss store conceivably could be used for a variety of enterprises. From retail
selling of women's clothing, the facilities could be converted to retail selling
of men's clothing, wholesaling of either clothing or nonclothing items, manu-
facturing of light goods, or leased so that only rental income would be derived.
At what point in this transmutation does a change in "prefusion business" occur?
This problem is further complicated when some of the original assets have been
either moved to a new location or exchanged for different assets. For example,
if, after the merger, one of the three loss stores in Libson had been sold and
the proceeds reinvested in a retail women's clothing store in a different location,
it would seem that any profits earned by the new store could not, under Rev.
Rul. 59-395, be "attributable to assets acquired" from the loss corporation. Even
if the "asset" requirement were satisfied by allowing tracing of assets (from
the loss store to the proceeds of the sale thereof and then to the new store) it
is arguable that selling women's clothing at retail in one location is a different
business from selling women's clothing at retail in another location and that
the assets had not been "used in continuing the prefusion business." 91
Furthermore, the ruling does not indicate at what point in time "the prefusion
business" is to be determined. Assume that X Corporation conducted two
distinct businesses, a profitable beauty parlor and an unprofitable steel mill for
several years. One month before X was absorbed by Y Corporation in a statu-
tory merger, the steel mill was sold. Y Corporation acquired the beauty parlor
and the proceeds of the steel mill sale and continued to operate the beauty parlor
in the same location. The Service might contend that the premerger steel losses
cannot be carried forward against postmerger beauty parlor income because
the prefusion business was steel plus beauty parlor while the postmerger busi-
ness was beauty parlor only. On its face, however, the reference to prefusion
business would seem to point to the moment in time immediately preceding the
merger,9 2 when the only business of the absorbed corporation was the beauty
91. The problem of determining the effects of changes of location on loss carryovers
is also important under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 382(a) (1) (C). See notes 268-75
inlra and accompanying text.
92. Cf. BITTER, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREIIOLDiRS
63 n.50 (1959) [hereinafter cited at BrTFEER] (construing INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §
382(a) (1) (C)).
If the absorbed corporation were inactive before the merger, presumably, the resultant
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parlor. This literal construction would place an undue premium on timing, since
a sale of one business immediately after the merger would cause forfeiture of
the carryover-the prefusion business, steel and beauty parlor, has been changed
to beauty parlor alone-while a sale just before the merger would avoid this re-
sult. The Government, and in some circumstances the taxpayer, might invoke the
analogous principle of Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.03 to shift the time
of the sale for tax purposes.
After continuation of the prefusion business is established, the resultant cur-
poration must ascertain the portion of its entire income attributable to the busi-
ness assets of the absorbed constituent. Rev. Rul. 59-395 requires maintenance
of records "in such manner as to enable the Internal Revenue Service to make
a reasonably conclusive determination." 94 An accurate allocation probably re-
quires that cost accounting records be produced for the period in question. In
addition to the complexities of allocating overhead and fixed charges,95 the
taxpayer faces the danger that his system of cost accounting may be unacceptable
to the Government,9" for the ruling does not endorse any accounting standards.
In sum, Rev. Rui. 59-395 is scarcely less ambiguous than the Libson continuity
of business test, unless it is interpreted to allow no alteration in the assets or
business of the absorbed loss corporation. Once the need to allow some changes
is admitted, the words of the formula furnish no criteria by which permissible
alterations can be identified. Moreover, the uncertainties of allocation are not
corporation could not continue the prefusion business and would, therefore, not inherit
the carryover. Cf. Rev. Rul. 58-9, 1958-1 Cum,. BuL. 190.
93. 324 U.S. 331 (1945). The case held that a sale of assets by shareholders im-
mediately after a corporate liquidation mas in reality a sale by the corporation so that the
capital gain on the sale was taxable to the corporation. See generally BiTrvxs 285-90.
The doctrine inay not be limited to sales following liquidations. See Brrrmm 87 (sug-
gesting its possible application to the situation where property subject to a liability is
transferred to a controlled corporation). At all events, general principles of substance
over form should permit a realistic appraisal of whether the "prefusion business" was
continued. For a recent commentary on the "substance over form" doctrine, see Lanning,
Tax Erosion and the "Bootstrap Sale" of a Business, 10 U. PA. L Ra,. 623, 6-7-34
(1960).
94. 1959 Ixr. REy. BuLw- No. 51, at 24-25. Limitation of carryovers to income at-
tributable to assets acquired from the loss corporation has been criticized on the ground
that "tax consequences [would] turn on difficult and debatable concepts of cost account-
ing and profit analysis...." Note, 65 HAnv. L. REv. 648, 659 (1952) ; see also Buffington,
supra note 80, at 582.
95. For an example of apparently satisfactory accounting, see F. C. Donovan, Inc. v.
United States, 261 F.2d 470, 473 (1st Cir. 1958).
96. Ordinarily the method by which the taxpayer "regularly computes his income
in keeping his books," Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (a) (1) (1957), will be honored by the Gov-
ernment. But "no method of accounting is acceptable unless, in the opinion of the Com-
missioner, it dearly reflects income." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (a) (2) (1957). See also
INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 446(b). For cases in which the Commissioner successfully
challenged the taxpayer's accounting methods, see, e.g., Standard Paving Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 190 F2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 3427 U.S. 860 (1951) ; Jud Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946). See generally Note, Clearly
Reflecting Income Under § 446 of the Internal Revenue Code, 54 CoLu,. L. R-v. 1267 (1954).
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reduced by the "income attributable to assets" formula, for, unless read literally,
it adds nothing to Libson's implication that loss business income must be segre-
gated. This administrative interpretation of Libson is, of course, not binding
upon the courts. 9 7 Other interpretations might be advanced which will avoid
some of the difficulties of the Service's ruling.
Libson-A More Restrictive View
One leading article, published before Rev. Rid. 59-395 was promulgated,
construed Libson's continuity of business requirement even more norrowly than
the Internal Revenue Service. 8 Interpreting "business" as meaning the entire
business activity of a corporation, the article read Libson as requiring a com-
parison of the total business of the resultant corporation with the business of
the absorbed constituent whose tax attribute was in issue.00 This rationale
would disallow carryovers across corporate lines whenever the two merging
corporations 'had conducted active businesses which were thereafter continued
by the resultant corporation, "because the two businesses of the amalgamated
corporation are different from the single business of each of the preamalgamated
corporations."' 0 0 Carryovers would be permitted only if the surviving corpora-
tion carried on little or no business activity prior to the merger.10 1 The theory was
based upon the Supreme Court's apparent approval of Stanton and Newnarket
and the factual distinction drawn between those cases and Libson.0 2 In Libson
the three loss stores and the thirteen profitable stores were active before they
were combined; in Stanton and Newnarket only one active business was in-
volved, before and after the mergers. While this interpretation would eliminate
all allocation problems and foreclose most opportunities for "abuse" of the
carryover, it seems unnecessarily restrictive. A loss corporation which merged
into a corporation conducting an active business would lose its carryover al-
though the same kind of business that produced the loss was carried on, using
the same assets in the same location, after the merger. Whatever its merits, this
theory has not been accepted by any post-Libson case; several cases have
permitted carryovers where previously separate businesses were continued by
the resultant corporation. 03
97. Cf. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 28 B.T.A. 1260 (1933) (similar formula allocating
income according to assets rejected when advanced by taxpayer).
98. Levine & Petta, Libson Shops: A Study in Semantics, 36 TAxEs 445 (1958). This
article antedates Rev. Rut. 59-395 by eighteen months.
99. "[T]he business of the predecessor which sustained the loss . . . should .. .be
compared with the business of the successor corporation." 36 TAxES at 448.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid. Stanton Brewery is cited in support. Levine and Petta take the saime
position in respect of carrybacks, ibid., citing Newmarket.
102. Id. at 447-48.
103. See F. C. Donovan, Inc. v. United States, 261 F.2d 470 (1st Cir. 1958) (carry-
back of net operating loss); Old Natl Bank v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 639 (7th Cir.
1958) (carryforward of unused excess profits credit) ; Hutchens Metal Prods., Inc. v.
Bookwalter, 174 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1959) (carryforward of net operating loss).
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Libson-The Broad Interpretation
A third interpretation of the Libson opinion, perhaps the most favorable to
the taxpayer, would confine the word "business" to the qualitative nature of a
profit-directed activity. This view would permit carryovers when, for example,
the absorbed loss corporation had manufactured fountain pens and the resultant
corporation continued the fountain pen "business." 104 Under this rule changes
in the situs of the operation or changes in the income-producing assets would
be irrelevant 105 so long as the resultant corporation continued to manufacture
fountain pens. If an additional business was also continued, losses would be
offset only against fountain-pen income. This reading of Libson would avoid
the rigidity of the asset criteria of Rev. Rul. 59-395, and might require less de-
tailed costs accounting techniques. But the term "business" would continue
to present definitional problems. Is "retailing" a "business" for these purposes
or must "business" be defined more precisely-"retailing women's clothing"
as distinguished from "retailing men's clothing"? More important, the qualita-
tive -theory does not take into account what seems to be the only criterion of
business difference relied onby the Libson court. The Court held that the income
of all sixteen stores engaged in retailing women's clothing was not produced
by substantially the same businesses which produced the loss, even though the
loss corporations were also engaged in retail women's clothing. This result sug-
gests that the same business qualitatively may not qualify under Libson if the
business has been expanded through a substantial contribution of capital. The
"asset" test of Rev. Rul. 59-395, though perhaps too rigid, does take account to
this problem.
Libson Applied Where No Shift in Entity Has Occurred
Although Libson is not a binding precedent when the legal entity of the tax-
payer is unchanged and the Court itself purported to reserve decision in that
104. Some support for this view can be found in the discussion of "business" in post-
Libson cases. See F. C. Donovan, Inc. v. United States, 261 F2d 470, 472 (1st Cir.
1958) ("Until ... 1946, F. C. Donovan, Inc. engaged in the business of merchandising
leather at wholesale. ... Plastic Products Corp... was engaged in the business
of distributing plastic sheeting."); id. at 473 (similar); Hutchens Metal Prods.,
Inc. v. Bookwalter, 174 F. Supp. 338, 339 (W.D. Mo. 1959) ("[one corporation] vas
engaged in the maufacturing of farm implements, farm wagons, trailers, tank trailers,
and other items of a similar nature.... [The other corporation] sold the manufactured
products ... and also did some manufacturing.") ; id. at 342 ("[the two corporations]
activities were substantially the same.... Prior to the merger they had operated sub-
stantially a single business.") ; cf. Packer Corp. v. United States, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 46
(E.D. Mich. 1958); Albert Gersten, 28 T.C 756 (1957), aff'd in part, remanded in part
without discussion of this issue, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959). But cf. Anderson & Middle-
ton Forest Prods. Co. v. United States, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R2d 784 (W.D. Wash. 1959).
105. Cf. Packer Corp. v. United States, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 486 (E.D. Mich.
1958). But see Old Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1958)
(implying that a change of location might be fatal); cf. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 285 (1954).
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situation,1°6 the Libson rationale may require disallowance of the carryover
when a single corporation discontinues the 'business to which the loss was
attributable. Since the difference between survival or dissolution of the loss
corporation's entity in merger or other acquisition of assets is devoid of economic
significance, it is arguable that the same carryover law should apply to both
situations.10 7 In Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, a coal mining company with
a loss carryover sold all its assets; then the stock of the corporation was sold
to third parties, who contributed a profitable oil transport business to the
corporation.108 The facts of Mill Ridge were almost identical to the pre-Libson
case of Alprosa Watch Corp., which heldithat the losses could be carried forward
against the income from the new business. The District Court in Mill Ridge,
applying, apparently sua sponte, what it thought was the Libson rationale,""
disallowed the carryover of coal mining losses against income from transport-
ing oil. °10 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that, under Libson, the "tax-
payer" claiming the deduction was not the same "taxpayer" as had sustained
106. 353 U.S. at 390 n.9.
107. See note 77 mipra and accompanying text.
The Court's language--We conclude that petitioner is not entitled to a carry-over
since the income against which the offset is claimed was not produced by substantially
the same businesses which incurred the losses"-is certainly broad enough to apply to
cases in which the corporate entity remains unchanged. See BrrKEm, CASES ON FEDEIIAL
INcOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 472 (2d ed. 1958) ; The Supreme Court, 1956 Terns,
71 HARv. L. REv. 83, 192 (1957); 43 IOwA L. REv. 669, 672-73 (1958). Moreover, the
court's reliance on the legislative history and purpose of the carryover provisions of the
statute tend to support such a reading.
Other commentators have argued that the Libson rationale is applicable only where
tax attributes of a corporation whose existence is terminated in a corporate amalgamation
are involved. See Levine & Petta, supra, note 98, at 448; Arent, Current Developments
Affecting Loss Corporations, 35 TAXES 956, 961 (1957); Sinrich, Libson Shops-An
Argument Against Its Application Under the 1954 Code, 13 TAx L. REv. 167, 176 (1958)(interpreting the Court's reference to Alprosa as approval of that line of cases).
108. 264 F2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (1959), afflrming on this
point 1 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 1627 (N.D. Ala. 1958). The District Court decision is
criticized at length in Levine & Petta, Libson Shops Applied To the Single Corporate
Taxpayer, 36 TAXES 562 (1958).
109. The unofficial report of the District Court's charge to the jury, I Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d at 1627-28, reveals that the deduction was originally disallowed by the Commissioner
on the authority of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 129. The court found, however, that as a
matter of law, § 129 was inapplicable. Nonetheless, the court directed a verdict for the
Government, considering itself "bound by the reasoning of the Supreme Court" in
Libson. 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at -1629. The opinion implies that Libson's applicability
was not suggested by the Government's attorney in oral argument, but that the court
adopted its reasoning on his own motion. See Levine & Petta, supra note 108, at 563.
110. "Mill Ridge Goal Co., which had previously been engaged in the production and
sale of coal in Kenutcky, and for a time the leasing of its lands and premises in Kentucky,
after that change in stock ownership .... went into the business of selling and distributing
bunker oil here in Jefferson County .... It is from that business, the . . . bunker oil,
that the plaintiff's income after December 31, 1953, was derived. Before December 31,
1953, the plaintiff had never engaged in the business of selling and distributing bunker
oil." 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 1628-29.
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the loss."' Subsequently, however, the Tax Court has reaffirmed its earlier
holding in Alprosa, holding Libson inapplicable where the corporate entity
continued unchanged."- Despite the Tax Court's position the Service has
indicated that it will continue to urge application of the Mill Ridge extension
of the Libson doctrine in future cases.1 ' 3
The Mill Ridge case may be easier to state than to apply. That a single
corporation which undergoes certain corporate adjustments can be deprived
of its loss carryover emerges dearly from the decision. What adjustments
will disqualify the loss carryover is not dear, however, since in Mill Ridge
there were two changes-sale of all the stock and change from coal mining to
the oil transport business-either of which could be viewed as crucial. The
Government may argue that the switch from coal to oil transport was itself
sufficient reason for denying the carryover,"14 although in the past it has seldom
taken such an extreme position.' 3  Taxpayers will contend that a business
change is not sufficient justification for denying the carryover unless accom-
panied by a complete change in ownership. The language of Mill Ridge would
seem to support this latter argument; the court was primarily concerned
with "windfall" benefits to third parties and "trading" in loss carryovers,
criteria that would be inapposite if no sale of stock had occurred."" But
Libson, which Mill Ridge ostensibly applied, involved no change in ownership.
And the Supreme Court adverted to ownership only once, in the statement
of the facts." 7 Thus Libson can be viewed as resting on change of business
alone without regard to change of ownership. Whatever definition of business
111. 264 F2d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 1959). The Fifth Circuit also found, contrary tu
the District Court, that § 129(a) was a proper ground for disallowance.
112. Virginia Metal Prods., Inc., 33 T.C. No. 88 (Jan. 29, 1960) (alternative hold-
ing). The Fifth Circuit's decision in Mill Ridge %as not cited. The Tax Cuurt cited
only footnote 9 of Libson, and its prior decisions in Alprosa and A.B. & Container Corp.,
14 T.C. 842 (1950), acq., 1950-2 Ctm. BuL. 1. Another Tax Court decision, British
Motor Car Distribs., Ltd., 31 T.C. 437 (1958), nonacq., 1959-1 Cum. BuLL 6, rered without
discussiom of the point, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1960), decided some six months
after the District Court decision in Mill Ridge similarly held Libson inapplicable to a single
corporation citing only footnote 9 of Libson.
113. The Government has argued Libson in Virginia Metal, supra note 112, and in
Joseph Weidenhoff, 32 T.C. No. 120 (Sept. 23, 1959).
114. The District Court seems to have relied upon the change in business alone. Set
1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 1629-30; Levine & Petta, supra note log, at 564.
115. In Northway Sec. Co., 23 B.T.A. 532 (1931), acq., X-2 Cum. Buu._ 52 (1931),
the Commissioner unsuccessfully sought to disallow a carryforward arguing that change of
business alone was a sufficient ground for disallowance. In other areas, the Commissioner
has not always been satisfied where ownership has remained the sane. See cases cited note
90, mupra; Sunswick Corp. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 856 (S.D. N.Y. 1958) (cor-
poration denied carryback of unused excess profits credit from a taxable year in which
taxpayer was a personal holding company); American Valve Co. v. United States, 137
F. Supp. 249 (S.D. N.Y. 1956) (same); Aluminum Prods. Co. v. United States, 121 Ct.
Cl. 187, 101 F. Supp. 373 (1951) (same).
116. 264 F.2d at 717.
117. 353 US. at 383.
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is accepted, a switch from coal mining to oil transportation would seem in-
cluded. The taxpayer may have to argue, therefore, that the Alprosa entity
theory was unaffected by Libson, and that Mill Ridge's disallowance of the
same entity's loss was erroneous.118
Libson-A Taxpayer's Weapon
Although the Libson case involved a statutory merger which transferred
rights and obligations "by operation of law," the holding did not seem to
depend upon the method of amalgamation."10 Taxpayers may derive some
comfort from Libson by arguing that "continuity of business" is now the sole
test of carryovers' availability, regardless of the technical form of amalgama-
tion. Indeed, a taxpayer might cite the Service's use of Libson in Mill Ridge's
single entity context ' 20 as supporting his position that entity theory, with its
ramifications, is now irrelevant. Under this view, carryovers would be allowed
in nonstatutory amalgamations such as a liquidation of a subsidiary into its
parent,' 21 or a so-called "practical merger" in which one corporation's assets
are transferred to another corporation in exchange for stock 1 22 -so long as
there is no substantial change in business. But the hobgoblin of consistency
has not haunted the Internal Revenue Service. Rev. Rul. 59-395 retains the
formalistic distinction when carryovers are attempted across corporate lines,
118. This is the position taken in Levine & Petta, supra note 108.
119. The Court purported not to decide the Government's broad argument that sep-
arately chartered corporations could never be the same taxpayer, or the taxpayer's equally
broad opposing argument that the survivor of a statutory merger is always entitled to
the absorbed corporation's carryover. The result was justified solely in terms of a con-
tinuity of business criterion. See text accompanying notes 62-67 supra.
120. See note 113 supra.
121. Such a liquidation may be tax free, i.e. no gain or loss is recognized, § 332(a),
and the property received retains its basis in the hands of the transferor, § 334(b) (1),
if the subsidiary was 80% owned, as defined in § 332(b), for more than two years, or
if owned for less than two years the subsidiary's stock was not acquired by a "purchase"
as defined in § 334(b) (3). Even if the subsidiary were owned for less than two years
and -the subsidiary's stock had been acquired by a purchase, no gain or loss would Ix
recognized, but the assets received would, under § 334(b) (2), take the adjusted basis of
the stock surrendered. If the subsidiary is less than 80% owned, the liquidation would
be fully taxable under § 331(a), and the property received would take a basis to its
fair market value under § 334(a). See generally Birrxm= 255-62, 272-82.
122. This transaction might be treated as a sale (barter) of assets for stock and
therefore taxable in full under §§ 1001-02. Or, the transaction might qualify as a (C)
reorganization under § 368(a) (1) (C), in which event, neither corporation would recog-
nize gain or loss by virtue of §§ 361, 1032, and the assets transferred would retain their
basis in the hands of the transferor under § 362(b), and the stock received would ta-e
the basis of the property given up under § 358. See generally BrrrK a 357-61, 365-72.
The same transaction might be effected by an exchange of stock in the acquiring cor-
poration for a controlling (as defined in § 368(c)) block of stock of the loss corporation
in a transaction qualifying as a (B) reorganization under § 368(a) (1) (B), followed by a
complete liquidation of the loss corporation tax free by virtue of § 322 and § 334(b) (1).
See BrrrKER 366 n.10.
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allowing the deduction only if the amalgamation was pursuant to state statute and
the particular continuity of business test laid down by the ruling is met.lm The
Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit had, in several post-Libson cases before
publication of the ruling, distinguished between operation-of-law and voluntary
combinations. 124 But a tax-payer apparently urging the irrelevance of the distinc-
tion was upheld in F. C. Donovan, Inc. v. United Statcs,21 where Judge
Magruder, speaking for the First Circuit, permitted a carryover across cor-
porate lines after liquidation of a subsidiary into its parent.2 The court found
a continuity of business and also emphasized that the beneficial omership of
the two corporations had not changed.l - A statutory transfer of rights and
obligations was not required, the opinion implied, because the transaction
was tax free, neither corporation recognizing gain or loss. The basis of the
Code's nonrecognition sections, the court reasoned, was the theory that such
transactions involve no real economic changes.12 Since Congress disregarded
the change in entity for that purpose, 20 the nature of the change in entity
should not affect the availability of the carryover. 30 Similarly, the Court of
123. 1959 Irr. REv. Bumw No. 51, at 24. Only New Colonial is cited in support.
124. See Patten FMine Papers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 1957)
(liquidation of subsidiary, probably tax free under Int Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (6);
capital loss carryover disallowed) ; Dumont-Airplane & Marine Instruments, Inc., 28 T.C.
1308, 1315-16 (1957) (tax-free (C) reorganization; carryover of unused excess profits
credits disallowed).
125. 261 F.2d 470 (1st Cir. 1958), vacating and remanding 159 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass.),
12 V.xD. L. REV. 1411 (1959).
126. Specifically, losses attributable to the Plastics division of F. C. Donovan, Inc.
were permitted to be carried back against income of a prior taxable year of the liquidated
subsidiary who in that earlier year conducted the "business" to which the loss was
attributable. The liquidation qualified under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (6) (now
§ 332). 261 F.2d at 476.
127. 261 F.2d at 472-74.
128. See 261 F.2d at 476: "it is no longer satisfactory to distinguish New Colonial
Ice Co., Inc. v. Helvering... on the basis of the distinction between a 'statutory merger'
and other forms of corporate reorganization.... We now think that the true explana-
tion of New Colonial Ice Co., Inc. v. Helvering is that it came up under the provisions
of the Revenue Act of 1921, which was several years before the Congress introduced
into the revenue laws the broad provisions for certain types of reorganization to be
tax-free as to the corporations. It was the obvious and stated purpose of the Congress to
encourage businessmen to effectuate certain types of tax-free reorganizations for adequate
business reasons, unaffected by fear of adverse federal tax consequences. . . . If we
should hold, in the present case, that the effectuation of such a reorganization has resulted in
cutting out a carryback privilege which otherwise existed, we would be defeating the essential
purposes of the Congress in enacting the provisions for tax-free reorganizations." This ra-
tionale for distinguishing New Colonial had been suggested a decade before Donovan in Rapp,
Current Problens With Carry-Overs and Carry-Backs Follow4ng Corporate Reorgaria-
tions, N.Y.U. 6TH INsT. oN FFD. TAX 327, 329-34 (1948).
129. On the rationale of the reorganization sections, see Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes
and Realism, 71 HARv. L. REv. 254, 258-61 (1957).
130. 261 F.2d at 475. The holding of the Donovan case may, however, be consider-
ably narrowed because a consolidated return was filed in the carryback year. Arguably,
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Claims in Wabash R.R. v. United States 13 1 seemed to rely on the fact that
a reorganization was tax free in allowing a carryover after a section 77 in-
solvency reorganization. 3 2
A Donovan approach may, in some circumstances, prove a pyrrhic victory
for taxpayers. If Donovan replaces the operation-of-law standard with a test
requiring qualification under the nonrecognition sections of the Code, carry-
overs will be allowed only after reorganizations which are tax free. 3 3 Indeed,
focusing solely on the underlying rationale of the reorganization sections
of the statute would compel this result, since a taxable merger is treated as a
sale of assets and no court has suggested that a sale of assets should operate to
transfer carryovers to the purchaser. Thus, a carryover might meet the oper-
ation-of-law test, but be disallowed if the reorganization was not tax free.
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 269
Congress did not leave the job of policing the carryover provisions solely
to the courts, and in 1943, enacted the predecessor of section 269. 14 This
therefore, the case has no applicability where corporations filing separate returns are
involved. That the holding is so limited seems dubious for several reasons. If consolidated
returns had been the crucial factor in the case, presumably the applicable conolidated
returns regulations would have been discussed in some detail, especially inasmuch as they
specifically precluded the carryback allowed in the case. See Treas. Reg. § 23.31 (d) (3)
(1939) (now Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-31(b) (3) (1955)). While Judge Magruder was not
unaware of the consolidated return regulations because several hypothetical examples
include citation to them, the opiniorq does not purport to apply these regulations to allow
the carryback. See Dale, Confusion Foreseen in Court's Disregard of Consolidated Re-
turn Regulations, 11 J. TAXATION 263, 264 (1959) (criticizing lack of discussion of ap-
plicable regulations). Moreover, if the consolidated return in the carryback year had
been significant, some citation of Koppers would have been appropriate since Koppers
was on all fours with Donovan.
131. 164 F. Supp. 226 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (alternative holding).
132. Since the Internal Revenue Service had ruled that the reorganization was tax-
able at the time of its consummation in 1941, the court was put to considerable difficulty
to hold, fifteen years later, that it was tax free. Query the effect of the decision on tie
basis of property received in the reorganization?
This case is of considerable importance since almost none of the pre-Libson cases
had permitted carryovers after any transaction other than a statutory merger. See
Donohue v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 660 (E.D. Mo. 1953) ; Follansbee Steel Corp.
v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 635 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
133. Curiously, neither Rev. Rul. 59-395, nor the Libson opinion speaks in terms of
tax-free statutory mergers. The ruling purports to deal with carryovers after mergers
and consolidations "the tax treatment of which is determined under the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939." 1959 INT. REv. BULL. No. 51, at 21. See also id. at 23,
24, 25. This phrase would include taxable as well as tax-free mergers.
134. Revenue Act of 1943, § 128, 58 Stat. 47, added § 129 to the Int. Rev. Code
of 1939. The 1954 Code reenacted § 129 as § 269 without substantial change and added
subsection (c) discussed at notes 156-61 infra and accompanying text.
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provision, not limited to loss carryovers, sought to curb stock or asset acqui-
sitions made primarily for the purpose of securing the benefit of tax attri-
butes.' 35 Section 269(a) (1) disallows carryovers if control of a corporatiun
is acquired for the principal purpose of "securing the benefit of a deduction,
credit, or other allowance, which such [acquiring] person or corporation would
not otherwise enjoy." Section 269(a) (2) disallows a carryover when "a cor-
poration acquires . . .property of another corporation, not controlled I before
the acquisition] .. . by such acquiring corporation or its stockholders, the
basis of which property... is determined by reference to the basis in the hands
of the transferor corporation," and the motivation for the acquisition is tax
avoidance. 136 The broad phrasing of section 269 would seem to provide the
Service with a potent weapon. If the proscribed "principal purple" can be
shown, a loss carryover could be denied after a purchase of stock,' T merger
or other type of tax-free reorganization, 3 so long as both corporatiuns were
not previously under common ownership. Moreover, since a presumption of
135. The abuses aimed at are described in H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., Ist Se,.
(1943), reprinted in 1944 Cu. BuLu. 901, 919-20, 938-39; S. REP. No. u27, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1943), reprinted in 1944 Cuii. BUL.. 973, 993-94, 1016-18; H.R. RuP. No. 1079,
78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944), reprinted in 1944 Cur,. BuT.. 1059, W0k.9-70. For example.,
of the situations to which the Commissioner interpreted § 129 to apply, see Treas. Reg.
118, § 39.129-3(b)-(c) (1945).
The discussion of § 269 will be concerned with its applicability to net operating loss
carryovers except where the reasoning of cases involving its applicability to other tax
attributes is significant. In the interest of clarity, the 1954 Code section number %%ill be
used in the discussion of the 1939 Code cases.
136. Relevantly, § 269 reads: If
(1) any person ... acquired... directly or indirectly, control of a corporation,
or
(2) any corporation acquires. ... directly or indirectly, property of another
corporation, not controlled, directly or indirectly, inunediately before such
acquisition, by such acquiring corporation or its stockholders, the basis oi
which property, in the hands of the acquiring corporation, is determined by
reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor corporation, and the
principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoid-
ance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit,
or other allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise
enjoy, then such deduction ... shall not be allowed.
137. "Control" is defined as "the ownership of stock possessing at least 50 per cent
of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least
50 per cent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of the corporation." § 269.
Thus a purchase of stock of sufficient voting power or value might bring § 269 into play.
And of course, "acquisition!' includes many transactions other than cash purchases.
138. The statute requires an acquisition of corporate property with a transferred
basis, which would include for example, transfers in reorganizations as defined in § 363-
(a) (1) or transfers qualifying under § 351, after both of which basis is determined under
§ 362(b). Transfers in liquidations would not fall within § 269(a) (2) since to retain
its basis under § 334(b) (1), property must be received from an 80 per cent owned sub-
sidiary and therefore the provision exempting acquisitions from controlled corporations
would apply.
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correctness attends the Commissioner's assessment of a deficiency,18 D the bur-
den of negating the tax avoidance purpose falls upon the taxpayer.
Prior to 1955 the Government was consistently unsuccessful in litgated cases
in establishing that 'tax avoidance was "the principal purpose" of an acquisition,
a surprising lack of success in view of the common belief that trafficking in loss
corporations was a widespread and transparent practice. More accurately, the
taxpayers were able, by showing a valid business purpose, to sustain their
burden of proof. 140 The Service's difficulty sprang in part from the courts'
construction of "the principal purpose." Once the taxpayer had established
some business purpose 'for the acquisition no further scrutiny of other purposes
was attempted.1 41 This approach seems unwarranted both in terms of the
statutory language 142 and legislative history. The Senate Report accompanying
the predecessor of section 269 stated that avoidance was to be considered the
principal purpose of the acquisition if "the evasion or avoidance purpose out-
ranks or exceeds in importance, any other purpose." 143 Implicit in this view
139. See, e.g., American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F2d 125, 127
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957).
140. See Commodores Point Terminal Corp., 11 T.C. 411, 418-19 (1948), acq., 1949-1
Cum. BuLL. 1 (alternative holding) (opportunity to secure new source of income for
repairs, expansion and interest payments on mortgage bonds); Alcorn Wholesale Co.,
16 T.C. 75, 89 (1951), acq., 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 1 (to increase borrowing capacity; to
limit liability; to permit handling of competitive lines of merchandise; to eliminate preju-
dice against absentee ownership) ; Berland's Inc., 16 T.C. 182, 188 (1951), acq., 1951-2
Cum. BULL. 1 (realignment of liability for store leases); Chelsea Prods. Inc., 16 T.C.
840, 853 (1951), nonacq., 1951-2 Cum. BuL.. 5, aff'd, 197 F.2d 620 (3rd Cir. 1952) (to
carry on business) ; J. E. Dilworth Co. v. Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957 (M.D. Tenn. 1951)
(to resolve differences with foreign state's tax authorities) ; WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C. 249,
255-56 (1952), acq., 1954-2 Cum. BULL 6 (to make available "large liquid assets");
cf. Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240, 244-45 (1948) (alternative holding). See also
John P. Wagner, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 524 (1958).
141. See, e.g., WAGE, Inc., supra note 140, at 256 ("it cannot be said that the
principal purpose... was to avoid... taxes because the facts clearly show a substantial
business purpose was achieved."); Tarleau, Acquisition of Loss Companies, 31 TAXES
1050, 1059-60 (1953).
142. In light of other provisions of the Code, "the principal purpose" must have been
intended to mean something more than "absence of business purpose." Compare it. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 112(k) ("if . . . the principal purpose of the taxpayer . . . was a pur-
pose to avoid Federal Income tax ... or if not such purpose, was not a bona fide business
purpose") ; id., § 112(i) ("a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance
of Federal income taxes"). See also INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1551 ("the securing of
[a tax attribute] . . . was not a major purpose") ; id. § 306(b) (4) ("a plan having as
one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax") ; id., § 302(c) (2)
(similar).
143. S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1943), reprinted in 1944 Cum. BULL.
973, at 1017. See also Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.129-3 (1945), added by T.D. 5426, 1945
Cum. BULL. 196; Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.129-3 (1953).
For a description of -the legislative history, see Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid Income
or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of the Interzal Revenue Code, 58 HARv L. Rzv. 196,
200-03 (1944).
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is congressional recognition that a particular acquisition may have more than
one motivation, and that the various purposes must be evaluated. The tide may
be turning, however, for in seven cases under section 269 since 1955 the Com-
missioner has prevailed. 4 Whether this success will be permanent remains to
be seen, since the cases for the most part represented extreme factual situations.
Even if the Commissioner could establish that tax avoidance were the only
purpose of a transaction, the taxpayer might prevail if he could shape his
amalgamation so that the loss entity would survive. In the 1948 decision of
Alprosa Watch Corp. the Tax Court read section 269(a) (1), albeit in dictum,
to disallow the deduction of the acquiring corporation or individuals, but not
deductions of the acquired corporation. 145 Thus in an Alprosa factual situa-
tion where a profitable business is transferred to a loss corporation by new
owners who have purchased all the loss corporation's stock, the new owners
would not have to fear the sanctions of section 269, because the "acquircd"
corporation- the loss corporation-would be claiming its own carryover. 4 0
Subsequent decisions by federal courts have rejected the Tax Court's long
standing interpretation of section 269. In Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Comm is-
sioner,'47 a parent corporation created a subsidiary to split its income and obtain
two surtax exemptions instead of one.148 The income-producing property was
144. American Pipe & Steel Corp., 25 T.C. 351 (1955), af'd, 243 F2d 125 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957); Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d
396 (4th Cir. 1957); Elko Realty Co., 29 T.C. 1012, aff'd per curiai,, 260 F.2d 949 (3d
Cir. 1958); Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 813 (1959); James Realty Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 306 (D. Minn.
1959) ; Hawaiian Trust Co. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 637 (D. Hawaii 1959) ; British
Motor Car Distribs., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1960). For
concise discussion of American Pipe and Steel, Elko Realty, and Coastal Oil, see Kirkpatrick,
Section 269 of the 1954 Code-It's Present and Prospective Function in the Comnis-
sioiwer's Arsenal, 15 TAx L. REv. 137, 150-57 (1960).
145. See Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240, 245 (1948). The Aiprosa dictum was
followed by the Tax Court in T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957); British Motor Car
Distribs.. Ltd., 31 T.C. 437 (1958), lonacq., 1959-1 Cum. Bum- 6, reced, 5 Am. Fed. Tax
R2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1960); Virginia Metal Prods., Inc., 33 T.C. No. 88 (Jan. 29, 1960).
146. It was generally assumed that the Tax Court's reasoning protected such trans-
actions. See, e.g., Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1627, 1629-30
(N.D. Ala. 1958), rev'd on this point, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cr.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
813 (1959); Ekman, What Has Happened Under Section 129; What May We Expect?,
N.Y.U. 10TH IN sT. ox FED. TAx 1231, 1240 (1952); Arent, Problems its Acquiring
Cldsely-Held Loss Corporations, N.Y.U. 1STH INsT. oN Fen. TAx. 453, 469 (1957). The
loss corporation would not be subject to section 269(a) (2) since it did not acquire "prop-
erty of another corporation." Moreover, since the corporation claiming the deduction
was the same entity which sustained the loss, the ttansaction was, at least prior to Libson,
completely immunized from attack under the "common law."
147. 242 F2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957), reversing 25 T.C. 1304 (1956), 43 VA. L REV.
1134 (1957). See also Arent, The Impact of the Coastal Oil Decison Upon Loss Cor-
porations, 8 J. TAxATiox 14 (1958).
148. "Surtax exemption" is a short hand phrase describing the "step" in the corporate
income tax rates. Under INT. Rrv. CoDE OF 1954, § 11, corporate taxable income up to
$25,000 is taxed at 30%. All in excess of $25,000 is taxable at 52%. Thus it is apparent
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transferred from the parent to the new corporation in exchange for its stock
without recognition of gain or loss.1 40 Applying section 269(a) (1), the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that, even though the subsidiary was
the acquired corporation, its surtax exemption could be disallowed because the
principal purpose of acquiring control of the subsidiary was to secure for the
acquiring corporation-the parent-the benefit of an allowance it would not
otherwise enjoy.150 The court was able to repudiate the Tax Court's acquired-
acquiring distinction by reading the word "benefit" to include not only the
corporation's privilege of claiming a deduction, but also the ultimate eco-
nomic advantage created by a deduction. Applying this interpretation to Al-
prosa-like situations, section 269(a) (1) might be applied because new owners
acquire control to secure the benefit of the loss carryover. Despite Coastal
Oil and several similar cases, 151 however, the Tax Court has not yet abandoned
its Alprosa distinctions.152
The Coastal Oil decision also sharpened the edge of section 269(a) (2).
The Government argued that the subsidiary had acquired property with a
transferred basis solely to obtain the additional surtax exemption. The Tax
Court held that the surtax exemption would have been available even if prop-
erty had not been transferred to the subsidiary, so that the acquisition of the
property did not secure for the subsidiary the benefit of an allowance which it
that $50,000 of taxable income of an enterprise will create a tax liability of $20,500 if
earned by one corporation and only $15,000 if equally attributable to two corporations.
149. The transaction was tax free under the predecessor of § 351. The stock re-
ceived would take the basis of property given up under § 358; the property in the hands
of the subsidiary would retain its basis in the hands of the parent under § 362(a).
150. 242 F.2d at 398-99.
The Tax Court bad noted that § 269(a) (1) was inapplicable because "petitioner [the
subsidiary) did not acquire control of another corporation." 25 T.C. at 1312. Behind
this cryptic remark is, of course, the acquired-acquiring distinction: since the parent
acquired control of the subsidiary, only deductions, credits or allowances of the parent
can be disallowed under § 269(a) (1).
151. In James Realty Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 306 (D. Minn. 1959),
section 269(a) (1) was held applicable to deny a surtax exemption. Mill Ridge Coal
Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959), reversing
on this point, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1627 (N.D. Ala. 1958), and British Motor Car
Distribs., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1960), also hold that
§ 269 may disallow deductions of the acquired corporation.
In Mill Ridge the Commissioner relied, and the court based its holding, on § 129 of
the 1939 Code. Since the taxable year involved began on Sept. 1, 1954, and ended on
Aug. 31, 1955, the applicable section would appear to have been § 269 of the 1954 Code.
See § 7851 (a) (1) (A). Apparently the Commissioner and the court applied the wrong
section. Because § 269(a) reenacted § 129(a) of the 1939 Code at a time when the Tax
Court's acquired-acquiring distinction had not yet been questioned by any court, arguably
Congress, by failing to alter the language of § 129(a) to repudiate the Tax Court's
interpretation, impliedly approved that distinction. If the Mill Ridge court had realized
the applicability of the 1954 Code section, the validity of this argument could have been
tested.
152. See note 145 smpra.
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would not otherwise enjoy.' 53 The Fourth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's
reasoning, holding that the subsidiary received a benefit it would not otherwise
enjoy-but for the income from the property acquired, the surtax exemption
would have been of no benefit 15 4 The Coastal Oil interpretation of section
269(a) (2) would apply to loss carryover transactions where a loss corporation
acquires income producing property by tax-free reorganization; but for the
acquisition of new income producing assets the loss corporation would have
obtained no "benefit" from its own carryover. 1 1
Congress attempted to strengthen section 269 in 1954 by the enactment of
subsection 269(c). 1' 5 The new section provides that "prima fade evidence"
of a principal purpose to avoid income tax will be established if the considera-
tion paid upon an acquisition described in section 269(a) is substantially dis-
proportionate to (less than) 157 the sum of (1) the adjusted basis of the acquired
corporation's assets, in the case of stock acquisitions under section 269 (a) (1),
or, the basis of property acquired, in asset acquisitions under section 269 (a) (2),
and (2) "the tax benefits (to the extent not reflected in the adjusted basis of
the property) not available to such person or corporation otherwise than I,
a result of the acquisition."' 5 8 Suppose that X Corporation acquires Y Cor-
poration's stock at a price of 10. If the adjusted basis of Y's assets is 50, and
the "tax benefit"-in this case a carryover-is valued at 50, the 10:100 ratio
is probably disproportionate and the carryover could be disallowed. At least
one premise of this amendment seems to have been that no tax avoidance
purpose was present if the price paid for the tax benefit was sufficiently large.'5
It assumes that no investor with a tax avoidance purpose will pay the full
value, because if he did, he would realize no gain on the transaction. If "tax
benefit" is interpreted to mean the market value of the tax benefit at the time
of transfer, the premise of section 269 (c) is inaccurate. For example, since
153. 25 T.C. at 1312.
154. 242 F.2d at 399.
155. Section 269(a) (2) would not apply unless "property of another corporation"
with a transferred basis was acquired; ordinarily this would occur in the course of a
"reorganization," or § 351 transaction if the -transferors were corporations.
156. See S. RE:. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1954).
157. "Disproportionate" was intended to mean "less than." S. Rpm'. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 228 (1954).
158. Whether the "prima fade" presumption adds anything to the usual presumption
of correctness attending the Commissioner's assessment of a deficiency is unclear. The
original House bill would have made a disproportionate purchase price "determinativ,
of the principal purpose of evasion or avoidance of Federal Income tax, unless the tax-
payer shows to the contrary by a clear preponderance of the evidence." S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Ses. 39 (1954). The House proposal was apparently based upon 2 ALl,
FFD. INcoME TAX STAT. § X661 (c), & comment, at 351 (Feb. 1954 Draft). More recently
the ALI has recommended repeal of § 269(c). See ALI, Ixcom TAx PnonmAs oi
CoRonATIOxS AND SHAnEaoLDERs 365 (1958).
159. See Cohen, Phillips, Surrey, Tarleau & %Varren, Tie Internal Rec:ue Code of
1954: Carry-Overs and the Accumidatcd Eamings Tax, 10 TAx L. Rxv. 277, 295 (1955);
ALI, Ixcoix TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SaE=EaommeRs 365 (1958).
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the value of a loss carryover must be discounted by business risks (the pur-
chaser may never have income against which to offset the loss) and by the fact
that several years may elapse before it is fully used, a profitable traffic in loss
carryovers can be carried on even if full "value" is paid. 100 Moreover, the
section 269(c) formula operates irrationally;11 given assets whose basis and
value are the same, the less a purchaser is interested in tax avoidance and the
more the purchase price is geared to the value of the assets alone, the greater
will be the spread between the price paid and the value of the tax benefit.
The failure of prior case and statutory law adequately to distinguish manipu-
lative schemes from bona fide corporate adjustments spurred Congress to enact
sections 381 and 382 in 1954, a detailed statutory scheme designed to insure
that preservation of tax attributes will "be based upon economic realities rather
than upon such artificialities as the legal form of the reorganization."' 0 2 Sec-
tion 381 provides that a successor corporation shall, after certain enumerated
transactions, inherit some twenty enumerated tax attributes 103 (including
loss carryovers) subject to the limitations and "operating rules" of section
381 (b). Section 382, entitled Special Limitations on Net Operating Loss
Carryovers, prescribes additional limitations on the succession to that tax at-
tribute.16
Section 381
Section 381 ostensibly sweeps away any vestiges of entity theory in favor
of the Donovan emphasis on the nonrecognition sections of the Code, providing
that "in the case of the acquisition of assets of a corporation by another corpora-
tion" through certain tax-free transactions, the acquiring corporation shall
"succeed to and take into account" the carryover of the "distributor or trans-
feror" corporation.0 5 The transactions to which section 381 is expressly made
applicable are:
160. See authorities cited note 9 mtpra.
161. See Liles, Section 269 of the 1954 Code: Acquisitions To Avoid Federal Income
Tax Al--A-.AJ. 936, 938 (1955) ; Birrym 56-57.
162. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).
163. These items are described in §§ 381(c) (1)-(21), and include, among others,
capital loss carryovers under § 1212, charitable contribution carryovers under § 170(b)-
(2), 'earnings and profits," and methods of inventory valuation under §§ 471-72. For
detailed treatment of the effect of § 381 on "earnings and profits," see Germain, Carryovers
in Corporate Acquisitions, 15 TAx L. REv. 35, 61-73 (1959).
The intricacies in the computation of loss carryovers after § 381(a) transactions are
beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381 (c) (1)-
1, -2, 25 Fed. Reg. 758-65 (Jan. 29, 1960); Germain, supra at 49-60.
164. It is important to note that § 382 is limited to net operating loss carryforwards
only, and can not cause forfeiture or partial disallowance of any other tax attributes. As
a theoretical matter, this approach seems hard to justify because a variety of favorable
tax attributes may motivate corporate acquisitions in one form or another. Bn-nmcm,
CASES ON FEDmAL INcoma- ESTATE AND GiFT TAxATIoN 471-72 (2d ed. 1958).
165. § 381(a).
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1) a tax-free liquidation of an 80 per cent owned subsidiary,.0  ex-
cept when the basis of the assets received in the liquidation is determined
by section 334(b) (2) ;167
2) a statutory merger or consolidation that qualifies as an (A) re-
organization under section 368(a) (1) ;1(8
3) acquisition of substantially all the properties of one corporation
in exchange for voting stock of another if qualifying as a (C) reorgani-
zation under section 368(a) (1) ;1(9
4) transfer of assets to a controlled corporation " 0 under section 368-
(a) (1) (D), if the acquiring corporation receives substantially all the assets
of the transferor so that section 354(b) (1) is satisfied;"" and
5) a mere change in form, identity, or place of organization of the trans-
feror if qualifying as an (F) reorganization under section 368(a) (1). -72
Section 381 does not apply to a (B) reorganization where stock of the trans-
feror is exchanged for stock of the transferee so that the transferor becomes
at least an 80 per cent owned subsidiary ;73 even after a stock-for-stock ex-
166. Section 381(a) (1) expressly refers to liquidations qualifying under § 332 for
nonrecognition of gain or loss. That section applies to liquidations of corporations when
at least 80% of the total combined voting power and 80% of the total number of shares
of all other classes of stock (except nonvoting preferred stock) is ovned by the corpora-
tion receiving the distribution in liquidation. See generally Brr'rza 272-79.
167. For a discussion of § 334(.b) (2), see note 121 supra. See also Kimbell-Diamond
Milling Co., 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th CAr.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 827 (1951) ("common law" ancestor of § 334(b) (2)). See generally Brrrm
280-82.
168. On (A) reorganizations, see generally Brrnrcm at 361-63.
169. On (C) reorganizations, see generally id. at 365-72.
170. The reference to a "controlled" corporation incorporates the definition of control
of § 368(c).
171. For purposes of the nonrecognition and basis provisions generally, a (D) reorgani-
zation involves a transfer of all or part of the assets of a corporation to another corporation
if immediately after the transfer the transferor or one or more of its shareholders control
the acquiring corporation and if stock or securities of the controlled corporation are dis-
tributed pursuant to the plan of reorganization in an exchange to which § 354 or
355 applies. This section's primary importance lies in its granting nonrecognition treat-
meat to corporate divisions but it also may apply to combinations of parent and sub-
sidiary and certain other acquisitions. In keeping with the Congressional desire that §
381(a) should not apply to divisive reorganizations, that section permits succession of
tax attributes after (D) reorganizations only if the acquiring corporation acquires "sub-
stantially all of the assets of the transferor," § 354(b) (1) (A), and the stock or securities
received by such transferor as well as the other properties of the transferor are distributed
in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, § 354(b) (1) (B). On (D) reorganizations,
see generally Brrrza 372-74.
172. On (F) reorganizations, see generally id. at 383-84.
Section 381(a) (2) also requires a transfer to which § 361 applies. Since § 361 can
apply only if a corporation "a party to a reorganimfaion exchanges properly, in pursuance
of the plan of reorganication," its inclusion in § 381 (a) (2) seems supererogatory, especial-
ly in view of § 381(a)'s own requirement that "assets" be acquired.
173. An exchange by which a corporation acquires a 20% interest in addition to a
60% interest previously held will qualify as a (B) reorganization. See Treas. Reg. §
1.368-2(c) (1955). On (B) reorganizations, see generally BrrTxRz 363-65.
Section 381(a) does not refer to (B) reorganizations presumably because the trans-
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change, however, -the carryover may be acquired by the parent under section
381(a) if the subsidiary is liquidated in a tax-free transaction.'7" Section
381 is inapplicable to certain insolvency reorganizations,17 5 sales of stock in
pursuance of orders of the Securities Exchange Commission, 170 recapitaliza-
tions under section 368(a) (1) (E),177 transfers to corporations controlled by
the transferors under section 351,178 and perhaps most important, divisive
reorganizations-spin-offs, split-offs, md split-ups. 179
Despite the congressional declaration that substance rather than form will
be decisive, tax attributes may still depend upon which entity survives a cor-
porate adjustment because section 381 deals only with the tax attributes of
a "transferor or distributor."'8i 0 For example, if X Corporation transfers its
assets to Y Corporation in exchange for voting stock of Y, section 381 affects
only X's tax history; Y's remains unaffected. The transaction could have been
cast to leave X's tax history unaffected by section 381 by having Y Corpora-
tion exchange its assets for stock of X. Also, when a parent corporation with
a carryover liquidates a profitable subsidiary, section 381 does not apply to the
parent's use of its own carryover to offset subsequent income from the sub-
action results in the acquisition of a subsidiary which can remain alive and make use of its
own tax attributes.
174. Of course, a (B) reorganization followed by a liquidation is functionally
equivalent to a (C) reorganization, see BiTTER 366 n.10, and could be treated as such
in appropriate cases. Apparently the Service has taken this position in unpublished rulings
even in cases not involving loss carryovers. Fager, The Acquisition of Partly-Held Cor-
porations (The Bausch & Lomb Decision), N.Y.U. 18Tlu I'csr. ox FuD. TAx 799, 815-11
(1960). So long as the (B) reorganization resulted in the acquisition of no more than
80% of the loss corporation's stock, whether the transaction is treated as a (B) re-
organization followed by liquidation under § 332, see note 166 supra, or a (C) reorgani-
zation, would not affect the acquiring corporation's inheritance of the transferor's carry-
over. If more than 80% were acquired, § 382(b) would reduce the carryover, see notel
216-19 infra and accompanying text, unless the separate steps were recognized.
175. Because § 381(a) (2) refers only to reorganizations defined in § 368(a) (1), in-
solvency reorganizations which are unable to meet the requirements of that section are
not included within the general rule of § 381(a), even though they may qualify for
nonrecognition treatment under §§ 371-74. On insolvency reorganizations, see generally
Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of
Creeping Confusion, 14 TAx L. Rzv. 225, 264-70, 277-79 (1959). Thus if a new cor-
poration is formed, § 381 (a) will be of no assistance to the successor corporation. Although
§ 381(a) may be inapplicable to transfer a net operating loss of a predecessor, Libson
Shops, as interpreted in Wabash R.R. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 226 (Ct. Cl. 1958),
may come to the taxpayer's rescue.
176. Such transactions may be tax free under §§ 1081-83.
177. On recapitalizations, see generally Bir=rr 374-83.
178. On transfers to controlled corporations, see note 149 supra. See generally BIrrrn
74-110.
179. On corporate divisions, see generally BiTrT Rr 321-56.
180. "Transferor" refers to a corporation transferring property in a reorganization
described in § 381 (a) (2). "Distributor" refers to a corporation transferring assets in a
liquidation described in § 381 (a) (1).
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sidiaxy's "business."' 81 Use of carryovers not affected by section 381 may
nevertheless be subject to -the limitations of section 382(b) which applies to
carryovers of both the transferor and transferee corporations.1b2 In addition,
section 269 or the "common law" may also apply.
Where a transfer of a carryover across corporate lines is predicated upon
section 381, the liquidation or reorganization must qualify as tax free by sat-
isfying the literal requirements of the Code's nonrecognition sections and also
the requirements superimposed on those sections by the case law and Regu-
lations. The Regulations under section 368 have codified a line of cases hold-
ing that a reorganization cannot qualify as tax free unless prompted by a "busi-
ness purpose."'1 3 Arguably, this requirement might import section 269 into
section 381 so that section 381 would not transfer the carryover if the "prin-
cipal purpose" of the reorganization was tax avoidance.' 84 But the cases under
section 368 itself have held a reorganization tax free so long as soine business
purpose can be established; theoretically, a tax avoidance motive is irrele-
vant.'8 5 If the "transferor" corporation had no assets other than its tax his-
tory, however, or had no operating assets, a reorganization involving that
corporate "shell" might be found to serve no business purpose and thus fail
even the minimal test of section 368. In addition, the reorganization might
fail to satisfy the business purpose requirement of section 368(a) (1) if the
plan of reorganization indicated that the business of the loss corporation was
to be discontinued. 86 And although the case law is far from clear, a similar
181. This would be true whether the liquidation were taxable or tax free.
182. § 382(b) (1).
183. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955):
Such transaction... must be an ordinary and necessary incident of the conduct
of the enterprise and must provide for a continuation of the enterprise.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c) (1955).
184. The theory would be that existence of a "principal tax avoidance" purpose is
inconsistent with the existence of any "business purpose." But it is theoretically possible
that even if tax avoidance is "the principal purpose" of a transaction, there may also
be "a business purpose." Indeed it is doubtful that many corporate transactions are con-
summated without careful consideration of the tax consequences. See Berland's Inc., 16 T.C.
182, 188 (1951), acq., 1951-2 Cum. BuLl. 1.
185. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935) (L. Hand,J.) :
[In Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), the Supreme Court] %%as
solicitous to reaffirm the doctrine that a man's motive to avoid taxation will not
establish his liability if the transaction does not do so without it.. . . We may
assume that purpose may be the touchstone, but the purpose which counts is one
which defeats or contradicts the apparent transaction, not the purpose to escape
taxation which .the apparent, but not the whole, transaction would realize."
186. In Rev. Rul. 56-330, 1956-2 Cumn. Bur.. 204, three corporations, X, Y, and Z.
and a partnership contemplated forming a new corporation to engage in the life insurance
business. None of the corporations was engaged in the life insurance business. The
transaction, according to the ruling, did not meet the definition of a (C) reorganization
"for the reason that there would be no continuity of any business enterprise in which
the transferor corporations may have engaged. ... it is the established policy of the
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plan to discontinue a subsidiary's business after liquidation might disqualify
the liquidation from nonrecognition treatment under section 332, thereby mak-
ing section 381 inapplicable.' 8 7 A holding to either effect would come peril-
ously close to importing the Libson continuity-of-business test into section 381
through section 368 even though the Service has announced that the principle
of Libson will not be applied to transactions described in section 381.188 The
nonrecognition regulations also require some "continuity of interest" ;189 the
Internal Revenue Service, that requisite to a reorganization under the law is the con-
tinuity of the business enterprise under the modified corporate form. . . In the instant
case, as the . . . [new corporation] would engage in a new btasness which would be
entirely different from the activities now being carried on by the X, Y, and Z Corporations
the requirement with respect to the continuity of business enterprise would not be satisfied."
1956-2 Curm. BUiL. at 205-06. (Emphasis added.) While the Regulations require "a
continuity of the business enterprise," Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955), and require that
the plan of reorganization "provide for a continuation of the enterprise," Treas. Reg. §
1.368-1 (c) (1955), the cases have uniformly held that there is no requirement "that the
business when reorganized must be the same, or even bear any similarity to the busihegs
previously conducted." Ernest F. Becher, 22 T.C. 932, 941 (1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 252
(2d Cir. 1955). The language of the Regulations stems from remarks of the Supreme
Court in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), and have generally been inter-
preted as requiring continuity of some business as distinguished from inactivity or liquida-
tion. See Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F2d 753, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Ernest F.
Becher, supra; Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 648-49 (1st Cir. 1949); Morley
Cypress Trust, 3 T.C. 84, 85-86 (1944) ; Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner,
231 F2d 288, 292-93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956) ; George D. Graham, 37
B.T.A. 623, 629-30 (1938), acq., 1938-2 Cu-m. BULL. 13; Dean Palmer, 11 P-H B.T.A. &
Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 1080-81 (1942) ; Standard Realization Co., 10 T.C. 708, 714-15 (1948).
acq., 1948-2 Curm. BULL. 3.
Although Rev. Rd. 56-330 appears to break with prior case law, its possible applicability
to a reorganization involving a loss corporation cannot be ignored.
187. In Fairfield S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 321, 323 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 774 (1946), Judge Learned Hand stated:
Section 112, as a whole . . . has its reason and justification in the fact that
the excepted transfers are of a kind which do not result in substantial changes of
interest, and that the original 'business is to go along as before.... [Tihe under-
lying purpose [of the predecessor of § 332] was to permit the union in one corporate
form of a single business or venture which had theretofore been managed by two
corporations .... [I]t presupposes that the persons actually interested . . . meant
to go on with the venture, and had not already decided that it should be wound up.
This language probably is no longer controlling. See Marold, Sale of a Subsidiary; Inter-
corporate Dividends; Section 332; Fairfield Steamship Company Rule, N.Y.U. 1T11 INST.
ox FED. TAX. 711, 727-28 (1957) (noting, however, that the case cannot be ignored).
At all events, the Tax Court, in International Inv. Corp., 11 T.C. 678, 685 (1948),
aff'd per curiamn, 175 F2d 772 (3d Cir. 1949), successfully distinguished Fairfield on
the theory that there both the subsidiary and the parent were to be wound up. Under
this distinction Fairfield would not apply where a parent liquidated a subsidiary with a
carryover since the parent would presumably be continuing some business.
188. Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cum. BuL. 147; Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959 INT. RLv.
BuL. No. 51, at 20, 25.
189. "Requisite to a reorganization under the Code [is] . . . a continuity of interest
. . . on the part of those persons who, directly or indirectly, were the owners of the
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shareholders of the transferor must retain a "definite and material" interest
in the acquiring corporation which "represents a substantial part of the value
of .the thing transferred."' 90 Probably this requirement will be superseded by
section 382(b), which contains a specific provision dealing with the same
problem.' 91
The transaction must also meet the requirement of section 381 that "assets"
be acquired from the transferor or distributor corporation. If the word "assets"
is narrowly interpreted to mean net assets, or operating assets, it might sup-
ply the Service with an additional weapon to attack the acquisition of cor-
porate shells with a history of losses. 92 Restrictive interpretation seems point-
less, however, since the transaction could be recast to permit the shell of the
loss corporation to acquire the assets of the profitable corporation. 203
In the area of carrybacks, section 381 expressly reverts to an entity ap-
proach. Section 381(b) (3) provides that a corporation acquiring property
in a liquidation or reorganization described in section 381(a), except an (F)
reorganization (mere change in form), cannot carry back postanalgamation
losses against preamalgamation income of the transferor corporation. If, for
example, a parent with a history of losses liquidated a profitable subsidiary
under section 332 and if that business became unprofitable in the hands of
the parent, section 381 (b) (3) would prohibit any carryback of the postliqui-
dation loss to prior profitable taxable years of the subsidiary.194 Section 381-
(b) (3) seems intended to meet a potential taxpayer argument that since the
enterprise prior to the reorganization." Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955). On this
requirement, see generally BrrrxE 83-84, 393-99.
190. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 385 (1935).
191. See text accompanying notes 216-19 infra.
192. The Commissioner has argued on occasion that "substantially all the properties"
of a corporation, in § 368(a) (1) (C), refers to gross assets rather than net. See Milton
Smith, 34 B.T.A. 702, 705 (1936), nonacq., XV-2 Cum. Bu.. 46 (1936), wtihdrauu,
1957-2 Cumr. BuLt. 6; J. Mf. Turner & Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F2d 370 (4th Cir.
1957). But the Government's position may have changed recently. See Rev. Rul. 57-51S,
1957-2 Cum. Bu L.. 253; National Bank of Commerce v. United States, 158 F.Supp. 887 (E.D. Va. 1958) ; Johnson, Reorgadzatior-Minorify Stockholders, Including
Dissenters, N.Y.U. 18H IsT. oN FEa. TAx. 821, 824, 827 (1960). But see Virginia
Stevedoring Corp., 30 T.C. 996, 1007 (1958).
193. Even if the "assets" requirement of § 381(a) is not important, the taxpayer
will have to face similar tests in complying with the nonrecognition sections. It seems
hard to believe that a reorganization involving a corporation with no assets could satisfy
the business purpose criterion. And even in the case of a liquidation of a subsidiary, §
381 (a) refers -to § 332 which requires a distribution of "property."
194. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c) (1)-1(b), 25 Fed. Reg. 758 (Jan. 29, 1960).
The result in this case under pre-1954 law is unclear. While Ncwnmartet, a case
approved by the Libson; Court, allowed a post reorganization loss to be carried bad-
across corporate lines, the case involved a statutory merger which probably would have
qualified as an (F) reorganization, see 233 F2d at 497, which is not subject to the rule
of § 381(b) (3). But the first Circuit, in F. C. Donouan, Inc. v. United States, 261 F.2d
470 (1st Cir. 1958), has indicated that a carryback is permissible after a tax-free liquidation
of a subsidiary. The Tax Court and Seventh Circuit presumably would hold otherwise
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policy of the carryforward and carryback is essentially the sane, the allow-
ance of carryforwards across corporate lines under section 381(a) should
justify a carryback under the same circumstances. Unfortunately Congress
did not fully clarify the status of postamalgamation losses. Taxpayers, rely-
ing on section 172 and aided by the implication of section 381 (b) (3) may be
allowed to carry back the entire postamalgamation loss against the preamal-
gamation income of the acquiring corporation. The proposed regulations
under section 381 approve this deduction.195
Section 381 (b) (3) will sometimes operate harshly where there is no con.-
tinuity of entity. If, instead of merger, two corporations consolidate to form
a third corporation, the new entity will have no preamalgamation income
against which to offset later losses. 190 On the other 'hand, a corporation which
had low preamalgamation income taxed at thirty per cent may be benefited
by losing the carryback; if postmerger losses are followed by income large
enough to draw surtax rates, the tax saving will be larger if the total post-
merger loss is carried forward.
The omission of divisive reorganizations from the general rule of section
381 (a) might be explained by the difficulty of allocating a single loss carry-
over between two or more corporations. 197 Suppose X Corporation has4 a
since -they have disallowed carryforwards of subsidiaries' preliquidation tax attributes.
See Patten Fine Papers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1957); Gramm
Trailer Corp., 26 T.C. 689 (1956); cf. Dumont Airplane & Marine Instruments, Inc.,
28 T.C. 1308 (1957).
195. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c) (1)-1(b), 25 Fed. Reg. 758 (Jan. 29, 1960).
Moreover, Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL 147, and Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959 lIT.
REv. BuuL. No. 51, at 20, renounce Libson "as to . . . any . . . transaction described in
section 381 (a)." This statement could be literally read to mean a transaction after
which an acquiring corporation "succeeds to and takes into account" a predecessor's loss
since only in such case could Libson be applied. More likely, however, those rulings
refer only to the "transactions," i.e., the reorganizations and liquidations, and thus Lisbon
presumably will not be argued where either a carryforward or carryback is involved
after any of the transactions described in §§ 381 (a) (1) or (2), except possibly three
party (A) or (C) reorganizations. See notes 213-15 infra and accompanying text.
196. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381 (c) (1) -1 (b), example (2), 25 Fed. Reg. 758 (Jan,
29, 1960).
While a split-up is analytically the converse of a consolidation, the availability of
carrybacks after corporate divisions will not be governed by § 381 (b) (3), for Pro-
posed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(a)-i (b) (3), 25 Fed. Reg. 757 (Jan. 29, 1960), states flatly
that: "Section 381 does not apply to ... divisive reorganizations. . . ." Thus, Libson, if
anything, will be the basis of a carryback after a tax-free split-up. For discussion of
corporate divisions under the 1954 Code, see notes 399-433 in Ira and accompanying text.
197. See Cohen, supra note 159, at 280, 281. Certainly the omission is difficult to de-
fend on policy since the theoretical justification for granting nonrecognition treatment to
corporate divisions is the same as that usually given for corporate combination, via., allow-
ance of business readjustments without significant tax consequences. See BtTT,-R 358,
Compare 2 ALI, FED. INcOME TAx STAT. § X608(e) (3), and pp. 330-31 (Feb. 1954 Draft)
(providing for allocation).
Another allocation was avoided by the provision of § 381 (a) which allows a parent
to inherit the entire carryforward of a subsidiary after a tax-free liquidation although the
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net-operating-loss carryforward. Then, for a nontax reason, X splits up into
Y Corporation and Z Corporation. To avoid a double deduction of X's carry-
over, some formula for sharing the carryover must be devised. Split-off or
spin-off could create similar problems since the newly formed corporation and
the old corporation would have to share the carryover. In other provisions
of the Code the complexities of allocations are squarely confronted. After
divisive reorganizations and some section 351 transactions, "earnings and
profits" must be allocated among the participants. 1 8 Similar allocations were
required in the computation of the Korean War Excess Profits tax.l3 Ap-
parently Congress abdicated responsibility for allocation of loss carryforwards,
with the result that divisive reorganizations and certain other tax-free trans-
actions will be governed by the "common law."
Section 381's emphasis on the nonrecognition provisions may create a prob-
lem for a corporation seeking to utilize the nonrecognition provisions of the
Code without transferring its loss carryover. For example, suppose that X
Corporation, in the textile business wishes to dispose of its textile assets but
retain its carryover. Y desires to acquire the assets in a tax-free exchange
which will allow it to retain X's basis.200 A (C) reorganization-assets of X
for stock of Y-would allow basis to be carried over, but section 381 (a) pro-
vides that the transferee shall succeed to the carryover of the transferor.01-
subsidiary was only 80% owned. See also Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c) (1)-1(c) (2),
25 Fed. Reg. 759 (Jan. 29, 1960). Nothing in section 381 discusses the effect of the
parent's assumption of the carryover on the minority shareholders of the subsidiary.
Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. B24 (1954) (views of minority of House
Ways and -Means Committee; "20 per cent minority stockholders... may well see their
possible benefits from an operating loss... carryfor\ ard... wiped out by consolidation
with the other income of a majority stockholder.").
198. Treas. Reg. § 1.312-10(a) (1955) provides that "earnings and profits" are
ordinarily to be allocated in proportion to the fair market value of the business or busi-
nesses transferred in cases where the division involves formation of a new corporation:
but allocation in proportion to the net basis of the assets transferred will be required
"in a proper case." Where the division takes the form of a distribution or exchange
of stock of existing subsidiaries, a more complicated method of allocation is required
by Treas. Reg. § 1.312-10(b) (1955).
Although Treas. Reg. § 1.312-11 (a) (1) (1955) sets forth the general rule that no
allocation of "earnings and profits" shall be made by reason of a transfer of property
by one corporation to another in a § 351 transaction, the next sentence states that the
general rule may not apply when the § 351 transaction is preceded by or follows a
reorganization or § 332 liquidation to which § 334(b) (2) does not apply. The allocation
after such § 351 exchanges is presumably intended to be made after a reincorporation.
199. See, e.g., Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950, ch. 1199, § 462(i), 64 Stat. 1203;
7A AME~mis § 42.165.
See also T.D. 5642, 1948-2 Cur. BuL. 70 (providing for allocation of loss carryovers
inherited under P.L. 189, see note 40 supra, by successor corporations after certain
railroad reorganizations).
200. This would be the case if, for example, X's assets had a high basis but low
value.
201. The mandatory nature of "shall" in § 381(a) is corroborated by Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.381(c) (1)-1(a), 25 Fed. Reg. 758 (Jan. 29, 1960).
19601 1245
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The mandatory aspect of section 381 can be avoided. X and Y can contribute
their assets to a newly formed corporation, Z, in a tax-free transaction under
section 351, X receiving the same amount of stock from Z Corporation that
it would have received in the (C) reorganization; X will now hold stock in
Z instead of Y. 202 Since 351 transactions are not within section 381 (a), the
carryover would not be transferred by that section °.2 0 3 Of course, the inapplic-
ability of section 381 does not insure that X will retain the carryover, because
Libson might disallow the carryover under a "change of business" theory;
section 269 might also apply.
Three Party Transactions
The provision in -section 381 transferring the carryover to the "acquiring
corporation" becomes difficult to apply to modified (A) or (C) reorganiza-
tions involving three or more corporations. 20 4 Suppose, for example, that X
Corporation acquired all the assets of Z Corporation in exchange for voting
stock of X in a transaction qualifying under section 368(a) (1) (C). There-
after, pursuant to the plan of reorganization, X Corporation transferred some
part of the acquired assets to Y Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary, and
retained the remainder of the Z assets. Under section 368(a) (2) (C), added
in 1954, the transfer of assets to the subsidiary does not prevent qualifica-
tion of the transaction as a (C) reorganization. But which corporation,
X or Y, is the "acquiring corporation" for purposes of section 381 (a)?
Both have acquired "assets" of another corporation. The proposed regula-
tions adopt the view that only one coropration 205 can be "the acquiring cor-
202. X Corporation will become a holding company which can be reactivated In
another business retaining its carryover.
The route outlined is, of course, not identical with a (C) reorganization for unless '
is liquidated, its corporate entity will entervene between Y's shareholders and Z Cor-
poration. But if Y Corporation receives stock in Z sufficient to constitute control under
§ 368(c), Y can be liquidated without recognition of gain or loss to its shareholders
by virtue of § 354 since the entire transaction, as to Y and its shareholders, will con-
stitute a (D) reorganization.
203. This result is not sure-fire, however, since the transfer by X could be treated as
a (C) reorganization after which a carryover is lost. If Z Corporation acquired sub-
stantially all of X's assets in exchange for voting stock the literal requirements of a (C)
reorganization would seem to be satisfied bringing § 381 into play. And the statute does
not indicate whether or not the reorganization sections or § 351 will take precedence.
For the suggestion that § 351, the more liberal nonrecognition provision, would govern,
see Darrell, Corporate Organizatio'ns and Reorganizations Under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, 32 TAXES 1007, 1009 (1954). It may be possible to foreclose treatment
as a (C) reorganization by retaining sufficient assets so that less than "substantially
all" X's assets are acquired by Z, or to receive stock other than "voting stock" (which
might not remove the exchange from § 351). A further possibility might be the use
of more boot than § 368(a) (2) (B) permits.
204. For examples of these transactions, see Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-2(d) (1), -2(f)
(1955). On three party reorganizations, see generally Lurie, Namorg-Or Groinan Re-
versed, 10 TAX L. REv. 119 (1954).
205. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(a)-1 (b) (2) (i), 25 Fed. Reg. 757 (Jan. 29, 1960).
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poration." In the example given above, the regulations hold that X Corpor-
ation, -the parent, is the "acquiring corporation" which inherits Z's loss carry-
forward.20 6 The regulations similarly hold that if X Corporation had divided
all of Z's assets pursuant to the plan of reorganization betveen tho subsidiaries,
X would nonetheless remain "the acquiring corporation."2 0 7 The latter result
is inconsistent with the theory of Rev. Rid. 59-395 because the corporation
which ultimately deducts Z's loss-X Corporation-will have none of the
assets which produced the loss. If, however, all of Z's assets were transferred
directly to Y (the subsidiary) in exchange for stock of X (the parent), a
transaction also qualifying as a (C) reorganization, Y would be the "acquir-
ing corporation." 208 Corporation Y also becomes the acquiring corporation
if, in pursuance of the plan, all of Z's assets are transferred first to X, then to
Y. 209 X can, therefore, obtain Z's carryforward or allow it to pass to Y at its
option. To retain the carryforward X need only retain some portion of the
acquired assets.210 If the assets are not divisible, however, this technique
will be unavailable and another device must be used. In stating that Y be-
comes the acquiring corporation if it receives all the assets "pursuant to the
plan" the proposed regulations imply that if Y acquires the assets other than
in pursuance of the plan, X would remain the acquiring corporation.211 Thus,
if the plan of reorganization does not include the transfer from X to Y, X
would presumably be the acquiring corporation even though the assets were
later transferred to Y in a nontaxable transaction qualifying under section
351. The success of this device would, of course, hinge on whether the later
transfer to Y was held to be part of the "plan," and the plan may not be limited
to steps outlined in a written document.212
206. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(a) -1(b) (2) (ii), e.xample 3.
207. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(a)-1(b) (2) (ii), example 4.
208. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(a)-1(b) (2) (ii), example 1.
209. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.368(a) -1(b) (2) (ii), e.ample 2.
210. The regulations state that whether "a corporation has acquired all of the assets
transferred by the transferor corporation is a question of fact to be determined on the
basis of all the facts and circumstances." Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(a)-1 (b) (2) (i).
211. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381 (a)-1 (b) (2) (i) : "Generally... the acquiring
corporation is that corporation which, pursuant to the plan of reorganization, ultimately
acquires, directly or indirectly, all of the assets transferred by the transferor corporation."
The qualification "generally" is curious for it suggests that there may be cases in which.
even though one corporation acquires all the assets transferred pursuant to the plan, that
corporation does not become the acquiring corporation.
212. It is also possible that the later transfer of assets from the parent to the sub-
sidiary, not being pursuant to a "plan," might take the transaction outside § 368(a) (1) (C)
on the theory that Y, the parent, did not acquire "substantially all the properties" of the
transferor corporation. Such treatment would be far more drastic than simply holding
that the subsidiary was the acquiring corporation because the carryover would be entirely
lost and gain or loss would be recognized in full.
On "plan of reorganization," see generally Manning, "In Pursitanco of the Plan of
Reorganization": The Scope of the Reorganisalion Provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, 72 HARv. L. REv. 881 (1959).
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Perhaps the Service attempted to prevent such manipulation by providing
in the regulations that:
If... a corporation is considered to be the acquiring corporation even
though all or part of the acquired assets are transferred to a corporation
or corporations controlled by the acquiring corporation, the carryover
of any item described in section 381 (c) Iincluding loss carryforwards]
to such controlled corporation or corporations shall be determined with-
out regard to section 381.213
This provision is operative only after a parent corporation has become the
"acquiring corporation" under the earlier provisions of the regulations. It
seems to recognize that the acquiring corporation receives the loss carryover
from the transferor corporation by virtue of section 381, but adds that, in
cases where not all the assets have been retained by the acquiring corporation,
possession of the entire carryover by the acquiring corporation may not be
permanent. The Service seems to reserve the power to step in and reallocate
the carryover among the several holders of assets. Thus, section 381 will
transfer the carryover to the acquiring corporation, but it will not determine
its final resting place. Whether or not reallocation of the carryforward is
required will be determined, according to the regulation, "without regard to
section 381." Perhaps the "common law" of loss carryovers will be applicable
and the Service will use the theory of Rev. Rid. 59-395 to claim that the carry-
over must follow the assets.214 The Service's declaration that the principle
of Libson Shops will not "be relied on as to a ...transaction described in
section 381 (a) '215 is not inconsistent, because the regulation states that the
parent is the acquiring corporation and that subsequent transfers are outside
section 381.
Section 382(b)
A carryover will not be allowed even if the requirements of section 381 (a)
are met, unless the standards of section 382(b) are also satisfied. Section
382(b) (1) provides that, after certain transactions, a carryforward will be
reduced 'by an amount specified in section 382(b) (2) if: 10
-the stockholders (immediately before the reorganization) of . . . [the
loss corporation], as a result of owning stock of the loss corporation, own
(immediately after the reorganization) less than 20 per cent of the fair
market value of the outstanding stock of the acquiring corporation.2 17
213. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381 (a) -1(b) (3) (ii), 25 Fed. Reg. 757 (Jan. 29, 1960).
214. 1959 INT. REv. BULL. No. 51, at 20. See notes 79-97 supra and accompanying
text.
215. Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 147; Rev. Rul. 59-395, supra note 214, at 25.
216. On the amount of the reduction, see note 253 infra and accompanying text.
217. § 382(b) (1) (B).
To take account of situations in which the stock of the loss corporation is owned by
the other corporation involved in the reorganization, § 382(b) (5) provides for an intricate
computation to determine the percentage of stock owned by the nonloss corporation. The
section, in substance, permits the loss corporation shareholders to retain less than a 20%
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For example, where X, a loss corporation, was merged into Y Corporation in
an (A) reorganization, Y Corporation-the survivor-will inherit X's carry-
over without limitation by section 382(b) only if X's former shareholders
receive at least a 20 per cent interest in Y. Section 382(b) also affects trans-
actions not governed by section 381 (a) since carryforwards of the acquiring
corporation are expressly made subject to its provisions; section 381(a)
deals only with the tax attributes of the transferor corporation.2 18 Thus, if Y
Corporation merged into X Corporation, a loss corporation, in an (A) re-
organization, the availability of X's carryover would not depend upon section
381(a). But unless X's former shareholders retain a 20 per cent interest in
X, section 382(b) would limit X's own carryover. Stated differently, if Y's
former shareholders receive more than 80 per cent interest in X pursuant to
the plan of reorganization, X's carryover will be reduced. Section 382( b)
does not apply to tax-free liquidations of subsidiaries 210 (although they are
included within 381 (a) (1)), tax-free transactions other than those described
in section 381(a) (2),220 or any taxable transaction. Additionally, section
382(b) has no applicability to carrybacks.2'
Underlying section 382(b) is an apparent belief that certain shifts in owner-
ship indicate abuse of the corporate carryover privilege. Congress did not
want a totally new group of shareholders to reap the benefit of a loss incurred
by a corporation under different ownership2 22 even though the loss corpora-
tion's shareholders have benefited by receiving a prenium as a result of the
carryover. Thus, the statute attempts to ensure that the corporation which
interest in whichever corporation survives-to adjust for the fact that the nonloss cor-
poration retains the interest in the carryover it previously had. See generally H.R. RP.
No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1954).
218. Thus, § 382(b) uses "acquiring corporation!' in two different senses. If the "trans-
feror corporation" is the loss corporation, its shareholders must receive a 20% interest in
the "acquiring corporation" as defined in § 381 (a). But if the "acquiring corporation"
as defined in § 381 (a) is the loss corporation and hence is not dependent upon § 381(a)
for preservation of its own carryover, its shareholders must retain a 20% interest.
219. Since the test of § 382(b) is continuity of interest alone, the inapplicability
of that section to § 332 liquidations of subsidiaries is easily understood. Section 332 re-
quires 80% ownership of the corporation liquidated. Thus, if the subsidiary has a carry-
over, its liquidation will not reduce the beneficial "ownership" of the carryover, but will,
in fact, increase such "owvnership" from a minimum of 80% before the liquidation to l00 t
after the liquidation.
220. Section 382(b)(1) incorporates § 381 (a) (2) by reference thereby excluding
from its scope those transactions enumerated in notes 173-79 supra and accompanying
text
221. Thus, the acquiring corporation may carry back post-reorganization losses against
its income in prior taxable years without limitation by § 382(b). This would be so even
if, as a result of the reorganizaation, its shareholders in the earlier profitable years re-
tained less than a 20% interest in the reorganized corporation.
222. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954); id. at 235; el. H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Gong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954) ("a major tax benefit... has been abused through
trafficking in corporations with operating loss carryovers, the tax benefits of which are
exploited by persons other than those who incurred the loss").
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ultimately utilizes the carryover be at least one-fifth owned by persons on
whom the loss "really" fell. Congress might have left prevention of manipu-
lation -of losses to section 269.223 But the difficulties of proving a principal
tax avoidance purpose highlighted the need for an "objective" test which could
be used to disallow carryovers.224 Perhaps the search for objectivity also
prompted the failure to adopt any type of ",same business" test. Whatever
the rationale, many problems of construction arise under section 382(b)
which may diminish its value as an objective supplement to section 269.
The first hurdle in determining whether the stockholders of the loss cor-
poiation own less than a 20 per cent interest of the acquiring corporation is
ascertainment of the "stockholders" of the loss corporation. Section 382(b)
might be interpreted to require that every shareholder of the loss corporation
receive stock in the acquiring corporation. But under the usual "continuity
of interest" test applied in reorganizations only the group as a whole is con-
sidered.2 25 Thus if any shareholder of the loss corporation, or any group of
shareholders, own the requisite 20 per cent, section 382(b) will probably be
satisfied. This interpretation leaves room for desirable corporate flexibility.
Some of the old shareholders may claim dissenters' rights or otherwise choose
to be paid in cash. Others may desire bonds or preferred stock which are
not counted toward fulfillment of the 20 per cent requirement. 2 0
The continuity of interest might be rendered nugatory unless section 382 (b)'s
reference to "immediately after the reorganization" is given an expansive
meaning. If read literally, this phrase would allow the loss corporation's
shareholders to 'hold stock in the surviving corporation for a brief interval
-after the reorganization and then sell it to the profit corporation or its share-
holders. This result would completely frustrate the congressional desire that
some continuity of interest be maintained. To prevent avoidance of section
382(b), "immediately after the reorganization" should be interpreted in the
same manner as those words are read under section 351.221 Under this read-
223. This was the position taken in 2 ALI, FED. INcOME TAx STAT. 331 (Feb. 1954
Draft).
224. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).
225. See Western Mass. Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 186, 192, 194-95
(1st Cir. 1956); Reilly Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 382, 383-84 (5th Cir. 1951) ;
Seiberling Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 169 F2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Miller v. Com-
missioner, 84 F2d 415, 418-19 (6th Cir. 1936); cf. §§ 351(a) & 368(a) (1) (D) (ex-
pressly adopting an aggregate test). The frequency of such occurrences was rccognized
in Miller v. Commissioner, supra 419; Western Mass. Theatres, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, supra at 192. On the variety of problems arising from minority interests,
see Johnson, Reorganizations-ilinority Shareholders, Including Disscners, N.Y.U. 18r
INST. ON FED. TAX. 821 (1960).
226. "Stock" for purposes of § 382(b) does not include nonvoting stock which 1s/
limited and preferred as to dividends. § 382 (c).
227. Under § 351, the requirement that the transferors be in control immediately
after the transfer is satisfied by even momentary control, in the absence of any restriction
upon the transferors' "freedom of action" after acquiring the stock. Wilgard Realty Co.
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ing, a sale of stock shortly after the reorganization which is deemed an integral
part of the transaction will disqualify the shares sold from being counted
toward the 20 per cent since "momentary control" would not be sufficient. On
the other hand, a section 351 reading of "immediately after" may benefit share-
holders in some circumstances. For example, stock issued directly to a donee
of the old shareholder is sometimes viewed as issued to the shareholder him-
self 228
In one situation, the requirement that the loss corporation's shareholders
own stock in the acquiring corporation "immediately after" the reorganization
may make the allowance of a carryforward under section 381 (a) illusory.
Section 381 purports to allow transfer of the carryforward in a (C) reorgani-
zation (assets for stock). In this type of reorganization the transferor-loss
corporation becomes the legal owner of the stock of the acquiring corporation
upon the exchange. The transferor can then retain the stock as a holding
company 229 or can distribute the newly acquired stock to its stockholders. If
the transferor-loss corporation retains the stock, its stockholders would not
"own" the stock of the acquiring corporation "immediately after" the trans-
action and the 20 per cent continuity of interest requirement would not be
v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 655 (1942). But see Rev.
Rul. 55-36, 1955-1 Cum. Bu. 340 (a shareholder owning stock of X company organized
Y corporation to which he transferred his X stock in exchange for stock and debentures;
he then donated the new stock to a tax exempt institution which liquidated the Y cor-
poration; the original transfer of the X stock to the Y corporation did not qualify for
nonrecognition treatment under § 351). Likewise, it seems clear under present la%%
that if the transferors' control is ephemeral and merely a step in a series of mutually
interdependent transactions whereby the transferors are under a contractual obligation
to dispose of more than a 20% interest, the original transfer is outside § 351. See Man-
hattan Bldg. Co., 27 T.C. 1032 (1957); May Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 200 F2d
852 (8th Cir. 1953); S. Klein on the Square, Inc. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 127 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 824 (1951). However, even when the transferor is under no
contractual obligation to dispose of his control, but nevertheless does so pursuant to pre-
original-transfer negotiations, the entire transaction will probably fall outside § 351 if the
subsequent transfer appears to be one "without which no other step would have been
taken." See American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397, 406 (1943), aff'd per curiam, 177
F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950). See also Ericsson Screw Mach.
Prods. Co., 14 T.C. 757 (1950); Commissioner v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 220 F.2d
415 (8th Cir. 1955). See generally Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Re-
organizations, N.Y.U. 12TH Ixsr. ox FFD. TAx. 247 (1954); Bir=ER 92-97.
228. See Brrr=a 96, making the point that if an issue of stock from the transferee
corporation to the transferor's donee of more than 20% of the shares is fatal under § 351,
a transferor is given the option of contravening the policy of § 351 by this simple expedient:
if he wishes to qualify under § 351, he can have all the stock issued to himself, and then
give the stock to the donee in a later, independent transaction. Cf. John C. O'Connor, 26
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 181 (1957), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 260 F.2d 358 (6th
Cir. 1958) (requisite control found to exist, although more than 20% of the stock of a
newly organized corporation was issued directly to the property-transferor's creditors).
But cf. Fahs v. Florida Machine & Foundry Co., 168 F2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948).
229. Section 368(a) (1) (C) does not require the transferor to liquidate. See Helver-
ing v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 386 (1935).
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satisfied. A taxpayer might argue that the stock owned by the holding coni-
pany should be treated as if owned proportionately by its shareholders." 30 But
such constructive ownership is ordinarily not applied without specific statutory
authorization.2 31 Moreover, in a different subsection of section 382 itself,
Congress specifically provided for attribution of ownership between a cor-
poration and its stockholders; the absence of this provision in section 382(b)
may imply negatively that attribution was not contemplated. 23 2 This prob-
lem may be avoided if the transaction is cast so that the loss corporation
is the acquiring corporation in the (C) reorganization. The loss corporation's
shareholders would continue to "own" the same stock which they bad pre-
viously owned; whether the transferor remained in existence would be tn-
important since ownership of stock by the nonloss corporation's shareholders
is irrelevant under section 382(b). 233
Even if the loss corporation, as the transferor in a (C) reorganization,
distributes stock of the acquiring corporation as a part of the plan of reorgan-
ization, section 382(b) may nevertheless operate to disallow the carryover.
Immediately after the loss corporation exchanges its assets for stock, the loss
corporation, not its shareholders, owns the stock of the acquiring corporation.
Thus if "immediately after" refers to a single point in time the 20 per cent
requirement will not have been met, even though the loss corporation distrib-
utes the acquired stock immediately after the transfer of assets.23 4 However,
it is arguable that "immediately after the reorganization" refers to the time
after the entire plan of reorganization is completed.235 The exchange of the
newly acquired stock for the old shares of the loss corporation can be made
230. Cf. Consolidated Office Bldgs. Co., 29 T.C. 492 (1957) (intervention of cor-
porate entity between former owners and acquiring corporation after insolvency re-
organization did not violate continuity of interest).
231. See § 318(a) ("For purposes of those provisions of this subehapter [including
§ 382) to which the rules contained in this section are expressly made applicable. .... ).
And in Consolidated Office Bldgs. Co., mtpra note 230, at 498, the Tax Court cautiously
pointed out that the Commissioner's argument was not based on any language in the
statute.
232. See Ringel, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of Stock Ownership in the Internal
Revenue Code, 72 H.Av. L. Rav. 209, 233 (1958) ("only section 382(a) involves appli-
cation of the attribution rules").
233. Section 382(b) (1) (B) requires only that the stockholders of the loss corporation
own (immediately after the reorganization) stock in the acquiring corporation. Of course,
if the loss corporation exchanges more than 80% of the fair market value of its outstand-
ing stock for the assets of the transferor-profitable corporation, the criterion of § 382(b)
will not be met.
234. For this judicial approach to § 351, see Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109
F2d 479 (1st Cir. 1940). This view seems to have been abandoned by the more recent
cases. See Bl-rxER 93.
235. Manning, "In Pursuance of the Plan of Rcorganioatio o": The Scope of the
Reorganization Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARv. L. Rxv. 881, 889
(1959), suggests that Congress originally intended that the liquidation of the transferor
after a (C) reorganization be part of the reorganization.
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a part of such plan. Indeed, a contrary interpretation would render section
381's reference to a (C) reorganization meaningless.
If no problems of ownership arise, owners of the loss corporation Uill still
have to demonstrate that their interest in the acquiring corporation qualifies
as "stock." For purposes of section 382 "stock" is defined, in section 382(c),
as "all shares except nonvoting stock which is limited and preferred as to
dividends." Thus either voting or financial equity in the acquiring corpora-
tion will suffice. 2, 6 The theory underlying section 382(b) was apparently that
the loss corporation's shareholders must retain a significant economic stake
in the acquiring corporation so that "too much" of the carryover's benefit does
not accrue to outsiders.23 The right to vote, however, does not seem suf-
ficiently related to enjoyment of the carryover. Additionally, the statute does
not give specific content to the phrase "nonvoting stock" and it could be
interpreted narrowly so that any stock with a contingent right to vote would
qualify as "stock." On the other hand, if the construction of a similar phrase
in section 1504 which defines the type of stock ownership required for con-
solidated returns "affiliation"' 8 will be applicable to section 382(c), stock
possessing the right to vote only when dividend arrearages or other contingen-
cies occur will probably not qualify.3 9 In any event, use of voting preferred
stock to acquire a carryover is limited by section 382(b)'s requirement that
the stock represent 20 per cent of the fair market value of the acquiring
corporation's "stock." When a profitable corporation acquires a loss cor-
poration's assets many shares of such nonparticipating stock ,ill probably
have to be issued for the value to equal 20 per cent of all outstanding "stock." 2. °
Owning stock in the acquiring corporation will not satisfy section 382(b),
however, unless persons holding such stock acquired it "as a result of owning
stock of the loss corporation. '"2 41 Apparently section 382(c)'s definition of
236. While nonvoting preferred stock has been held "a substantial interest" sufficient
to satisfy the continuity of interest requirement necessary for a tax-free reorganization,
John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935), more recently the Commissioner
has been unsuccessful in arguing that corporate bonds with voting rights evidence a pro-
prietary interest sufficient to satisfy the continuity of interest doctrine. In Howes' Estate,
30 T.C. 909, 923-24 (1958), 2wnacq., 1959 Ixr. Rz.s BuLu. No. 32, at 6, aff'd sub norn.
Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959), nonacq. withdrawn 1960 INIT. Ray.
Bu.T. No. 6, at 7, the voting rights of bonds did not evidence a proprietary interest since
they were reserved as additional security for the purchase price of the property exchanged
for the bonds. See also W. I Truschel, 29 T.C. 433, 438-39 (1957), acq., 1960 INT. RXV.
Bnu.. No. 6, at 7.
237. See authorities cited note 222 supra.
238. See BiwnmR 69-70 (citing cases).
239. Cf. Vermont Hydro-Electric Corp., 29 B.T.A. 1006 (1934), acq. XIII-1 Cum.
Bumi 16 (1934); Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3(a) (1955) (stock without voting rights until
the happening of an event is not "voting stock" until the happening of the specified
event).
240. Or if not a large number of shares, a rather high dividend preference on those
shares that are issued will be required.
241. § 382(b) (1) (B).
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"stock" applies to the stock previously owned as well as to that acquired, so
that the -lew shareholders of the acquiring corporation must have held either
voting stock in the loss corporation or stock which was not limited and pre-
ferred as to dividends. This requirement creates a strict continuity-of-interest
test, since only the interest of persons with voting or financial equity in both
the loss corporation and the acquiring corporation will be counted toward the
requisite 20 per cent.2 42 Curiously, however, a person with a financial equity
in the 'loss corporation and 'only voting equity in the acquiring corporation will,
under the statutory language, be counted, even though his interest has been
drastically altered. The Senate Committee Report on section 382(b) indicated
that the section was designed only to force the acquiring corporation to give
up a 20 per cent share.243 This result could have been achieved by focusing
solely on the stock given up, without regard to the prior interest of the new
owners.244 But even if the statutory definition of "stock" is applied to the
interest given up by the loss corporation's shareholders, the restriction may
be circumvented. Kno-wing that a merger is imminent, the shareholders of
the loss corporation can agree to a recapitalization which will give the pre-
&erred stock voting rights. Stock subsequently obtained by the preferred
holders will thus be counted toward the 20 per cent requirement. The extent
to which the Service must recognize this transaction is speculative. 245
Section 382(b) (6) may provide another method of avoiding the require-
ment that the 20 per cent be 'held by former holders of the loss corporation's
"stock." This subsection was designed to mesh the general 20 per cent re-
quirement with three party transactions qualifying as (C) reorganizations.
It provides that:
if the stockholders 'of the loss corporation . . . own, as a result of the
reorganization, stock in a corporation controlling the acquiring corpora-
tion, such stock of 'the controlling corporation shall . . . be treated s,
stock of the acquiring corporation in an amount valued at an equivalent
fair market value.
Assume that X Corporation, a loss corporation, transferred its assets to Z
Corporation, which is controlled by Y Corporation, in exchange for voting
242. The restrictive definition of "stock" in § 382(e) excludes from the computation
of the 20% interest of the loss corporation's shareholders any stock received by non-
voting preferred stockholders, bondholders or other creditors of the loss corporation.
243. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1954).
244. But cf. Neville Coke & Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 726 (1945) (individuals exchanging notes for stock denied non-
recognition under the predecessor of § 354). The case was severely criticized in Griswold,
"Securities" and "Continuity of Interest," 58 HARv. L. REv. 705, 720-25 (1945),
245. Of course, the entire transaction might be disregarded as a sham, or if outside
§ 368(a) (1) (E) as serving no business purpose, treated as a redemption (if nonvoting
preferred was given up) the tax treatment of which would be determined by § 302 or
§ 346, or a retirement (if bonds were given up) the tax treatment of which would be
determined under §§ 1001, 1002, 1232(a) (1).
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stock of Y Corporation in a (C) reorganization. If the Y Corporation stock
received by shareholders of X 'has a fair market value of 10,000 dollars and the
total fair market value of Z Corporation's stock is 50,000 dollars, the loss cor-
poration's shareholders would be treated as owning 20 per cent of Z because
Y's stock is treated as Z stock in an equivalent value. Z Corporation would
then succeed to X Corporation's carryforward in full. In contrast to section
382(b) (1) (B) which applies to two party transactions, section 382(b) (6)
only refers to a 20 per cent interest obtained "as a result of the reorganization"
and not "as a result of owning stock in the loss corporation." Thus section
382(b) (6) seems to ignore the quality of stock given up by the loss corpora-
tion's stockholders. Under this construction, the limitations of section 3W-
(b) (1) (B) on the type of stock which must be surrendered by the loss cor-
poration's shareholders could be evaded by recasting an ordinary two-party
(C) reorganization as a three-party transaction. Assume that P, a profitable
corporation, wishes to obtain the carryforward of L by means of a (C) re-
organization but that much of the stock issued to L will be distributed to
shareholders whose nonvoting preferred stock in L will not meet section 382-
(c)'s definition; therefore, after the reorganization the 20 per cent requirement
of section 382(b) (1) (B) will not have been met. P's shareholders can form a
new corporation, Z, by contributing their P stock to it in exchange for all its
stock in a tax-free transaction, Z becoming a holding company. Then in a
(C) reorganization, L Corporation's assets would be transferred to P Cor-
poration in exchange for Z stock which in turn will be distributed to L's share-
holders. Since this is a three-party (C) reorganization,240 section 382(b) (6)
will apply and only the quality of Z's stock, not the nature of the L stock
given up by L's former shareholders, will be relevant. This evasion can be
frustrated, however, if "stockholders" in section 382(b) (6) is construed to
incorporate section 382(c)'s definition of "stock." The difference in language
between section 382(b) (6) and section 382(b) (1) (B) was probably inad-
vertent and no difference in outcome was intende -2 4 7
The entire 20 per cent problem is moot if the reorganization involves two
corporations owned by the same economic group. Under section 382(b) (3)
the limitation of the carryforward "shall not apply if the transferor corpor-
ation and the acquiring corporation are owned substantially by the same persons
in the same proportion. 2 48 Congress must have assumed that such transactions
do not involve tax avoidance, because the people whose corporation sustained the
246. There is always the possibility that the Commissioner may treat the newly formed
holding company as a sham and therefore take the transaction outside the definition
of a (C) reorganization.
247. Section 382(b) (6) was added to § 382(b) by the Conference Committee. See
H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1954).
248. This language seems to have meant "owned by substantially the same persons
in substan4jally the same proportions." In the statute as written it is arguable that "sub-
stantially" (an adverb) modifies "owned"; therefore "same persons in the same propor-
tion" means exactly the same.
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loss are the persons who will ultimately benefit from the carryforward. 240 In any
eventy section 382(b) (3) may have little significance in the light of section
382(b) (1) (B). Assume that individuals A and B each own 50 per cent of
loss corporation X and profitable corporation Y. If X is merged into Y in a
(C) reorganization so that A and B surrender their stock in X for stock in
Y, section 382(b) (1) (B) is satisfied if the new stock they receive in Y is
equivalent to 20 per cent of the value of Y's outstanding stock. This require-
ment presents no difficulty since A and B's equity interests will be unaffected
if Y Corporation prints new stock certificates to satisfy the 20 per cent re-
quirement. Therefore, while section 382(b) (3) eliminates the need to issue
new stock in this situation, it is not needed to transfer the carryover.2 0 Even
for this limited purpose section 382(b) (3) may be difficult to apply because
no content is given to the word "own."'251 Suppose that an individual owns
stock in the acquiring corporation and bonds in the transferor. In some cir-
cumstances a bondholder may be viewed as an owner,25 2 but section 382(b) (3)
does not indicate whether "ownership" includes ownership of stock or securi-
ties other than those defined in 382(c). Additionally, there is no indication
whether ownership in "substantially... the same proportion" is to be measured
by financial equity or by voting equity. Since voting equity is sufficient for
other parts of section 382(b), a substantially similar share of voting power in
both corporations may satisfy section 382(b) (3) although financial interests
are disparate. Or, perhaps only financial interests are to be considered, irre-
spective of voting rights. Once the measuring factors are ascertained, what
is "substantially ... in the same proportion" will still have to be determined.
If section 382(b) (3) is inapplicable and the 20 per cent requirement of
section 382(b) (1) (B) is not satisfied, section 382(b) (2) provides for a pro-
portional reduction of the amount of the available carryforward. The carry-
249. Compare § 269(a) (2) excepting from its general rule tax-free transfers of
property between corporations controlled directly or indirectly by the same shareholders.
In view of the passage of this provision in 1954, the result in Libson is surprising, for
the transaction in that case probably would not have caused forfeiture of the carryovers
under the 1954 Code. The stock of the loss corporations was owned by the same persons
as the surviving corporation.
250. If X Corporation is worth substantially less than Y Corporation, however, the
Commissioner could argue, in the absence of § 382(b) (3), that the 20% interest was
not acquired as a result of the surrender of X stock but only to meet the statutory require-
ment. Such an argument would be based on the origin of the 20% requirement. The
original House bill denied nonrecognition treatment to reorganizations of closely held
companies where, in general, one of the two combining corporations was worth more than
four times as much as the other. Hence, the 20% test of § 382(b). The Government
could, on this theory, argue that "as a result of owning stock in the loss corporation"
requires a comparison of the values of the transferor and acquiring corporations. A
relative size requirement has been found in § 382(b) by Cohn, Acquiring the Loss Cor-
poration: Fact or Fantasy, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FFz. TAX. 757, 764-65 n,15 (1955).
251. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (1956) (describing in detail tests of "owner-
ship" of an interest in a family partnership) ; H. S. Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382 (1958).
252. See, e.g., Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942).
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forward will be reduced 5 per cent for every one per cent less than 20 which
the loss corporation's shareholders obtain or retain in the acquiring corpora-
tion. For example, if these shareholders obtain twelve per cent, the acquiring
corporation will inherit 12/20 (60 per cent) of the carryover. Why a scheme
of scaling down was adopted in place of total forfeiture is not dear. Else-
where, failure to meet continuity of ownership requirements usually results
in total disallowance. 253
Section 382(b) fails to explain the interrelationslip, if any, between it and
section 269.254 The Senate Finance Committee Report on section 382 states
that even if a 20 per cent interest is retained, the carryforward may be dis-
allowed if the principal purpose of the reorganization is tax avoidance as
defined in section 269.255 Applicability of the latter section is dubious, how-
ever, where section 382(b) has operated to scale down the carryforward. The
same Senate Report contains the statement that "if a limitation in this section
[382] applies... section 269... shall not also be applied.... ."8 Some com-
mentators have interpreted this statement to mean that even a minute scaling
down under section 382(b) will immunize the transaction from the impact
of section 269257 Under this view, businessmen might find it profitable to
ensure that section 382(b)'s requirement is not fully satisfied by arranging
the reorganization so that the loss corporation's shareholders will receive 19
per cent of the acquiring corporation's stock-giving up 5 per cent of the car'-
over to immunize the transaction from section 269. Of course, the statute itself
does not compel this result and the Service may well ignore the statement in
253. Section 269(a) provides for total disallowance, except to the extent that, under
§ 269(b), the Commissioner mitigates the damage. And § 382(a), see note 260 infra and
accompanying text, adopts the rule of complete forfeiture.
Curiously, SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY GRoup, RmE Rm 'oR 567-73 (1953), also recom-
mends scaling down of carryovers, the amount to be determined as a function of the pur-
chase price of the loss corporation. Congressman Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee queried this scaling down on the ground that the new
shareholders participated in the benefits thereof. 1959 Hcarings 423, 630.
254. Under ordinary canons of statutory construction, the more specific section
should take precedence over a general section. From the statute alone, an argument can
be made that § 382 is the exclusive route to disallow%,ance of loss carryovers. See, e.g..
Note, 23 GDn. WAsH. L. Rv. 549, 557-58 (1955); H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. §
29 (1959) (§ 382 as revised by the Subchapter C Advisory Group included a subsection
() making § 269 specifically applicable to the transactions covered by § 382).
255. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 284 (1954) ("the fact that a limitation
under this section [§ 382] does not apply shall have no effect upon whether section
269 applies"). But see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(a)-l(a), 25 Fed. Reg. 756 (Jan.
29, 1960) (implying that § 382(b) is the only limitation on a carryover of a transferor or
distributor which is inherited, under § 381(a), by the acquiring corporation).
256. S. REP. No. 1622 supra note 255, at 284.
257. See Cohn, supra note 250, at 768; Arent, Tax Aspects of Buying Loss Cor-
porations Under the 1954 Code, 33 TAXES 955, 962 (1955) ; Sugarman, Organization of
a Corporation: New Considerations Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 6 W.
REs. L. REv. 333, 373 (1955).
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the committee report.258 Moreover, the statement may be interpreted as re-
ferring only to that part of section 269 which grants the Commissioner dis-
cretion to allow carryovers which are disallowed by the mandatory language
of section 269(a). The report, under this view, was specifically denying any
applicability of section 269(b) to section 382(b) so that the Commissioner will
not have the power to allow any part of the carryforward which was disallowed
under section 382(b).
Section 382(a)
Comporting with Congress' desire that "economic realities" should govern
transferability of loss carryovers, 2 9 ,section 382 (a) was added in 1954 to limit
carryovers where stock of a single corporation is purchased and the "business"
of the corporation is altered. In general, section 382 (a) completely disallows
a carryforward. when 50 per cent of a corporation's stock changes hands in a1
taxable transaction, and the "corporation has not continued to carry on a trade
or business substantially the same as that conducted before" 210 the change in
ownership. Section 382 (a) was apparently aimed at transactions such as that
involved in Alprosa Watch Corp., where individuals purchased all the stock
of a glove company and then converted the corporation into a jewelry sales
corporation.201 Once Congress decided to focus on business changes, 0 2 a fur-
ther requirement of shift in ownership was necessary if section 382(a) were
not to be a radical departure from prior law. Individuals and single corporations
have long been able to retain their carryovers despite conversion from one
line of endeavor to another. 2 3 Even the Libson cases, which focus primarily
upon change in business, have never employed this test to disallow a carry-
over if the change was not accompanied or preceded by a shift in ownership
or corporate entity.2"
While some cases have applied the theory of Libson to carrybacks, 0 0 section
382 (a) does not apply to this type of carryover. Thus, if a profitable business
258. See ,SUBCHAPER C ADViSORY GRouP, Rm vISF Rsa'oRT 567 (1958).
259. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954) ; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 52 (1954).
260. § 382(a) (1) (C).
261. 11 T.C. 240 (1948); see notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
262. As originally drafted, § 382(a) would have relied solely upon changes in owner-
ship. See H.R. Rm. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
263. See notes 34-36 supra. Moreover, in 1954, Congress specifically validated in-
heritance of net operating losses of trusts by the beneficiaries after the trust termination,
§ 642(h), indicating that the policy of the carryover was not restricted to averaging
of gains and losses of the same business.
264. Libson itself involved a change of "business" and a change of entity. See text
accompanying notes 60-62 supra. And Mill Ridge involved both change of ownership and
change of "business." See text accompanying note 108 supra.
265. F. C. Donovan, Inc. v. United States, 261 F.2d 470 (1st Cir. 1958), discussed in
text accompanying notes 125-30 supra. See also Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States,
233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957); Koppers Co. v. United
States, 133 Ct. Cl. 22, 134 F. Supp. 290 (1955), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957).
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is purchased by outside interests and thereafter its business is changed to an
unrelated activity which proves unprofitable, section 382 does not prevent
carryback of -the "post-change-of-business" loss to offset income of prior
years. Congress probably was not concerned with carrybacks in tids situation
because purchase and change of business are not ordinarily prompted by tax
avoidance motives; few businessmen purchase a corporation expecting that
it will lose money. Lack of tax avoidance purpose has not, however, dissuaded
the Service from a Libson-based attempt to disallow carrybacks in common-
law cases 266 The Service may argue in cases under the 1954 Code that, even
where a single corporation is involved, only losses of the same "business" can
be carried back, using the formula of Rev. RuL. 59-395 to isolate the "same
business." 267
Whether or not a Libson theory is applied to carrybacks, the disallowance
of carryforwards under section 382(a) will still depend on the definition of
"trade or business." No section 382(a) regulations have yet appeared and
the only clue to the meaning of this elusive phrase is found in the Senate
Finance Committee Report:
If... the corporation shifts from one type of business to another, dis-
continues any except a minor portion of its business, changes its location
or otherwise fails to carry on substantially the same trade or business
as was conducted before such an increase.2 0 8
266. The statement in text does not apply, of course, where a corporation possesses
high basis low value assets which are to be sold in future years for the purpose of estab-
lishing losses. See, e.g., American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 125 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957). Nor does it apply where, because of a capital
structure with thin equity, the economic loss will be borne by creditors but a tax loss may
be deducted by shareholders by means of, for example, the skillful use of consolidated
returns. See, e.g., Elko Realty Co., 29 T.C. 1012, aff'd per curiam, 260 F.2d 949 (3d Cir.
1958), discussed in detail in Kirkpatrick, Section 269 of the 1954 Code-Its Present and
Prospective Function i; the Commissioner's Arsenal, 15 TAx L Rxv. 137, 151-55 (19-0).
See e.g., Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957) ; Koppers Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. C. 22, 134 F. Supp. 290
(1955), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957) ; Acampo Winery & Distilleries, Inc., 7 T.C. 629
(1946), acq., 1949-1 Cum. Bum.. 1.
267. The only case which would support such a position is Mill Ridge, and that case in-
volved a carryforward. See notes 108-18 supra and accompanying text. Application of the
Libson rationale to carrybacks of single corporations under the 1954 Code is suggested, how-
ever, by Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cur. BuuL. 147, and Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959 I.N. Rev. Buu..
No. 51, at 20. The rulings repudiate Libson only "as to mergers or other transactions
described in section 381(a)" The implication is that Libson will be applied in all other
situations. See Germain, Carryovers in Corporate Acquisitions, 15 TAx L. REv. 35, 48-49
n.44 (1959. This would create the anomaly of allowing carrybacks in full by virtue of §§
172, 381 (b) (3) and Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c) (1)-1 (b), 25 Fed. Reg. 758 (Jan. 29,
1960), against income from unrelated businesses of the surviving corporation in a trans-
action described in § 381 (a), but requiring allocation in the case of a carryback to a taxable
year during which the ownership of the corporation was significantly different.
268. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1954).
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This statement, as well as the statutory language, seems to equate "business"
with the entire profit-making activity of the corporation. Thus, when a major
part of the business activity is discontinued after a change in ownership, no
carryover will be permitted, even though the qualitative nature of the business
(manufacturing gloves) remains the same. Under this view a similar result
should obtain if new owners add a different type of activity (such as a jewelry
business), or enlarge the old. But the Conference Committee Report stated:
"If the corporation continues to carry on substantially the same trade or busi-
ness, the limitation would not be applicable even though the corporation also
added a new trade or business. ' 2 9 Read literally, this report would even allow
addition of a lucrative steel manufacturing enterprise to a corporation formerly
operating only a beauty parlor without forfeiture of the carryforward ; Alprosa-
like transactions could proceed so long as the previous business of the corpor-
ation is continued. On the other hand, the Senate Report's statement that a
change in location will disqualify the carryover under section 382(a) seems
unnecessarily restrictive and may not be accepted by the courts. In Packer
Corp. v. United States, where the court construed almost identical language
in the Korean War Excess Profits Tax statute, an automobile dealership in
Flint, Michigan, was held to constitute a "substantially similar trade or busi-
ness" to an automobile dealership in Detroit.270
The Service may choose to ignore the ambiguities of the Senate and Con-
ference'Reports and use Rev. Rid. 59-395, which interpreted "business" under
the Libson case for section 382(a) purposes as well.27 1 Of course, Rev. Rid.
59-395 will serve a different function, since section 382 (a) requires only the
ascertainment of whether or not substantially the same business has been con-
tinued.272 The extent to which a trade or business is continued within the
meaning of section 382 (a) would be measured by the extent to which the same
269. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1954). Assuming that § 382(a) (1)-
(C) does not require evaluation of the entire business activity of the corporation, it is
possible that the meaning of "a trade or business" may be taken from §§ 355 and 346. On
the meaning of "business" as used in those sections, see Young, Corporate Separations: Some
Revenue Rulings Under Section 355, 71 HRV. L. Rav. 843, 849-51 (1958). It should be
noted, however, that the statutory phrase in § 355 is "active conduct of a trade or business,"
and the regulations thereunder speak of an "active business." Arguably the absence of
"active" in § 382(a) (1) (C) is a critical distinction.
270. 3 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 486 (E.D. Mich 1958). But cf. Rev. Rul. 56-344, 1956-2
Cum. BULL. 195 (a poultry business operated in two states constituted two "active trades
or businesses" within the meaning of § 355(b) (1) (A)), discussed in Young, supra note
269, at 860-63.
271. Rev. Rul. 59-395 is, itself, limited to taxable years governed by the Int. Rev.
Code of 1939.
For a discussion of the assets test of Rev. Rud. 59-395, see text acompanying notes
79-97 smpra.
272. Since failure to continue a trade or business is a condition precedent to disallow-
ance of the entire carryover, the only relevant question is whether or not the pre-change-
of-ownership business has been continued. No determination of the portion of the income
attributable to the assets of the pre-change-of-ownership business is required.
1260 [Vol. 69:1201
NET OPERATING LOSS CARRYOVERS
assets are utilized before and after the change in control. If "assets" is con-
strued narrowly, surprising results may ensue. Suppose that a glove manu-
facturing corporation continues to manufacture gloves, in the same location
and in the same volume, but replaces all of its antique machinery with modem
equipment after ownership changes. Under Rev. Rul. 59-395, the substantial
change of assets would break the continuity of business, an unlikely conclusion
under either the Senate or Conference Report interpretations. On the other
hand, the significance of any qualitative change of business (for example, from
retailing women's clothing to retailing men's clothing) would probably not be
affected by the decision to apply Rev. Rid. 59-395, since the ruling's "prefusion
business" is as ambiguous as the statute's "same business" phrase. And while
the ruling may enable the Service to measure the extent of any business change,
it does not furnish criteria to separate "substantial" from insubstantial changes.
Whether or not the ruling applies, both these issues are yet to be resolved.
A taxpayer may be able to minimize the risk of a finding that the corpora-
tion's trade or business was not continued by influencing the loss corporation's
shareholders to alter the corporation's activities before the purchase of stock.
Presumably the pre-change-of-ownership business will be ascertained immedi-
ately before the first purchase of stock which is counted toward the requisite
percentage.273 The prospective owners may ask the old owners to change the
corporation's business to whatever activities the nev owners expect to pursue.
The ever-available Court Holding Co. analogy 2 74 may be invoked, however,
to ignore a change resulting from negotiations with the new owners. Tax-
payers may also attempt to avoid the change of business restriction by having
the old shareholders dispose of the operating assets of the loss corporation
before the sale. The new owners could then argue that the reactivation of the
corporation was not the kind of change in trade or business which 382 (a)
contemplates. But, the Service has ruled that section 382(a)'s continuity of
business requirement cannot be satisfied if the loss corporation has been in-
active prior to the change of ownership.2 7 5
The complexities of continuance of a trade or business will not be reached
unless at least 50 per cent of the corporation's stock changes hands. Specific-
273. See Brrrxz 63 n.50.
274. See note 93 supra.
275. In Rev. Rul. 58-9, 1958-1 Cum. BuL. 190, a corporation formerly engaged in
the general insurance business, but which had become inactive because of losses, %%as
sold to an individual engaged in the same type of business. Thereafter, both businesses
were operated under the taxpayer's corporate charter. A carryover of pre-change-of-
ownership losses was denied under § 382(a).
Since the corporation was not engaged in business but was inactive, the reactivation
of ithe corporation after the change in . . . ownership . . . whether or not in the
same line of business as that originally conducted, did not put the corporation in a
trade or business "substantially the same as that conducted before the change in...
ownership."
See also Patten Fine Papers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 1957).
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ally, section 382 (a) provides that a corporation's net operating loss shall not
be carried forward if (1) its trade or business is not continued, (2)
at the end of a taxable year ... [the 10 principal shareholders (or such
lesser number as own the stock of the corporation) ] own a percentage of
the total fair market value of the outstanding stock of such corporation
which is at least 50 percentage points more than such person or persons
owned at the beginning of such taxable year or the beginning of the prior
taxable year,27 6
and (3)
[the increase in percentage points] is attributable to a purchase by
such person or persons of such stock . . or a decrease in the amount of
such stock outstanding ... except a -decrease resulting from a redemption
to pay death taxes [qualifying under section 303] .... 277
Section 382(c)'s definition of "stock" is applicable to section 382(a). Thus
only stock which is either voting or participating is counted toward the requisite
50 percentage points; transactions involving the usual type of preferred stock
will have no carryover consequences under section 382 (a) .2 7 8 In addition to
the possible difficulty of determining when a stock is "voting," existence of
voting preferred in the corporation's capital structure may create troublesome
valuation problems. 279 Section 382(a) provides that the percentage change
should be measured by the value of stock which changes hands and not by
number of shares or voting power. Where voting preferred stock is present,
placing an absolute value on the preferred's voting rights will be a likely source
of disagreement.
In determining whether the 50 per cent change in ownership has occurred,
section 382(a) focuses not on the absolute size of stockholders but on the
increase in percentage points. For example, if a holder of 30 per cent of the
fair market value of the loss corporation's stock purchases an additional 30 per
cent, he will own 60 per cent of the stock, his ownership will have increased
100 per cent, but his holdings would have been augmented by only 30 percent-
age points, the only figure relevant to section 382(a). The test adopted by
section 382(a) is in some ways more realistic than the ownership criterion
of section 269. Carryovers may be disallowed under section 269 if "control"
is acquired for a principal tax avoidance purpose. "Control" is defined as
ownership of 50 per cent (in voting power or value) of the corporation's stock,
and the applicable regulations 'have construed the section to focus solely on
the total holdings after any stock acquisition. 28 0 Thus a shareholder with a 49
276. § 382(a) (1) (A).
277. § 382(a) (1) (B).
278. See text accompanying notes 236-40 supra.
279. The complexity of this problem is illustrated by the number of relevant factors
listed in Rev. Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 187, to be used in valuing stocks in closely
held companies for estate and gift tax purposes. See generally 1 MERTENS, rEDEIRAL GIFr
AND ESTATE TAXATION ch. 8 (1959).
.280. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.129-1(d) (1953). See also H.R. REP. No. 1079, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1944), reprinted in 1944 Cum. BULL. 1059, 1069.
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per cent interest who purchases 2 per cent has acquired "control" as defined
by section 269. The increment rather than total holding would seem to be
more significant if both sections 269 and 382(a) are designed to prevent
"outsiders" from obtaining a tax benefit through purchases of stock in loss
corporations. 28s The additional 2 per cent which a shareholder has acquired
does not radically increase the tax benefits he would have obtained from the
carryforward without the 2 per cent purchase, nor does it realistically change
his status from a "outsider" to an "insider." Of course, section 269, unlike
section 382, is not limited to loss carryovers but covers any "deduction, credit,
or other allowance," and a 2 per cent shift may be significant when dealing
with other tax attributes.
To determine whether the requisite change in ownership has occurred, sec-
tion 382 (a) looks to the -holdings of the ten persons owning the largest per-
centage (in value) of the stock.2 8 2 In the event that two shareholders or more
are tied for tenth place, they are all included in the group;293 for example, if
nine persons each own 6 per cent and four own 5 per cent, section 382(a) looks
to all thirteen in determining whether the control group's ownership has in-
creased by the requisite 50 percentage points. Moreover, the constructive own-
ship rules of section 318 are generally applicable so that purchases by certain
relatives, or entities in which members of the group have interests, will be
treated as purchases by members of the group.2 8 4 Once the relevant group is
281. In an early case, Commodores Point Terminal Corp., 11 T.C. 411 (1948), acq.,
1949-1 Cmt. BULl 1, the taxpayer corporation had acquired a controlling block of stock
in another corporation from its principal shareholder just before a dividend on such
stock was declared. The Commissioner sought to disallow the dividends-received credit
arguing that, under the predecessor of § 269(a) (1), control had been acquired for a
principal tax avoidance purpose. While finding no such principal purpose, the Tax Court
held that the statute required the disallowed deduction to "stem from the acquired control."
11 T.C. at 417. The statute was, therefore, inapplicable to the taxpayer's dividends-
received credit because the taxpayer "would have been entitled to claim a dividends-
received credit proportionately as great from any number of shares less than an amount
constituting a controlling interest." Ibid. This theory would seem to preclude applicabilty
of § 269 (a) (1) to a loss carryover after purchase of a 2% interest by a 49% shareholder
since the "benefit" of the deduction does not stem from the acquired control but would
have been proportionately available without the additional purchase. The Tax Court
seems wedded to this "stem from" interpretation, for in Coastal Oil Storage Co., 25 T.C.
1304, 1312 (1956), the same reasoning was employed to hold that § 269(a) (2) did not
disallow a subsidiary's surtax exemption since the surtax exemption would have been
available even without the forbidden acquisition of property. This latter holding was
reversed on appeal, Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir.
1957), but may still be viable at least where § 269(a) (1) is concerned.
282. Section 382(a) (1) (B) (i) also takes account of purchases of interests in cor-
porations, trusts or partnerships owning stock in the loss corporation. Section 382(a) (1)-
(B) (ii) takes account of decreases in the amount of outstanding stock of corporations
owning stock in the loss corporation.
283. § 282(a) (2).
284. § 382(a) (3). Since the family is treated as a group, the constructive ownership
rules may benefit the loss corporation. Sales of stock by related members of the group of
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ascertained, its collective holding is compared with the amount of stock owned
by the same group at the beginning of the preceeding year and the second
preceding taxable year.
Since the 50 percentage point change in ownership is measured only over
a two-year period, prospective purchasers may be able to escape section 382(a).
Suppose, for example, that corporation X, a glove company, has a large operat-
ing loss during 1955 and no income in any of the preceding three years. A, the
owner of a profitable jewelry business, wishes to acquire X, abandon its glove
business, and use X's carryforward to reduce the jewelry business' taxable
income. He does not, however, wish to contribute the new business until lie
has gained voting control of the loss corporation. If he purchased 24 per cent
(in value) of X's stock in 1956, 24 per cent in 1957 and 24 per cent in 1958
when, assuming voting control, the corporation's business activities would be
changed, section 382(a) would not be applicable since only 48 per cent of
the stock changed hands in any two-year period. While three years of the
five-year carryforward period will have elapsed, the 1955 losses could still be
used to offset income earned in 1959 and 1960.28' The entire five-year period
might be utilized if the loss corporation's old shareholders placed their stock
in a voting trust with A as trustee in 1956 so that A could safely add the new
business at that time. Either scheme, however, may be susceptible to an attack
by the Service based on section 269,280 which the Senate Report indicated
could be applied even if section 382(a) was inapplicable. If the Service can
demonstrate that the purchase which gave A more than a 50 per cent interest
in X was motivated principally by tax avoidance, the entire carryforward will
be disallowed.
Even if the ownership interest of the relevant group has increased by fifty
percentage points within a two-year period, section 382(a) is not operative
unless the increase is attributable -to a "purchase" or a "decrease" in the out-
standing stock of the corporation. 28 7 Purchase is defined in section 382(a) (4)
as:
the acquisition of stock, the basis of which is determined solely by reference
to its cost to the holder thereof in a transaction from a person ... other
ten largest shareholders would reduce the percentage point increase of other related
members.
On the constructive ownership rules as applied to § 382(a), see Ringel, Surrey &
Warren, Attribution of Stock Ownership it the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARV. L. REV.
209, 233-36 (1958).
285. And any losses sustained during 1956-1957 would be deductible over the five
succeeding years.
286. If the voting trust were used, § 269(a) (1) might be applied on the theory that
although only 24% of the stock was actually acquired in 1956, 50% of the total combined
voting power was purchased at that time. Section 269(a) (1) is applicable either to
acquisition of 50% of the value of stock, or to acquisition of stock possessing 50% voting
power.
287. § 382(a) (1) (B).
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than the person ... the ownership of whose stock would be attributed
to the holder by application of [the constructive ownership rules of
section 318 without the 50 per cent limitation of section 318(a)(2)
(C)] ....
Thus a transfer which is tax free in whole or in part, such as acquisition of
stock by gift, by an exchange qualifying under section 351, or by bequest, will
not be considered a "purchase" under section 382 (a).2" Similarly, stock
purchased from a person whose stock is treated as constructively owned by the
purchaser will not be counted. For example, section 382 incorporates section
318(a) (2) (C) (ii), which provides that a corporation is treated as the owner
of all stock owned by a 50 per cent shareholder; under section 382 (a), however,
the 50 per cent requirement is eliminated so that, apparently, a corporation is
treated as the owner of all stock owned by any of its shareholders, sometimes
producing strange results. Assume that A is an 80 per cent shareholder of X
Corporation which has a loss carryover; A also owns 1 per cent of the stock
of Y Corporation. A's 80 per cent interest in X is attributed to Y. If Y Cor-
poration buys A's interest in X Corporation, no "purchase" will have been
consummated for section 382(a) purposes because Y Corporation construc-
tively owned A's stock in X before the sale. Even if there are no common
shareholders initially, a profitable corporation could sell a small amount of its
stock to -the majority shareholders of the loss corporation and thereby acquire
288. Similarly, the acquisition of stock in an exchange which qualified under § 354(a)
becamuse pursuant to a plan of reorganization qualifying under § 363(a) (1) (B) and the
acquisition of stock in a transaction qualifying under § 1033(a) (3) (A) (relating to
acquisitions of stock in corporations owning property similar or related in service to property
involuntarily converted) would not, under § 382(a) (4), be treated as a "purchase." Since
§ 382(a) (4) requires that basis be determined solely by reference to cost, the presence of
boot in any nonrecognition exchange is not fatal.
The exclusion of gifts from the definition of "purchase" in § 382(a) (4) suggests a
possible avenue of avoidance. An individual could purchase 50 percentage points in value
of the loss corporation's stock and then give the newly acquired stock to his wife. While
the wife would own 50 percentage points more than she owned at the beginning of the
taxable year, § 382(a) (1) (B) (i) requires that the increase be attributable to "a pur-
chase by such person." The basis of the stock in her hands being determined, under §
1015(a), by reference to the basis in the hands of her husband, not by "its cost to the
holder" as required by § 382(a) (4), the increase would not be attributable to a purchase.
But because of the attribution rules of § 318, it is arguable that the husband, the "pur-
chaser," is the person whose increased ownership is relevant. Under § 318(a) (1) (A) (i),
he "owns" the stock owned by his wife. And his "ownership" has increased 50 percentage
points as a result of a "purchase.' The difficulty with this argument, however, is that §
382(a) (4) defines "purchase" as the acquisition of stock the basis of which is "its cost
to the holder thereof," not the "owner" thereof. Thus it may be that '"older" refers
solely to the actual "holder" not a person treated as a constructive owner. Of course, the
Commissioner might argue that in reality the transaction was a gift of cash followed by
a purchase of the stock by the record owner, or treat the donee as a nominee without
any beneficial interest. Cf. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1 (a) (2), (4) (1956); Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1 (a) (2), 24 Fed. Reg. 1798 (Mar. 12, 1959).
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the necessary constructive ownership.2s9 Either acquisition may, of course,
be attacked under section 269 if a principal tax avoidance purpose can be shown.
Section 382(a) also operates where an increase in percentage points re-
sults from a decrease in the outstanding stock of the loss corporation.90 This
provision was undoubtedly aimed at redemptions,29 ' which are as effective
to shift control of a corporation as a cash sale of stock. Thus, if X Corpora-
tion is owned 25 per cent by A, 25 per cent by B, and 50 per cent by C, a re-
demption of C's interest by the corporation would increase the interest of A and
B .the required 50 percentage points. Moreover, while the statute uses dis-
junctive language-purchase or decrease-a shift of 50 percentage points at-
tributable partly to a redemption and partly to a purchase would fall within
section 382 (a) .292 In the above example, therefore, the same result would
obtain if C sold half his stock to A and B and the corporation redeemed the
other half. Since "stock" for purposes of section 382 (a) does not include
nonvoting preferred, redemptions of such stock would not be taken into account
in determining satisfaction of the 50 percentage point criterion.
Although the Senate and Conference Reports explaining section 382 (a)-
(1) (B) refer only to redemptions when discussing decreases in stock,293 cer-
tain recapitalizations may also be included. A taxable recapitalization is similar
in many respects to a redemption and should be similarly treated.2 4 Thus, if
the X Corporation with a single class of stock is owned 25 per cent by A, 25
per cent by B, and 50 per cent by C, and C surrenders his stock in exchange for
bonds in a taxable transaction, section 382 (a) (1) (B) is operative since A and
B then would own 100 per cent of the fair market value of the stock, 50 per-
centage points more than they previously owned. But suppose that C exchanged
his stock for nonvoting preferred stock in a recapitalization tax free as an (E)
reorganization. Since C's preferred stock is not counted in determining owner-
289. Of course, the success of such a technique would depend upon whether the pre-
liminary sale is treated as independent of the later sale. If past cases are any indication,
the transaction may well be regarded as a purchase by the profitable corporation of the loss
corporation's shareholders stock for cash plus a small amount of the profitable corporation's
stock. See Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 12TIL
INsT. oN FED. TAx. 247, 264-66 (1954) (citing analogous cases).
290. § 382(a) (1) (B) (ii). Redemptions qualifying under § 303 (redemptions to
pay death taxes) are not taken into account for purposes of § 382(a).
291. "Redemption" is used in the corporate law sense and is not limited to redemptions
meeting the tests of § 302. A redemption which was "essentially equivalent to a taxable
dividend" or qualified for capital gain treatment as a partial liquidation would undoubtedly
be within § 382.
292. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(h) (1955) (" 'or' denotes both the conjunctive and
disjunctive"); BrrrHEa 62 nA6.
293. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 284 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1954).
294. A recapitalization which fails to qualify as an (E) reorganization would or-
dinarily cause recognition of gain or loss in full (except to the extent § 267 may apply)
under §§ 1001, 1002, or would be treated as a distribution of a dividend to the extent of
current, or post-1913 earnings and profits.
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ship for section 382(a), 0 5 A and B's holdings of eligible stock have increased
by 50 percentage points. Since the exchange is not a redemption as that tern is
used in the Code,20 6 the shareholder might argue on the basis of the Committee
Reports that section 382(a) is totally inapplicable. - T He might also argue
that section 382(b), entitled Change of Owwrship as the Result of a Reorgani-
zation was the only section intended to deal with tax-free reorganizations and
that omission of (E) reorganizations from that section relegated these trans-
actions, like divisive reorganizations, to the "common law."'ms And finally, the
corporation can argue with some force that the exchange of common for pre-
ferred stock ordinarily preserves the economic benefit of the carryover to those
who originally sustained the loss. But section 382(a) (1) (B) (ii) refers only
to "decreases" in outstanding stock without specifying the methods by which
such reduction could occur. And the reference to redemption in the Committee
Reports may not have been an exclusive definition. Most important, a tax free
recapitalization can, in some circumstances, shift control as effectively as an
outright sale or redenption 2 9
The 1954 Code and Libson
Some commentators have claimed that the entire "common law" of loss carry-
overs is rejected by changes in the 1954 Code.300 In large measure the pre-
1954 case law turned on the construction of the phrase "the taxpayer" in the
predecessor of section 172. In the "comprehensive revision" of 1954, Congress
omitted "the taxpayer" from section 172 which was rewritten in the passive
voice 30' Even if intent to erase the common law is conceded, however, some
295. Under § 382(c) nonvoting preferred stock is not "stock" for purposes of § 382.
296. "Redemption" -in its technical sense refers only to an exchange described in § 302.
297. See text accompanying note 293 supra. For the view that § 382(a) does not apply
to (E) reorganizations, see Brnrmx 375.
298. Section 269(a) (1) may apply. See Rev. RuL 54-482, 1954-2 Cus. BuLL. 148
(by implication); BiTTm 375.
299. See Elmer W. Hartzell, 40 B.T.A. 492 (1939), acq., 1939-2 Cu. BULL- 16;
Marjorie N. Dean, 10 T.C 19, 25 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. Bum. 1. See alo Rev. Rul.
56-179, 1956-1 Cum. BuL. 187; Alan 0. Hickok, 32 T.C. 80, 87-93, nonacq., 1959 IN.T.
REv. BuLi. No. 34, at 8;Penfield v. Davis, 105 F. Supp. 293, 301-12 (N.D. Ala. 1952),
aff'd, 205 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1953).
300. See Arent, Current Developments Affecting Loss Corporations, 35 TAXES 956,
961 (1957) ; Levine & Petta, Libson Shops: A Study in Semantics, 36 TAxES 445, 452-53
(1958); Sinrich, Libson Shops-An Argument Against Its Application Under the 1954
Code, 13 TAX. L. Rv. 167 (1958); The Supreme Court, 1956 Tenn, 71 HAnv. L. Rnv.
85, 192 (1957) ; 43 IowA L. REv. 669, 673 (1958) ; 15 WNAsH. & LEE L. Rsv. 135, 140-41
(1958).
For suggestions that Libson may not be totally inapplicable under the 1954 Code,
see Tobolowsky, New Cases Limit Changes in Ownership and Operations That Preserve
Carryovers, 12 J. TAXATION 8, 9 (1960) ; Winton, Loss Carryovers: Courts Grope Toward
Judicial Doctrbie of Business Continuity, 11 J. TAXATION 76, 77 (1959).
301. Section 172 begins: "There shall be allowed as a deduction . .. ." Levine &
Petta, supra note 300, at 452, suggest that the omission of "the taxpayer" was mandatory
in view of § 381(a). But could not Congress by use of a parenthetical--" (except to the
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body of law would have to be created to fill the void left by the absence of statu-
tory rules. One of the commentators has suggested that any new rules should
reflect the explicit Congressional intent that "economic realities" should con-
trol..3 0 2 Under this approach New Colonial and a broad reading of Stanton
would be properly rejected as turning on empty formalisms. But Libson, and
some of the cases which adopt its reasoning, attempted to avoid formalities by
focusing on the "realities" of the transaction at issue and would still be viable.
Moreover, to search for more specific congressional intent would prove fruitless:
section 382(b) focuses on changes in ownership, section 382 (a) on ownership
and business, and section 269 (c) on whether the "outsiders" paid an appropriate
price for the carryforward. Which factor is most important in a case not within
the ambit of any of these sections would be impossible to determine.303 In such
cases courts are likely to turn to prior Supreme Court cases whose theories have,
in general, been remarkably tenacious even though supposedly superseded by
specific statutory provisions.304
SELECTED ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE ADJUSTMENTS ON
Loss CARRYOVERS
The existence of interrelated statutory sections and judicial doctrines make
carryover law difficult to understand and even harder to apply. A detailed study
of a particular section, or case, while necessary fully to comprehend that section
tends to obfuscate the over-all statutory and judicial scheme. To illustrate the
operation of carryover law the final portion of tLis Comment will discuss the
effect on carryovers of certain combinative and divisive transactions, focusing
on alternative ways of accomplishing a particular carryover objective. Choice
by the tax planner will of course depend on many additional considerations, but
treatment of other tax or business consequences is beyond the scope of this work
and will be largely omitted.
Acquisitions by Loss Corporations
After several unprofitable years the shareholders of a loss corporation may
want to shift their corporation's endeavors to a more lucrative business, not
only for profit motives but also to take advantage of the carryforward. This
extent provided in section 381)"-have retained the venerated phrase with its encrustation
of interpretation without undercutting the liberality of § 381? The absence of "the tax-
payer" may have been intended to do no more than conform the operative carryover section
with the sentence structure of most other sections permitting deductions, all of which
have for many years used the passive. Compare §§ 162(a), 163(a), 164(a), and 165(a),
with Int Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 23(a) (1) (A), 23(b), 23(c), 23(e) and 23(f). At all
events, it seems futile to suggest that the change in phraseology is sufficient to justify total
disregard of prior case law. The Committee Reports fail to corroborate such a conclusion.
302. Sinrich, supra note 300, at 181.
303. See 1958 Hearings 2611-13 (discussion of Chairman Mills, Norris Darrell, Esq.,
Samuel J. Lanahan, Esq., Rep. Mason, of Illinois).
304. See Bir-xRc, CAsEs ox FEDERAL INCOME EsTATm AND GiFr TAxA Ao ix-x (1958).
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section will examine various ways shareholders of the loss corporation who do
not want to sell their interests can acquire income producing property, and the
carryover consequences of each method.
Purclase of Assets by Loss Corporation
The simplest method of acquiring income-producing property is through
purchase, using its own cash, borrowed money, or proceeds from the sale of
a minority stock interest. Since no tax-free reorganization or liquidation is
involved when assets are purchased, sections 381 and 382(b) are inapplicable.3"03
Section 382(a) will not ordinarily be operative because the ownership of the
loss corporation remains substantially unclanged. 0 0 Nor is section 269 rele-
vant, no acquisition of corporate control or tax-free acquisition of corporate
assets having occurred 307 Therefore, carryovers against income produced by
the new assets will be denied, if at all, by the Libson doctrine. While no case has
yet disallowed a carryover where the business alone has changed, Mill Ridge
may presage such an extension of Libson.3 08
Purchase of Stock in Profitable Corporation by Loss Corporation.
If the income producing property is owned by a corporation rather than
individuals, the loss corporation can purchase the stock of the profitable
company instead of its assets, using the same financing devices employed in
305. See notes 165-72, 218 mrupra and accompanying text.
Of course, the nonoccurrence of a reorganization is dependent upon a court's recognition
of debt instruments exchanged for the income-producing property (or sold for the cash
used io purchase such property) as debt rather than equity. Such new "debt" may bring
the "thin capitalization" doctrine into play causing the obligation to be treated as equity.
See Emanuel N. (Manny) Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37, 57-62 (1956), aff'd, 254 F2d 51 (7th
Cir. 1958) (sale of stock for notes of $4 million face amount of corporation with only
$1000 equity capital; notes treated as equity). But see WV. H. Truschel, 29 T.C. 433, 437-
40 (1957), acq., 1960 INT. Rsv. BuL.r No. 6, at 8 (Commissioner unsuccessfully argued
purchase money securities were preferred stock received in a reorganization); Howe's
Estate, 30 T.C. 909, 920-22 (1958), iwitacq., 1959 INT. Rxv. Bua. No. 32, at 7, aff'd sub
nor., Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959), nonacq. uqthdramz, 1960
IxT. REv. Bum- No. 6, at 8 (similar). On thin capitalization, see Brrmm 114-16.
Even if, because of thin capitalization, a sale were treated as reorganization, § 382(b)
would not apply unless the obligations constituted "stock," i.e., stock other than non-
voting preferred stock, exceeded 80% of the fair market value of the loss corporation's
stock and were acquired by persons other than shareholders of the loss corporation
before the reorganization.
306. Since it is assume4 that the loss corporation's shareholders are seeking to make
use of the carryover themselves, presumably they will not sell or exchange more than
50 percentage points in value of stock to finance the acquisition of income-producing
property.
307. See note 136 supra and accompanying text. In all references to § 269 in the
immediate section of this Comment, the presence of a principal tax avoidance purpose vll
be assumed, so that applicability of § 269 will depend only upon the presence of the
other conditions required by that section.
308. See notes 108-18 supra and accompanying text.
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.the assets purchase. Once the stock is purchased the profitable corporation will
become a wholly owned subsidiary of the loss corporation. A further step is
needed to take full advantage of the carryover, however, since the loss corporate
entity itself must earn the income against which the loss is sought to be offset. 09
The assets could be transferred to the parent in any of several ways 3 10 and
retention of the carryover would depend only on Libson.31 Section 269(a) (1)
might be applied to the original purchase of stock on an extension of the
Coastal Oil theory :312 control of the subsidiary has been acquired for the ul-
timate purpose of obtaining income to offset the prior year's loss; without such
income the loss corporation might not "enjoy" the benefit of its own carry-
over.313 Section 269 (a) (1) might be avoided, however, if the taxpayer can
argue successfully that, under a step transaction theory, the entire deal has
the net effect of, and should be viewed as, a cash purchase of assets. 14 Section
269(a) (2) does not apply, because the transferor (profitable subsidiary) was
controlled directly or indirectly by the acquiring corporation (parent loss cor-
poration) or its shareholders immediately before the transfer of assets.315 And
if the transaction is recast as a purchase of assets, section 269 (a) (2) would be
309. The acquisition of the stock of a profitable corporation would make the two
corporations "affiliated" for purposes of an election to file a consolidated return but such
an election would be useless in making use of the carryover. Losses from taxable years
prior to the year in which the subsidiary was acquired can be deducted from consolidated
taxable income only to the extent of income of the loss corporation included in the con-
solidated return." Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-31(b) (3) (1955).
310. The income-producing property could be acquired as a dividend, taxable under §
61(a) and § 301(c) (1), in redemption of a portion of the profitable corporation's stock
the tax treatment of which is governed by §§ 302(b) (1) or (2), or, in a partial liquidation
the tax treatment of which is governed by §§ 331(a) (2) and 346(a) or (b). Ealh of
these methods of acquiring income-producing property from the profitable company re-
sults in that corporation's continued separate existence. To avoid this result, the profitable
corporation may be liquidated into its parent. Such a liquidation may be taxable or tax
free. See note 121 supra.
311. For the possible application of the Libson doctrine, see notes 18-18 supra and
accompanying text.
Section 382(a) does not apply since the ownership of the loss corporation remains
substantially unchanged (subject to the method and extent of financing the acquisition
of the profitable corporation's stock). And § 382(b) does not apply because no reorgani-
zation has occurred.
312. See notes 147-52 supra and accompanying text.
313. The application of § 269(a) (1) could possibly be avoided by introduction of
evidence that income-produoing property could have been easily acquired from other
sources than the particular profitable company acquired. The argument would be that
"the benefit" of the carryover would have "otherwise!' been "enjoyed": other assets
would have been acquired which would have produced income against which the carry-
over could have been offset. This argument is close to, but not identical with, the Tax
Court reading of "otherwise" in Commodores Point Terminal Corp., 11 T.C. 411, 417
(1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 1, and in Coastal Oil, both discussed in note 281 suipra.
314. On this theory, interdependent steps may be telescoped and the entire transaction
viewed as a whole. See generally BirrKER 15, 393; Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions
in Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 12r INsT. oN FED. TAx. 247 (1954).
315. See text accompanying note 136 supra.
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avoided because the property acquired does not have a transferred basis." lu
Assuming that the transaction escapes section 269, it must still come to grips
with the Libson-Mill Ridge continuity-of-business tests, and the question of
whether that rationale applies without change of ownership.
If liquidation of the subsidiary is deemed undesirable, the income producing
property and the history of operating losses can be united through certain
tax-free amalgamations. The parent may merge downstream into the sub-
sidiary in an (A) reorganization; 317 the parent may exchange its assets for
the subsidiary's voting stock in a (C) reorganization;3 18 the parent may trans-
fer its assets to the subsidiary and distribute the subsidiary's stock to its share-
holders in complete liquidation-a (D) reorganization. 310 After these reorgan-
izations the loss corporation's carryover would pass to the subsidiary by oper-
ation of section 381(a) subject to the limitations implicit in the concept of a re-
organization-business purpose and continuity of interest.220 Section 382(b)
will be inapplicable because the loss corporation's shareholders will retain the
requisite 20 per cent interest. 321 The Coastal Oil interpretation of section 269
may prevent the subsidiary from deducting the carryover; control was indi-
rectly acquired by the loss corporation's shareholders when the subsidiary's
stock was purchased, invoking section 269(a) (1); section 269(a) (2) wi1
also apply since the subsidiary has acquired property of another corporation
with a transferred basis .3 22 The Service 'has, at least for the time being, re-
nounced Libson as to section 381(a) transactions.s3o
Purchase of Assets by Loss Corporation's Shareholders
If for any reason the loss corporation itself does not wish to purchase income-
producing property, its shareholders might purchase the property in their
individual capacities. The assets can then be contributed to the corporation
in a section 351 exchange or as a contribution to capital. -4 The consequences
316. Section 269(a) (2) applies only if the basis of the property is determined by
reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor.
317. See § 368(a) (1) (A); note 168 supra and accompanying text.
318. See § 368(a) (1) (C); note 169 stpra and accompanying text.
319. See § 368(a) (1) (D); notes 170-71 supra and accompanying text.
320. See notes 183-91 supra and accompanying text.
321. See notes 216-18, 306 supra and accompanying text.
322. See notes 147-55 supra and accompanying text.
323. Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959 INT. REv. Bun.. No. 51, at 20; Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2
Cum. Bun. 147.
324. A shareholder contribution to capital is similar to a § 351 exchange. If any
stock is received by the transferors of property, the exchange will qualify under § 351
so long as the transferors had or gain control (as defined). If no stock is received the
property transferred is termed a contribution to capital. The basis of the property in the
hands of the corporation, under § 362(a), becomes the basis in the hands of the transferor.
The shareholder's basis for his stock is increased by the basis of the property con-
tributed. Neither the corporation, by virtue of § 118, nor the shareholder (except possibly
if the property is subject to a liability) recognizes gain or loss. See generally Birrimr,
108-10.
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of shareholder purchase would ordinarily be the same as the consequences of
purchase by the corporation itself. Section 382 and section 269(a) (1) are
irelevant for the same reasons that applied when the loss corporation purchased
the assets. Nor will section 269(a) (2) apply since the loss corporation is not
acquiring "property of another corporation. 3 25 Even if the transaction is
recast as a contribution of cash to the loss corporation followed by purchase of
assets,326 section 269(a) (2) is inapplicable, because in the fictional acquisition
of assets by the loss corporation, the basis of the assets acquired was not de-
termined by reference to the basis in the hands of the former owners of such
assets. 327 The only threat to the carryover's survival is the possible application
of a Libson-Mill Ridge theory.
Purchase of Stock in Profitable Corporation by Loss Corporation's Share-
holders
The shareholders have the same alternative which was available to the loss
corporation-purchasing the stock of a profitable corporation instead of its
assets. They can then liquidate the profitable company in a taxable complete
liquidation and contribute the assets received to the loss corporation.a88 The
carryover consequences would be similar to those obtaining when the corpor-
ation itself purchases the stock. The Government might argue that acquisition
of control of the profitable corporation by the loss corporation's shareholders will
invoke section 269(a) (1) since the shareholders will "benefit" from the loss
corporation's ultimate deduction of the carryover from the income earned by
the acquired assets.329 Section 269(a) (2) is inapplicable since the loss cor-
poration would not have acquired "property of another corporation."330 The
325. See note 136 supra. If the original seller is a corporation, the brief ownership
by the individual shareholders might nonetheless be recognized. Cf. Airlene Gas Co.
v. United States, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R2d 5880 (W.D. Ky. 1958) (applying the predecessor
of § 1551).
326. For an analogy, see BrrriE 124 (suggesting that a corporate borrowing guaran-
teed by shareholders may be treated as a shareholder borrowing followed by a contribution
of cash). See also Virginia W. Stettinius Dudley, 32 T.C. 564, 584-590 (1959) (sale
of all stock of one corporation treated as sale of assets by another followed by distribution
of a dividend to latter's shareholders; both corporations roughly owned by same share-
holders).
327. See text accompanying note 136 supra.
If the transaction were treated as a purchase by the loss corporation, the basis of the
assets would be "cost." § 1012.
328. Of course, gain or loss, if any, would be recognized, § 331 (a) (1), but the basis
of the assets would be stepped-up or down to their fair market value. § 334 (a).
329. The Coastal Oil reasoning would be extended an additional step. That case held
that § 269(a) (1) disallowed an allowance of the corporation control of which was
acquired. Here a deduction of a taxpayer neither acquired nor acquiring is sought to
be disallowed. But the statute speaks solely of "benefit" and in no way limits the taxpayer
whose deduction is disallowed to the acquired corporation or the persons acquiring the
control.
330. See notes 136 supra and accompanying text.
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Commissioner might contend, however, that in effect the loss corporation pur-
chased the stock of the profitable corporation after a contribution of cash by its
shareholders. In this event, section 269(a) (2) would still not apply because the
basis of assets would be determined by the cost of the stock under section
334(b) (2 ),33' and because the property was acquired from a corporation con-
trolled by the acquiring corporation.332 Section 269(a)(1) would remain a
threat even if the transaction is recast. The Commissioner would then argue
that control of the profitable corporation was acquired for the interdicted pur-
pose. But the taxpayer could claim that the substance-over-form doctrine has
been imperfectly applied since one step-the liquidation-was ignored; the entire
transaction should be recast as a purchase of assets by the loss corporation.3
The specter of Libsonl hovers over this transaction as well as all others where
the income sought to be reduced by the carryover was produced by a different
"'business" than that which sustained the loss.3 34
Instead of liquidating the profitable company and then contributing the assets,
the shareholders may contribute their newly purchased stock in the profitable
company to the loss corporation. The same combinative techniques vll be open
to the loss corporation as were available when the loss corporation itself pur-
chased the stock; it can liquidate the profitable corporation or can merge into
it. And the same limitations will be applicable. 335 At least one major noncarry-
over difference between a direct purchase of stock by the loss corporation and a
preliminary purchase by its shareholders exists, however; in the latter case
section 334(b) (2) will be inapplicable if the two step transaction is taken at
face value, because the subsidiary's stock was not purchased by the loss cor-
poration.336 Thus, even if the profitable company is liquidated within two
years, the basis of its assets will remain the same in the hands of the loss
corporation.337
Loss Corporation Exchanges its Stock for Stock in the Profitable Corporation
If the owners of the profitable corporation do not wvant to recognize gain
or loss when they dispose of their corporation, the loss corporation may ex-
331. See note 121 stpra. Since the corporation would be treated as having purchased
the stock for cash, § 334(b) (3)'s definition of "purchase" would be met.
332. See text accompanying note 136 sipra.
333. Section 269 is entirely inapplicable to a purchase of assets by the corporation.
See text accompanying note 307 mpra.
334. See notes 108-18 supra and accompanying text.
335. See text accompanying notes 309-16 supra.
336. Section 334(b) (2) does not apply unless the stock of the liquidated corporation
was acquired by "purchase" as defined in § 334(b) (3). And a "purchase" does not include
an acquisition after which the basis of the stock is determined by reference to the basis
in the hands of the transferor. Since the basis of the profitable corporation's stock in the
hands of the loss corporation is determined, under § 362(a), by reference to the basis
in the hands of its shareholders, no "purchase" has occurred. This analysis assumes that
the transaction is not recast as a purchase by the loss corporation after a contribution
of cash by its shareholders. See note 326 supra and accompanying te.t.
337. See note 121 supra.
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change a portion of its voting stock for 80 per cent or more of the stock of
the profitable corporation, a (B) reorganization. 38 After such an exchange
the profitable corporation would be a subsidiary of the loss corporation and
the former shareholders of the profitable company would hold stock in the
loss corporation.33 9 Thereafter, the profitable corporation can be liquidated 40
or the loss corporation can merge downstream, practically or statutorily, into
its newly acquired subsidiary.341 The same possible limitations will be ap-
plicable as were relevant when the loss corporation purchased the profitable
corporation's stock and then combined the two corporations. 42 When a liqui-
dation follows the (B) reorganization, section 269(a) (2) might apply rather
than 269(a) (1) if the Commissioner argues that the entire transaction should
be treated as an acquisition of assets for stock-a (C) reorganization. 43 If
the transaction is so viewed, section 269(a) (2), under the Coastal Oil reason-
ing, might be employed to disallow the carryover since the loss corporation has
acquired "property of another corporation" (not controlled by the acquiring
corporation before the transaction) which would retain its basis in the hands
of the profitable company.344 But section 269(a) (1) cannot operate because,
disregarding the acquisition of the profit corporation's stock, no acquisition of
corporate control has occurerd. And section 382(b) would not limit use of
the carryover because the loss corporation's shareholders retain more than a
20 per cent interest in the acquiring corporation; section 382(a) would not
apply, because 50 percentage points -of the fair market value of the loss cor-
poration's stock has not changed hands. 845
Anuilgamation of a Profitable Corporation into the Loss Corporation
In addition to a (B) reorganization followed by a liquidation, assets of a
profitable corporation may be acquired 'by a direct tax-free merger. In an (A)
reorganization (statutory merger or consolidation), the former shareholders
of the profitable corporation would exchange their stock in that corporation
for stock in the surviving loss corporation. In a (C) reorganization the profit-
able corporation may exchange its assets for stock in the loss corporation and
338. See § 368(a) (1) (B); notes 173-74 supra and accompanying text.
339. Even if more than 80% of the loss corporation's stock were used in this acquisition,
§ 382(b) would not apply since that section in terms excludes (B) reorganizations.
340. The liquidation may be tax free under § 332 or taxable to the extent of any gain
or loss under § 331. See note 121 supra. Section 334(b) (2) cannot apply because the
profitable company's stock was not acquired by "purchase." See note 336 supra.
341. A practical merger by (C) or (D) reorganization would be possible. See notes
169-71 supra and accompanying text. A combination of the two corporations by statutory
merger or consolidation in an (A) reorganization could be consummated. See note 168
supra and accompanying text.
342. See notes 309-16 supra and accompanying text.
343. For a discussion of this possibility, see note 174 supra and accompanying text.
344. § 362(b) ; see note 136 supra and accompanying text.
345. See note 306 supra.
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either remain alive as a holding company, or exchange this newly acquired
stock for its own stock in liquidation. In either transaction, application of
the loss carryover against subsequent income may be limited only " by sec-
tion 269(a) (2), on the same theory applied to the recast (B) reorganization
followed by liquidation.34 7 Since the transactions fall wsithin those described
by section 381 (a), the Service will presumably not argue Libson-Mill Ridge.3
Acquisition by Loss Corporation of Income-Producing Property Owned by
Individiuls without Recognition of Gain or Loss
The income-producing property sought by the loss corporation may be owned
by individuals, who do not wish to recognize gain on a transfer of their property
to the loss corporation. This result can be accomplished by a transfer of the
loss corporation's assets to a newly organized corporation in exchange for at
least 80 per cent of its stock, the first part of a (D) reorganization. At the same
time the individuals will transfer their assets to the new corporation in ex-
change for the remainder of its stock, a tax-free transfer under section 351.-31
Finally, the loss corporation will distribute its newly acquired stock to it.
shareholders in exchange for their loss corporation stock thus completing the
(D) reorganization.3 50 The newly organized corporation would inherit the
loss corporation's carryover by virtue of section 381 (a) and the income from
the assets formerly owned by the individuals could be offset by the loss cor-
poration's carryforward. Section 382(b) will not be operative when the loss
corporation's shareholders retain more than a 20 per cent interest in the new
corporation. Section 382 (a) is inapplicable since no "purchase" of stock has
occurred. 351 Section 269(a) (1) might apply since stockholders of the ls
346. Since the loss corporate entity would survive, it would not depend upon § 381 (a)
for the preservation of its carryover. While § 382(b) is applicable even though the 1os
corporation is the acquiring entity, see note 218 supra and accompanying text, it is
assumed here that the 20% requirement is met.
347. See notes 343-44 suPra and accompanying text.
348. See note 188 supra and accompanying text.
349. No gain will be recognized by either the corporate transferor or individual
transferors of property because, in the aggregate, they will control the new corporation.
By virtue of § 351(c), the subsequent distribution by the loss corporation is disregarded
in determining whether the transferors have control immediately after the transfer. The
stock received by the individuals ill, under § 358(a) (1), take the basis of the property
given up.
350. § 368(a) (1) (D); see notes 170-71 sipra. The loss corporation's shareholders'
new stock will, under § 358(a) (1), take the basis of the stock given up.
351. Since none of the stock in the new corporation, held by the former shareholders
of the loss corporation and the individuals, has a cost basis, no "purchase" as defined in
§ 382(a) (4) has occurred. See notes 287-88 supra and accompanying text Moreover,
less than 50% of the new corporation's stock is held by persons other than the former
shareholders of the loss corporation. Finally, it is doubtful, to say the least, whether §
382(a) applies at all when the corporation seeking to deduct the loss is not the corporation
which sustained the loss. See note 372 infra.
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corporation have indirectly acquired control of the newly organized corpor-
ation, and "but for" this acquisition, income producing property might not
-have been obtained, and the benefit of the carryover lost.352 In addition, Coastal
Oil held section 269(a) (2) applicable to a similar transfer of assets from
parent to stubsidiary.3 53 Libson is probably inapplicable since the Service has
disclaimed any intention to use that doctrine after transactions described in
section 381 (a), including a (D) reorganization. The same transaction might
be more simply accomplished if the individual incorporates his assets and then
causes his corporation to amalgamate with the loss corporation. 854 Sections
382(a) and 382(b)3 55 would not apply but section 269(a) (2) would still
be apposite under the Coastal Oil rationale.350
Acquisitions of Loss Corporations
All of the foregoing devices assume that the stockholders of the loss cor-
poration retain a substantial stake in the corporation that seeks to use the
carryover. Retention of a controlling interest, however, is often not feasible.
In the "classic" case of carryover manipulation,3 " they are bought out 'by owners
of the profitable enterprise. This section will examine some of the ways by
which the loss history of a corporation can be transferred to a new group of
shareholders.
352. The formation of the new corporation is an acquisition of control by the loss
corporations' shareholders 'within the meaning of § 269(a) (1) under Coastal Oil. See
notes 148-52 supra and accompanying text.
353. See text accompanying note 154 supra. On the other hand section 269(a) (2)
may be inapplicable even though some property of another corporation-the loss cor-
poration-was acquired. Under the Coastal Oil reasoning, the property without which
the deduction would not have been enjoyed, in this case the individuals' assets, must be
corporate property.
354. Either an (A) or (C) reorganization could be used for this purpose. Or, a (B)
reorganization by which the newly formed corporation became at least an 80% subsidiary
of the loss corporation would be effective provided a subsequent step was taken to transfer
the income producing property to the loss corporation. For the limitations on this latter
technique, see notes 309-16 supra and accompanying text.
Of course, a "reorganization" is a prerequisite to the success of this technique for a
transfer by the individual without recognition of gain. The Commissioner may disregard
the corporate entity of the new corporation as a sham, thereby taking the transaction
outside the reorganization provisions. Cf. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935);
Jacobs v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1955).
355. Section 382(a) will not apply because no purchase has occurred. See notes
287-88 supra and accompanying text.
Section 382(b) will not apply, assuming that the loss corporation's shareholders retain
more than a 20% interest in the acquiring corporation.
356. Corporate property with a transferred basis will have been acquired without
which the loss corporation's shareholders would not have enjoyed the benefit of their
corporation's carryover. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
357. This classic technique is exemplified by Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240(1948), discussed in text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
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Purchase of Stock of a Loss Corporation
The simplest way to acquire a loss corporation is to buy its stock. Income-
producing property can be transferred to the newly acquired loss entity by a
section 351 exchange or by contribution to capital. 3rs The availability of the
carryforward will be governed primarily by section 382(a). If section 382(a) '.
continuity of business requirement 359 will not be met, the acquiring share-
holders must avoid purchase within two years of 50 per cent of the loss cur-
poration's stock, either by "creeping acquisition" a0 0 or by manipulating the
constructive ownership rules so that the purchase is not a "purchase."-" Section
269 (a) (1) will be applicable, because control has been acquired by persons who
would not otherwise "enjoy" the benefit of the carryover.36- Additionally, the
Mill Ridge holding may be used to disallow a carryforward where the mechanical
criteria of 382(a) are not applicable.1as
When the buyer of the loss corporation is also a corporation, it may attempt
to obtain the carryover under section 381 (a) by liquidating the loss corporation
(now its subsidiary). If the liquidation occurs within two years after the
purchase of stock, the basis of assets received in liquidation will be determined
under section 334(b) (2). 36 Since section 381 (a) does not apply to such
liquidations, the acquiring corporation will not inherit the carryforward under
that section.3 65 Thus, only if the profitable corporation postpones the liquida-
tion for more than two years so that the basis of assets received will, under
section 334(b) (1), be the same as in the hands of the loss corporation, vill
section 381 (a) transfer the carryover. Section 382(b) will not reduce the
carryover for by its own terms it does not govern liquidations. But unless the
corporation's pre-change-of-ownership business were continued during the two
years, section 382 (a) would disallow the carryover. The original stock acqui-
358. On the meaning of this phrase, see note 324 su pra.
359. See notes 268-75 supra and accompanying text.
360. See notes 285-86 supra and accompanying te.
361. A "purchase" within the meaning of § 382(a) may be avoided if stock of a loss
corporation is acquired from a person whose stock is attributed to the purchaser by the
constructive ownership rules. In some cases, such attribution may be created specifically
with a view to the later purchase. See note 289 supra and accompanying text.
362. See notes 147-52 supra and accompanying text.
If the purchaser of the loss corporation's stock were a corporation, § 269(a) (2)
might apply under the Coastal Oil reasoning, because corporate property with a trans-
ferred basis would have been acquired.
363. See notes 108-18 supra and accompanying text.
364. See note 121 spra.
365. Although § 381 (a) does not transfer the carryover, it is arguable that the
Dowvant distinction of New Colonial, see note 128 supra, would validate such a transfer
because, even though the basis of assets is determined under § 334(b) (2), the liquidation
is still tax free under § 332(a). The argument is only superficially plausible however,
because a § 334(b) (2) liquidation is treated as a sale of assets and, just as "earnings
and profits" are not inherited by a buyer of corporate assets, BITTErm 22, it seems
highly unlikely that a carryover would follow those assets.
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sition may also -be subject to section 269(a)(1),360 although the tax-free
acquisition of property is probably immune from section 269(a) (2) since the
loss corporation was under the control of the profitable corporation before the
transfer. Libson 'has been abandoned by the Service in this context.
Purchase of Loss Corporation's Stock by Profitable Corporation's Shareholders
The two-year waiting period imposed 'by section 334(b) (2) and incor-
porated into section 381 (a) might be avoided if the initial acquisition of the
loss corporation's stock is made by the shareholders of the profitable corpora-
tion rather than by the corporation itself. The shareholders cannot liquidate
the loss corporation and contribute its assets since section 381 (a) transfers
carryovers across corporate lines only after liquidations of subsidiary corpor-
ations. 0 7 But the loss corporation's stock can be contributed to the profitable
corporation in a section 351 exchange or as a contribution to capital. 0 8 After the
loss corporation becomes a subsidiary of the profitable corporation, it can
be liquidated immediately without running afoul of section 334(b) (2) be-
cause that'section is inapplicable when the stock of the subsidiary is not acquired
in a "purchase."3'0 0 Since the basis of the subsidiary's assets will be determined
under section 334(b) (1) rather than section 334(b) (2), section 381 (a) will
transfer the carryover from the liquidated subsidiary to the profitable parent
company. Arguably, however, the transaction could be recast as a contribu-
tion of cash to the profitable corporation followed by a purchase of stock by
that corporation.370 Alternatively, the Government might argue persuasively
that the entire transaction was in substance a purchase of assets by the cor-
poration, on analogy to Kimbell-Diarnond Milling Co. 371 If the transaction
is not recast and the carryover is transferred by section 381 (a), there will be
no diminution under section 382(b) since that section does not apply to
liquidations. Section 382(a) will be similarly inapplicable, if construed as
affecting carryforwards only when the same corporate entity which sustained
the loss seeks the deduction.3 7 2 The threat of section 269 will depend, as usual,
366. Control has been acquired. See text accompanying notes 150-51 supra.
367. Section 381 (a) (1) refers only to liquidations to which § 332 applies. See notes
166-67 supra and accompanying text.
368. See note 324 supra.
369. See note 336 supra.
370. See note 326 supra and accompanying text. In such case, the basis of property
received in the liquidation would be determined under § 334(b) (2) since the profitable
corporation would have acquired the loss subsidiary's stock by "purchase." The carryover
would not pass to the parent under § 381 (a) since that section excludes liquidations to
which § 334(b)(2) applies.
371. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiarn, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 827 (1951). In such case, the carryover would be lost because tax attributes do
not follow corporate assets after sales.
372. Tobolowsky, New Cases Limit Changes in Ounership and Operations That
Preserve Carryovers, 12 J. TAXATION 8, 14 (1960) seems to assume that § 382(a)
may apply after a merger described in § 381 (a) (2). The language of § 382(a) does not
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on the liberality of the interpretation afforded it;373 and Libson, if the Service
means what it said in Rev. Rid. 58-603, 374 will be inapplicable. Instead of
liquidating the loss corporation after it has obtained the loss corporation's
stock, the profitable corporation may merge downstream into the loss corpora-
tionY7 In such case, section 382 (a) may disallow the carryover since there
has been a change in ownership of 50 per cent of the stock. 3-a
After purchase of the loss corporation's stock, the shareholders of the profit-
able corporation will own both the loss and profitable corporation as "brother"
and "sister." The profitable corporation can then be merged into the loss cor-
poration in an (A) or (C) reorganization. 377 Section 382(b) seems inapplicable
because both corporations were owned by the same persons in the same pro-
portions before the reorganization.378 Similarly section 269(a) (2) will not
apply because of the common ownership of both the transferor and acquiring
corporations.3 79 And Libson presumably will not be used by the Service after
(A) or (C) reorganizations. But section 269(a) (1) might reach the original
acquisition of control by the profitable corporation's shareholders.380 And
section 382(a), if the loss corporation's former business is discontinued, would
apply when more than 50 per cent in value of the loss corporation's stock %as
originally purchased. But section 382(a) may be avoided if, instead of the
profitable corporation merging into the loss corporation, the latter merges into
the profitable corporation and transfers its carryover under section 381. Section
382 (a) may be read to apply only if the loss corporate entity seeks to deduct the
carryforward.3 s L Reversing the form of the merger may not escape section 269-
(a) (1), lpossibly applicable to the preliminary purchase of the loss corporation's
stock without regard to which entity survives. Of course, the entire transac-
support this view: "If, at the end of a taxable year of a corporation [the three conditions
-50 per cent change of ownership, by a purchase or decrease in outstanding stock, and
the business is discontinued-are satisfied] ... the net operating loss carryovers, if any,
from prior taxable years of smch corporation to uch taxable year and subsequent taxable
years shall not be included in the net operating loss deduction for such taxable year."
(Emphasis added.) The statute thus seems to refer only to carryovers of losses sustained
by the same corporation which seeks to deduct the prior years' losses.
373. Under an extension of the Coastal Oil reasoning, see note 329 supra, § 269(a) (1)
might apply to the original purchase by the profitable corporation's shareholders. Section
269(a) (2) will not apply to the asset acquisition by liquidation of the subsidiary loss
corporation because of § 269(a) (2)'s common ownership provision.
374. See note 188 supra.
375. For the types of reorganization available, see notes 317-19 sutpra and accom-
panying text.
376. Throughout this section of the Comment, it is assumed that the loss corporation's
shareholders dispose of more than 50% of the fair market value of the loss corporation's
stock.
377. See notes 168-69 supra and accompanying text.
378. § 382(b) (3). See notes 248-52 supra and accompanying text
379. The transferor (profitable corporation) was owned, immediately before the
transfer of assets, by the shareholders of the acquiring corporation.
380. See note 329 supra.
381. See note 372 supra.
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tion might be recast more favorably to the Service. For example, the Govern-
ment might argue that the sequence of events was in substance no more than
a purchase by the profitable corporation of -the loss corporation's assets. So
viewed, the carryover would be entirely forfeited.
The techniques outlined in the preceding paragraph depend upon corporate
ownership of the profitable enterprise and are not available to individuals.
If, however, as in Alprosa, the profitable business is a partnership, the partners
can incorporate when they purchase the loss corporation's stock. The "brother-
sister" corporations can then be amalgamated with the profitable corporation
surviving.3 8 2 In an appropriate case, the Commissioner might treat the cor-
poration newly formed to acquire the partnership assets as a sham.88 In this
event, the later transaction would not qualify as a "reorganization" and the
carryover would be lost.
Amwlgamation of the Loss Corporation and a Profitable Corporation by Tax-
Free Reorganization
If the shareholders of the loss corporation desire to avoid recognition of
gain or loss on the disposal of their corporation, their wishes can be accom-
modated by combining the loss and profit corporation in a tax-free reorgani-
zation. The profitable corporation can merge into the loss corporation in an
(A), (C) or (D) reorganization with the loss corporation's shareholders re-
taining only a minority interest. Retention of the carryover in these circum-
stances, however, is doubtful. Unless a 20 per cent interest (in value) is
retained, the carryover will be reduced under section 382(b). Even if limita-
tion of the carryover under section 382(b) were avoided, section 269(a) (1)
would remain a threat since the profitable corporation's shareholders have
indirectly acquired control of the loss corporation. Moreover, section 269(a)-
(2) might apply, under Coastal Oil, because the loss corporation has acquired
another corporation's property without change of that property's basis
a8 4
To escape some ofthese restrictions, the loss corporation can be merged into
the profitable corporation in an (A) or (C) reorganization.8as The carryover
would be inherited under section 381 (a) by the surviving profitable corpora-
tion. But again, unless a 20 per cent interest in the acquiring corporation were
obtained by the loss corporation's shareholders, the carryover would be pro-
portionately reduced by section 382(b). Section 269(a) (2) would remain a
382. This could be accomplished by (A), (C), or (D) reorganization. The carryover
might be disallowed under section 269 (a) (1), under the theory discussed in the previous
paragraph at note 380 supra.
383. For examples of this doctrine, see cases cited in note 353 .supra.
384. Section 382(a) would not apply because, in the tax-free reorganization, there is
no "purchase" of stock as required by § 382(a). See notes 287-88 supra and accompany-
ing text.
385. A (D) reorganization cannot be used because the loss corporation's shareholders
will not have control of the profitable corporation after the transaction as required by
§ 368(a) (1) (D).
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threat if section 382(b) were inapplicable, since an acquisition of corporate
property with a transferred basis has occurred. If some scaling down occurred
under section 382(b), section 269's applicability would be questionable due to
the Senate Report's curious explanation of the relation between the two
sections.38 6
Exchange of Stock of Loss Corporation for Stock of Profitable Corporation
Another method of marketing the carryforward without recognition of gain
or loss is a (B) reorganization-stock for stock-followed by a liquidation.
The loss corporation's shareholders can exchange all their stock in the loss
corporation for stock in the profitable corporation. The loss corporation has
become a subsidiary and can be liquidated under section 332; since there has
been no "purchase" of stock, the basis of assets received wilU be determined
under section 334(b) (1),38 and the loss corporation's carryover il be trans-
ferred by section 381(a). Section 382(b) does not apply to liquidations, and
section 382(a) is inapplicable because the stock-for-stock transfer is not a
"purchase" of the loss corporation's stock; in addition, that section probably
does not apply when the corporation claiming the deduction is not the same
entity which suffered the loss.388 Section 269(a) (1) might prevent transfer
of the carryover since control of the loss corporation has been acquired, but
application of section 269(a) (2)'s common owvnership provision will immunize
the liquidation from attack under the latter subsection. The Government may
argue, however, that, in substance a (C) reorganization under section 381
has occurred so that section 382(b)'s 20 per cent continuity of interest re-
quirement must be satisfied.3 8 9 Characterization as a (C) reorganization might
also invoke section 269(a) (2).
After the (B) reorganization is completed, the profitable corporation can,
instead of liquidating the subsidiary, transfer its own assets to the subsidiary
in a section 351 exchange or contribution to capital. The carryforward would
then be available to reduce income from the property transferred. And if the
profitable parent corporation liquidates pursuant to a plan of reorganization
to eliminate the intervening corporate entity, the transfer of assets and the
liquidation will qualify as a (D) reorganization.390 Section 382(b) may dis-
allow the carryover, however, since, immediately before the (D) reorganiza-
tion (transfer of assets and liquidation) the loss corporation was owned by the
profitable corporation and immediately after the reorganization by the profit-
able corporation's shareholders.3 ' Section 382(b) may be avoided by not
386. See note 256 supra and accompanying text.
387. Section 334(b) (2) will not apply even if the liquidation occurs within twu
years of the stock acquisition because the loss corporation's stock will not have been
acquired by a "purchase" as defined in § 334(b) (3).
388. See note 372 stpra.
3S9. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
390. See note 170-71 supra and accompanying text.
391. Section 382(b) (1) (B) requires the stockholders of the loss corporation-in
this case the profitable corporation-to own, immediately after the reorganization, a 7oc,
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liquidating the profitable corporation,8 2 or by liquidating it under section
331 recognizing gain or loss in full.393 In any event, section 382(a) will not
apply since, under the constructive ownership rules, there has been no "pur-
chase. '39 4 However, the acquisition of control in the (B) reorganization will
subject the transaction to section 269 (a) (1). The Libson and step-transaction
doctrines present their usual complexities.
Acquisition of Loss Corporation by Section 351 Exchange
The loss corporation may be acquired by section 351 exchange without any
outlay of cash or credit by the owners of the profitable business. If, as in
Alprosa, the profitable enterprise is owned -by individuals, they may exchange
their income producing property for a controlling block of stock in the loss cor-
poration.3 ,5 The carryforward will be unaffected by section 382 (a) because no
"purchase" has been consummated. 30 Section 382(b) does not come into play
because no reorganization described in section 381 (a) (2) has occurred. And
section 269(a) (2) does not apply because the loss corporation has not acquired
"property of another corporation." Section 269(a) (1), however, would be
interest in the acquiring corporation. Thus the fact that, after the reorganization, the
profitable corporation's shareholders own the acquiring corporation would seem to cause
total forfeiture of the carryover.
Section 382(b) would seem to apply even if the original shareholders of the loss
corporation received a 20% interest or more in the profitable corporation as a result
of the (B) reorganization. Although those shareholders would receive 20% of the loss
corporation's stock when the profitable company liquidated as part of the (D) reorgani-
zation, they would not have been stockholders of the loss corporation "Immediately before
the reorganization" because "the reorganization" is the (D) reorganization, not the
(B) and the (D) together.
392. If the profitable corporation stays alive the reorganization may qualify as t
(C) reorganization and § 382(b) will not apply since that corporation-the stockholder
of the loss corporation immediately before the reorganization--will own 100% of the
loss corporation immediately after the transaction. Arguably, however, the transaction
should not be treated as a (C) reorganization but as a § 351 exchange which would make
§ 382(b) totally inapplicable. See note 203 supra.
393. If the liquidation were not pursuant to a "plan of reorganization," it would
be governed by § 331, and the liquidation of the parent would be independent of and
subsequent to the transfer of assets to the subsidiary. Thus the loss-corporation stock-
holder immediately before "the reorganization"-the profitable company-would own more
than the requisite 20% interest immediately after the transfer of assets, unless, under a
step transaction theory, the liquidation was regarded as a step in an integrated plan to
transfer the ownership of the loss corporation to the profitable corporation's shareholders.
See note 227 supra and accompanying text.
394. The profitable corporation's shareholders are treated as the owners of the loss
corporation's stock before the liquidation. See note 289 supra and accompanying text.
395. Section 351 requires that the fransferors of property have "control" of the trans-
feree, immediately after the exchange. "Control" is defined in § 368(c) as 80% of the
total combined voting power and 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes
of stock.
396. The basis of the stock received will be determined under § 35 8(a) (1) by refer-
ence to the basis of the property given up.
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applicable since outsiders have acquired control of the loss corporation. Alter-
natively, Libson as extended -by Mill Ridge might restrict the deductibility of
the carryover.397 Acquisition of a loss corporation by section 351 exchange may
also be accomplished by a corporate owner of a profitable business. But if
the profitable corporation is not kept alive as a holding company, the Com-
missioner may argue that the transaction is a (D) reorganization and therefore
section 382(b) is operative; unless the loss corporation's shareholders retain
the requisite 20 per cent continuity of interest the carryover wiU be reduced.
Even if the profitable corporation is kept alive,308 the Government may argue
that a (C) reorganization has occurred so that section 382(b) remains applica-
ble. Additionally, even if the transaction is treated as a section 351 exchange,
section 269(a) (2) would be applicable since corporate property with a trans-
ferred basis was acquired by the loss corporation.
Corporate Divisions
Congress and commentators have focused primarily on the aailability of
a carryforward after the combination of tvo or more enterprises. Largely
overlooked are the carryover consequences of corporate divisions, which are
ordinarily not prompted by carryover considerations. No provision of the
1954 Code deals specifically with this problem nor have regulations been issued
to fill the gap. This section of the Comment will discuss the effect on carry-
overs of several types of corporate division. Since corporate division for the
purpose of tax avoidance is unlikely, the impact of section 269 upon such
transactions vill not be considered.
Formation of a Subsidiary
If a loss corporation wishes to segregate a portion of its business activities
by formation of a subsidiary corporation (usually through a section 351 ex-
change), whether the subsidiary would inherit any of the parent's net operating
loss is questionable. While the formation of the subsidiary is tax free, section
381(a) will not operate to transfer any part of the parent's carryover since
that section is not applicable to section 351 exchanges. The Senate Report and
the proposed regulations under section 381, however, state that omission of
transactions from section 381 shall not affect the carryover consequences of
any transaction omitted.39 9 Therefore, a taxpayer can invoke the Libson and
Donovan cases to support transfer of the carryover. In Donovan, where a
397. Since a § 351 transaction is not among those "described in section 331 (a),"
Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cums. BuLL 147, does not grant amnesty from a Libson-based
attack. For discussion of the theory of Libson applicable to this transaction, see text ac-
companying notes 108-18 supra.
398. It is not clear to what extent the overlap of § 351, § 368(a) (1) (C), and §
368(a) (1) (D) may be used to the taxpayer's advantage. See note 203 supra.
399. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1954) ; Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.81-
(a)-1 (b)(3), 25 Fed. Reg. 757 (Jan. 29, 1960).
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subsidiary had been liquidated, Judge Magruder allowed a carryback of a
postliquidation loss to a prior taxable year of the liquidated subsidiary; the
loss was attributable to the business formerly conducted by the subsidary.40°
While this particular holding may have been reversed as to post-1954 tax-
able years by section 381 (b) (3),401 conceptually it would support a carryfor-
ward of that portion of a parent's loss attributable to the business subsequently
conducted by the subsidiary, assuming a tax-free formation of a subsidiary to
be the converse of a tax-free liquidation of a subsidiary.402 If Libson-Donovan
is inapplicable, the parent will retain the entire carryforward, even though
the carryforward is applied to income produced by a business different from
the loss business. Thus the entity theory of New Colonial would be per-
petuated.403
400. 261 F.2d 470 (1st Cir. 1958), discussed in text accompanying notes 125-30 stupra.
401. The statement in text assumes that the Donovan holding was not dependent upon
the fact that a consolidated return has been filed in the carryback year. Actually, on the
precise facts of Donovan, § 381(b) (3) has no applicability since that section, in terms,
applies only where separate returns have been filed in the carryback year.
402. Where the basis of assets received is determined under § 334(b) (1), this assump-
tion does not seem unwarranted since the usual elimination of "earnings and profits" and
step-up or -down of basis does not occur. And the underlying theory of both § 351 and
§ 332 seems to be essentially the same--changes of the form of doing business which are
without substance should not be impeded by tax considerations.
Since the only basis for inheritance of the carryover by the subsidiary would be Libson,
that case will obviously not restrict the deductibility of the carryover by the subsidiary.
And § 382(b) is inapplicable since § 351 exchanges are not among those described in §
381 (a) (2). Section 382(a) would not apply because no purchase of, or decrease in, the
subsidiary's stock has occurred.
What is the status of a loss sustained in the first taxable year of a subsidiary
formed to operate one of two profitable businesses formerly operated by the parent? Will
a carryback against income of the parent attributable to that business in prediviston tax-
able years be allowed? Section 381(b) (3) does not preclude such a carryback because
§ 381 does not apply to § 351 transactions. Arguably, under Libson and Donovan, carry-
forwards and carrybacks against income from the business to which the loss is attribut-
able are permitted so long as the. transaction which separated the business from the
loss (or profitable) entity was tax free. And Rev. Rid. 59-395, although expressly
limited to corporate combinations by statutory merger or consolidation, see text accompany-
ing note 123 supra, could easily be extended to permit carryovers after any tax-free
transaction.
403. This would be the converse of Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.38 1 (c) (1)-1 (b), 25
Fed. Reg. 758 (Jan. 29, 1960): if the parent corporation into which a subsidiary is
liquidated under § 332 and § 334(b) (1) can carryback a postliquidation loss agaiinst income
of the parent in preliquidation taxable years without regard to changes in business or
income producing property, presumably a parent must carry forward a loss from a taxable
year prior to the formation of a subsidiary to its own taxable years after the organization
of a subsidiary. It is possible, however, that Libsan may be a one-way street. The sub-
sidiary does not inherit any portion of the parent's carryforward and the parent itself
may carry forward its own losses only to the extent of income from the business or income
producing property to which the loss is attributable.
If the entity theory is retained and the parent must carry forward the loss against
its future income, its carryforward might be lost under § 3 8 2 (a). If 50% of its stock
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Spin-Oifs
After formation of a subsidiary, the stock of the subsidiary may be distributed
to the parent's shareholders in a nontaxable spin-off.40 - Unless Libson trans-
ferred the carryover when the subsidiary Nwas formed, the loss corporation
will retain the entire carryover. If the subsidiary succeeded to a portion of the
carryover, the change of ownership occasioned by the subsequent distribution
of its stock will not bring section 382(a) into play. When, as in this case,
the basis of acquired stock is not "cost,"4 0 5 the acquisition is not a "purclMse"
within the meaning of section 382(a) (4). Additionally, under the constructive
ownership rules of section 318 incorporated in and modified by section 382(a)-
(3) the stock owned by the parent is attributed to its shareholders, so that
distribution is not a "purchase." 400
Stock of an existing subsidiary may also be spun-off tax free.40 7 If only
the parent has a loss carryover, the distribution of the subsidiary's stock will
have no carryover consequences. 408 Even if the subsidiary itself has a loss
changed hands by purchase within the two years preceding the end of the taxable year
during which the formation of the subsidiary occurred, and the business acquired by the
subsidiary was more than "a minor portion" of the pre-change-of-ownership business,
see text accompanying note 268 supra, the tests of § 382 (a) would be met.
404. "A spin-off is a distribution by one corporation of the stock of a subsidiary cor-
poration." Birx-mm 32. This distribution to the shareholders of the parent is tax free if
the detailed requirements of § 355 are met. The basis of the subsidiary's stock is deter-
mined under § 358(a) (1) assisted by § 358(c) ; the pre-spin-off basis of the parent cor-
poration's stock is allocated between parent stock and subsidiary stock in proportion to
the fair market value of each corporation. See BirruKn 349. See generally id. at 321-56.
This section of the Comment will discuss only pro rata spin-offs. The carryuver con-
sequences of disproportionate distributions of stock of a subsidiary will be similar to the
effects of nonpro rata split-offs and split-ups, discussed in text accompanying notes 420-21,
427-33 infra.
405. See note 404 supra.
406. Moreover, § 382 (a) probably does not apply where the corporation claiming
the deduction is not the same entity which sustained the loss. See note 372 mspra. The
commencement of a new business by the subsidiary would not affect its inherited carry-
over since Libson will allow the carryforward only to the extent the income against which
the loss is sought to be offset is attributable to the business which produced the loss.
It may seem anomalous to suggest that § 3,87(a) could ever apply to a carryover which
owes its existence solely to Libson, and hence to the continuation of "substantially the
same business." But it may be possible to satisfy the Libson test and yet run afoul of
the slightly different continuity of business test of § 382(a). For example, if the spun-off
subsidiary abandoned one-half of its business, Libson as interpreted by Rev. RuL. 59-395
would allow one half of the carryover while, under the Senate Report interpretation of §
382(a), see text at note 268 supra, would disallow the carryover in full. Compare the
hypothetical in text following note 272 supra.
407. Such a distribution qualifies under § 355 by virtue of § 355(a) (2) (C) even though
the distribution is not pursuant to a plan of reorganization within the meaning of § 3b8-
(a) (1) (D).
408. The ownership of the parent remains unchanged so that § 382(a) will be inap-
plicable even if the losing business is subsequently discontinued.
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carryover, the distribution itself will not ordinarily affect the deductibility
of the subsidiary's carryover. Section 382(a) is again inapplicable because,
though stock has changed hands, there has been no "purchase." On the other
hand, the possibility persists that Libson may be applied to a single corporation
if both ownership and business of the existing subsidiary have been changed.4 9
If spinning-off the stock of a newly formed subsidiary or an existing sub-
sidiary should fail to qualify for nonrecognition treatment under section 355,
the distribution of the subsidiary's stock would be treated as a distribution in
kind under section 301, and therefore a dividend to the extent of current or
post-1913 earnings and profits 41 0 -possibly a "purchase" for 382 (a) purposes.
Nevertheless, the constructive ownership rules of section 382(a) attribute
the parent's stock to its shareholders and preclude even taxable distributions
from being classified as "purchases."
Split-Offs
An alternative device for dividing several businesses among more than
one corporation is the split-off. One form of this transaction involves the for-
mation of a subsidiary followed by a pro rata tax-free exchange of the sub-
sidiary's stock for a portion of the parent's own stock.411 Both corporations are
then owned by the original shareholders in the same proportion. After forma-
tion of a subsidiary by a loss corporation, Libson may permit the split-off cor-
poration to deduct that portion of the parent's loss carryforward attributable
to the business transferred to the split-off corporation.4 12 Section 382(a)
will not prevent transfer of the carryforward, for the same reasons applicable
to the tax-free spin-off. Likewise, the split-off of an existing subsidiary will be
treated the same as its spin-off counterpart.
At times a non pro rata split-off may be used to resolve a shareholder dis-
pute.413 Assume that A and B each own 50 per cent of X Corporation which
has a subsidiary, Y Corporation, each operating an active business for the past
five years. X Corporation can exchange all the Y stock for B's one half interest
in X in a tax free transaction qualifying under section 355. After the exchange
the two corporations are owned by different shareholders. If X, the former
parent corporation has a carryforward, section 382(a) may come into play
should that corporation fail to continue the pre-split-off business, whether or
not the split-off qualifies as tax free under section 355; if the bought-out share-
holder originally owned 50 per cent or more of the former parent, the remain-
409. See notes 108-18 supra and accompanying text.
410. BiTTxER 353.
411. See BirrRn 322. The distribution will be nontaxable if the requirements of § 355
are met. See generally id. at 321-56.
412. See notes 401-03 supra and accompanying text.
413. See BlrrxER 321.
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ing shareholder of the loss corporation will have increased his ownership at
least 50 percentage points by virtue of a decrease in outstanding stock of the
former parent. Nothing in section 382(a) requires that the decrease be attribut-
able to a taxable transaction.4 4
If the existing subsidiary is a loss corporation, complex carryover problems
will occur if its pre-split-off business is not continued. If the split-off qualifies
under section 355, section 382(a) will not apply, because there has been no
purchase. When the split-off is taxable, the carryover consequences are less
dear. Of course if the bought-out shareholder owned more than 50 per cent
of the former parent, section 382(a) cannot apply because of its constructive
ownership rules.41 5 But if he owned 50 per cent or less of the former parent,
less than 50 per cent of the subsidiary's stock Nas attributable to him before
the split-off and his ownership of the former subsidiary will increase by 50
per cent or more as a result of the split-off. Section 382(a) wil disallow the
carryover if this 50 per cent increase was attributable to a "purchase."
When a split-off fails to qualify under section 355, the exchange is presumably
treated as a redemption, the tax consequences of which would be determined
by sections 302 and 346. Under these sections, the distribution would be treated
either as a dividend, or a payment in exchange for the former parent's stock.410
If treated as a dividend, the basis of the newly acquired stock of the former
subsidiary would ordinarily be fair market value 417 Since section 382(a) (4)
defines "purchase" as the acquisition of stock the basis of which is determined
solely by its "cost," the acquisition as a dividend in kind probably would qualify
as a "purchase." 4' 8 Alternatively, because a non pro rata split-off often involves
complete termination of the bought out shareholder's interests in the former
parent, the newly acquired stock will, under section 302(b) (3), often be treated
as received in payment for the stock surrendered. In this case, the acquisition
more closely resembles a "purchase." The basis of the split-off corporation's
stock will bethe fair market value of the stock given up; since section 302(b) (3)
attempts to reconcile the tax treatment of certain redemptions with the tax
treatment of a sale of a shareholder's entire interest, arguably the basis for
414. Section 382(a) (1) (B) (ii) refers only to "a decrease." This is somewhat puzzling
in view of the exemption of nontaxable acquisitions and acquisitions from related persons
in § 382(a) (4)'s definition of "purchase."
415. In fact, the bought-out shareholder's ownership of the loss subsidiary will increase
by 100%. But by virtue of § 382(a) (3), incorporating the attribution rules of § 318
(without the 50% limitation of § 318(a) (C)), the bought-out shareholders w'ill be treated
as owning the subsidiary's stock in proportion to his ownership of the parent. Since he
owns more than 50% of the parent, he constructively owned more than 50% of the sub-
sidiary before the split-off; hence acquisition of 100% ownership later will not increase
his total ownership by the required 50 percentage points.
416. See Brrrm 356. See generally id. at 208-45.
417. § 301(d). See Brrr=u 162, 163.
418. See Greenbaum, The Basis of Property Shall Be The Cost of Such Property:
How is Cost Defined?, 3 TAX L. Rr. 351, 375-76 (1948).
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the newly acquired stock is "cost"419 and section 382(a) is applicable. Laying
aside the section 382 (a) argument, the Service might also argue for disallowance
of the carryover under the Libson-Mill Ridge theory, on the ground that both
the business and ownership have changed.
A non pro rata split-off may also be utilized in a single corporation which
operates two businesses. For example, A and B each own 50 per cent of X
Corporation which has conducted two active -trades or businesses--steel manu-
facturing and grocery retailing-for the five preceding years and has a loss carry-
forward partially attributAble to each business. X Corporation can exchange
the assets of the grocery business for all the stock of a newly organized corpora-
tion, Y, and then exchange all the Y stock for B's one half interest in X in a
transaction qualifying under section 355. Y Corporation, if it continued the
grocery business, might inherit under Libson that portion of X's carryforward
attributable to the grocery business. Libson, as interpreted by the "asset"
test of Rev. Rul. 59-395, would presumably allow the transfer of part of the
carryover even though some of the grocery business was discontinued or
changed. Whether or not the split-off qualifies as tax free under section 355,
section 382(a) would probably not affect Y Corporation's carryover, because
that section, 'by its own terms, seems inapplicable when the corporation claim-
ing the deduction is not the entity which sustained the loss ;420 if section 382(a)
were applicable, the issue of "purchase" would still exist, governed by the
factors discussed in the previous paragraph. The former parent corporation,
X, might lose its proportionate share of the carryover under section 382(a).
A, X's sole shareholder, has increased his ownership 50 percentage points
'by virtue of the "decrease" in X's outstanding stock. By transferring the
assets of the grocery business, X Corporation has probably failed the continuity-
of-business test 'under section 382 (a),421 and the carryover will be disallowed.
The result, though crude, may be justified if the only alternative under section
382(a)'s all-or-nothing test is to allow the carryover in full.
Split-ups
Another technique for corporate division is the split-up. Two subsidiaries
may be -formed by exchanging assets for the stock of two newly organized
419. See BITrKER 242 & n.35. If the redemption failed to qualify under § 302(b) (3)
but nevertheless was nondividend redemption under §§ 302(b) (3) or (b) (2), the same
result would presumably follow.
Should the redemption qualify as a partial liquidation under §§ 346(a) (2) or (b), the
basis of the stock received would be its fair market value by virtue of § 334(a) ; the
determination of whether such stock has a basis of "cost" would be the same as that
presented if the stock were received as a dividend in kind. See notes 417-18 supra and
accompanying text.
420. See note 372 s'pra.
421. Presumably, X corporation's "business" before the split-off was steel and grocery
retailing. Afterward, the business is steel alone.
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corporations followed by a pro rata exchange of the newly acquired stock for
the stock of the original corporation thereby liquidating that company.4 22
Since the formation of the subsidiaries is tax free under section 351 or as a (D)
reorganization, Libson-Donovan may permit the transfer of all or part of a
loss carryover of the original corporation."23 If not, the carryover %ill be
entirely lost since the loss entity does not survive the split-up.F
The stock of existing subsidiaries may also be distributed in a pro rata split-
up by a complete liquidation of the parent corporation. If the parent has a
loss carryforward and prior to the liquidation contributes assets to one or
more subsidiaries, Libson will probably determine whether any portion of the
carryover is transferred to the acquiring subsidiary. If the parent has a loss
carryforward but distributes its assets to shareholders rather than transferring
them to the existing subsidiaries, presumably its carryover will be lost.42 6 Where
any one or more of the existing subsidiaries has a carryover, the pro rata distri-
bution of its stock will ordinarily not bring section 382(a) into play even if the
predistribution business is discontinued. The results do not depend upon quali-
fication of'the shareholder exchange under section 355, because in either case the
attribution rules will take the acquisition out of section 382 (a) (4)'s definition
of a "purchase."
Even if the exchange of the existing subsidiaries' stock is non pro rata, no
subsidiary's carryover will be affected by section 382(a) so long as the trans-
422. The distribution of the subsidiary's stock will be nonta.xable if the requirements
of § 355 are met. See generally BrrrimR 321-56.
423. In Rev. RUl. 56-373, 1956-2 Cum. BuLL 217, the Internal Revenue Service held
that a carryover was not deductible by either of two newly organized subsidiaries wh'ise
stock was distributed nonpro rata in a § 355 transaction. This ruling antedate; Lihson
and Domwvan, however, and may, therefore, no longer be valid. Moreover, the holding
of the ruling seems to be based on a negative inference from § 381 (a) (2) : since carryovers
are inherited by the acquiring corporation in a (D) reorganization if the requirements
of § 354(b) are met, carryovers are not inherited by the acquiring corporations in a (D)
reorganizations wiless § 354(b) is complied with. This basis of the ruling contravenes
the express statement by the Senate Finance Committee, see note 399 supra, and Pru.
posed Treas. Reg. § 1.381 (a)-l(b) (3), 25 Fed. Reg. 757 (Jan. 29, 1960), that "no in-
ference is to be drawn from the provisions of section 331 as to whether any item or tax
attribute shall be taken -into account without regard to that section." Since the Pruposed
Regulations postdate Rev. RiiL 59-375, the Service may have changed its mind, at least
as to the reasoning of the ruling, if not its result.
If Libson does permit a portion of the parent's carryover to be inherited by the sub-
sidiary, § 382(a) will not be applicable because of the constructive ownership rules.
424. This is the converse of Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c) (1)-1 (b), example 2,
25 Fed. Reg. 758 (Jan. 29, 1960).
425. This transfer would be tax free as a contribution to capital, or under § 351 if
some new stock or securities were received, and therefore a broad reading of Donovars
might allow transfer of the carryover. See note 402 supra and accompanying text.
426. Since no subsidiary will acquire the assets to which the loss is attributable,
Libsdn would not permit any transfer of the carryover.
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action qualifies under section 355. The newly acquired stock will take the basis
of the stock given up,427 and will not have been "purchased." But if, after
a taxable split-up, a loss subsidiary is owned by ten or less shareholders who
originally owned 50 per cent or less of the parent, section 382(a) may apply
if the pre-split-up business is discontinued. 425 A split-up which fails to meet
the requirements of section 355 may be treated as a taxable complete liquidation
of the parent.429 Thus, stock received is treated as received in "full payment
in exchange for the stock" surrendered. 43 0 The basis of the newly acquired
stock will therefore be the fair market value of the stock given up.4"8 Since
the tax treatment of complete liquidations was intended to comport with the
tax treatment of sales to third parties,4 2 the basis of the newly acquired stock
arguably is "cost," 483 and thus 50 or more percentage points in value of the loss
subsidiary's stock has changed hands as a result of a "purchase."
CONCLUSION
The original common law carryover cases such as New Colonial and Stanton
did not rationally reflect carryover policies because they were based on the
formalities of corporate ilaw. Libson seems to represent an attempt by the Su-
preme Court to focus on what the Court thought were the policies of the carry-
over, but the opinion was so broadly phrased as -to provide little aid in future
cases. Nor did the congressional foray into the carryover area clarify the con-
fusion. For example, section 382 (a) deals with purchases of loss corporations by
outsiders. Why Congress did not deal in more detail with purchases of profitable
businesses by loss corporations is not clear.43 4 Furthermore, the 1954 Code does
not reflect a unified view of carryovers; different sections use different criteria
to test the availability of the carryover. For instance, changes in ownership
plus changes in business, changes in ownership alone, and price paid for the
carryover are the tests used in various places43 5 Also, application of the Code
427. § 358(a) (1).
428. The new owners of the loss subsidiary will have acquired more than 50 per-
centage points of that corporation's stock from a person the ownership of whose stock
would not be attributed to those shareholders before the liquidation.
429. S e -BirrTxER 354-55.
430. See § 331(a) (1).
431. § 334(a).
432. See BrrrxE 255.
433. See note 419 supra and accompanying -text.
434. Even the Subchapter C Advisory Group failed to deal with this situation in their
Tecommendations for statutory revision of § 382. See 1959 Hearings 424; SUIICIIAPTER C
ADVISORY GRoup, RE VIsED REPORT 567-73 (1958). And some commentators have suggested
that serious abuse exists where loss corporations acquire profitable businesses. See 1950
Hearings 876 (statement of Stanley H. Ruttenberg) ; id. at 887-88, 907-08, 915 (statement
of George E. Lent).
435. 0§ 382(a), 382(b), and 269(c) respectively.
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to divisive reorganizations illustrates the automatic nature of the sections, which
operate indiscriminately without regard to any tax avoidance purpose. The
inconsistencies and omissions of 'both statutory and case law governing carry-
overs will not be resolved by da hoc solutions drafted in response to particular
problems. A thorough reexamination and reevaluation of the averaging concept
in our present tax system is in order.
